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C O N C L U S I O N  258
ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with identifying and 
understanding the typical behaviour of the early Tudor 
nobility, particularly in relation to military activity.
It is also an attempt to describe that behaviour without 
following the usual practice of categorising it as declining 
chivalry and the emergence of modern attitudes. Instead,
I suggest that insofar as there was a shared area of ideas 
and behaviour amongst the nobles, that behaviour was in 
large part an outcome of their position in society as a 
military elite. Because the nobles formed a military elite, 
the behaviour of individuals in both military and civilian 
life was, to a major degree, shaped by the expectation that 
their typical actions would be the same as those of the 
leaders of the army. Their peacetime behaviour was, therefore, 
often related to the position occupied in the army by nobles, 
and, at the same time, behavioural characteristics associated 
with the noble in his civilian life frequently intruded into 
war situations.
An outcome of the identity between the noble as a 
civilian and as a soldier was that the noble tended to regard 
the army as the proper sphere in which to display his select 
status, rather than seeing the army merely as an instrument 
of the nation or the government. Nobles were often concerned 
to be seen to be acting in a manner befitting their rank, even 
in times of great stress and danger. Because these typical 
activities associated with the noble might emphasise somewhat 
resource wasting actions, their presence helped make warfare 
seem even less efficient than it already was.
At the same time, there were numerous traditionally 
based types of behaviour associated with the military elite, 
which many writers have been content to label as chivalry.
These were adopted by the nobles as aspects of the typical 
behaviour of their group. But it would be incorrect to claim 
that these characteristics alone made up the main influence 
on the ideas and actions of the early Tudor nobility.
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A suit of armour made by Germans, usually 
of three-quarter length.
A handgun.
Cloth or metal protection for horses.
One of the three divisions of an army.
The basic infantry unit of varying size 
but usually around 10 0 men, commanded by 
a-captain and deputy captain.
Armour similar to Almain rivets, worn by 
demi-lances and front ranks of infantry.
Cavalry which was not as heavily armed as 
men at arms.
Armour, or equipment for horses.
Reinforced cloth coat.
Lightly armoured cavalry equipped with 
the relatively light boar spear.
Individual combat between men at arms.
A cavalry weapon or a formation of 
cavalry containing heavy and light 
horsemen in varying numbers. Also known 
as a spear.
Fully armoured cavalryman, usually of 
noble birth, equipped with weapons such 
as heavy lance, sword and mace, and riding 
a charger which was often barded.
Also known as Border horse or javelins. 
Light horsemen recruited from the northern 
marches.
A melee of numerous men at arms. Also 
an occasion on which jousts and melees 
take place.
One of the three divisions of an army: 
Vaward (vanguard), Midward (main battle 
or king's ward) and Rearward (rearguard).
I cannot, to proove my descent, bring forth the Images 
of my Ancestors, their Triumphs, their Consulships; but 
if neede be, I can shew Launces, my Ensigne, Caparisons, 
and other such warlike implements, besides a number of ^
scarres upon my breast: these are my Images, my Nobilitie...
2Les armes ennoblissent 1'omme...
1. Marius Maximus quoted by H.Peacham, The Compleat 
Gentleman (1622) (Amsterdam, 1968) , p.17.
2. Le Jouvencel par Jean de Bueil (c.1450) ed .L .Lecestre 




This is an examination of the ways in which the 
values and attitudes of a sixteenth century elite shaped 
and were shaped by contemporary warfare. It was inspired 
by a dissatisfaction with the usual characterizations of 
noble behaviour as it occurred in early sixteenth century 
England. Attempts to describe the military behaviour of 
nobles have generally begun from a single assumption. This 
is the idea that the concept of chivalry was not, for the 
sixteenth century, an appropriate way of representing noble 
behaviour, whereas chivalry had been a satisfactory means 
by which to describe noble behaviour of the previous half a 
millenium. Chivalry, according to this premise, was an aspect 
of noble behaviour which was unique to the medieval period.
But it had no relevance to, the military reality of the 
renaissance or early modern period.
Sixteenth century chivalry was, generally speaking, 
a luxurious game to charm the leisure of a courtly 
society., no longer troubled by the older military 
obligation of the order. ^
Where some of its features did survive into the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, therefore, they were 
anachronisms or isolated incidents without any significant 
effect on the actions of nobles or on society as a whole.
The early sixteenth century was, rather, part of the period 
when nobles began to act according to modern tenets, which 
might be broadly typified as rationality, realism, ruthlessness 
and a kind of new middle class practicality. This was the 
image of Henry VIII and his era portrayed in A.F. Pollard's 
biography of the second Tudor monarch.
/ 2 . . .
1. R.L.Kilgour, The Decline of Chivalry as Shown in the French 
Literature of the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass.,1937), 
p. 23.
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He ruled in a ruthless age with a ruthless hand, 
he dealt with a violent crisis by methods of blood 
and iron, and his measures were crowned with 
whatever sanction worldly success can give. He is 
Machiavelli's Prince in action.1
There have been many variations on this theme of
the decay of a chivalric style of life and its replacement
in the early sixteenth century by a novel, more modern, ideal
of noble behaviour. A number of historians have seen this
new ideal as the outcome of the influence of humanists, whose
emphasis on learning encouraged the creation of a Tudor
nobility which was more learned in literature than in war.
According to the only historian who has so far published an
extensive study of the decline of English chivalry, A.B.Ferguson,
the new humanist ideal was able to flourish and grow because
decadent chivalry no longer had any connection with the real
2world, and was simply the romantic memory of a past age.
All of these representations of the context of the 
early sixteenth century English nobility are thus based on 
the idea that there was something essentially new about the 
era. Most of them also subscribe to the proposition that 
the old way of life identified as chivalry, was decadent and 
all but extinct. This has been a longstanding tenet amongst 
historians, which probably had its most powerful formulation
/3. . .
1. A.F.Pollard, Henry VIII new ed. (London, 1905), p.440, 
cf. p .363.
2. A.B.Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry. 
Studies in the Decline and Transformation of Chivalric 
Idealism (Durham, 1960), pp. 75 and ix,*cf,F. Caspari, 
Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England (Chicago, 
1954),p.9; R.P.Adams, The Better Part of Valor. More, 
Erasmus, Colet, and Vives, on Humanism, War, and Peace,
1496-1535 (Seattle, 1962) , Chapter Two, passim.
from the pen of Johan Huizinga, whose ideas and language can 
be found informing virtually all subsequent discussions of 
chivalry.^
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But more recently there has been a minor reaction
amongst historians, some of whom have begun to question the2idea of a decline of chivalry during the late middle ages.
One of these, J.J.Scarisbrick, has argued that chivalry 
continued to be the significant influence on noble behaviour 
even during the reign of Henry VIII, and particularly on the 
king himself. Whereas Pollard attributed Henry's involvement 
in the 1544 war to the steady evolution of a rational and 
orderly royal foreign policy which was a reflection of the 
monarch's Machiavellian character, Scarisbrick saw Henry's
/4. ..
1. J.Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages. A Study of the 
Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the 
Netherlands in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries 
(1919) trans. F.Hopman (Harmondsworth, 1972), Chs.Four- 
Eight , passim; cf..Kilgour, Decline of Chivalry, p. 8 and 
passim; Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry, 
p.ix and passim. Discussions of the decline of chivalry 
may also be found in R.Barber, The Knight and Chivalry 
(London, 1974), p.300; M.H.Keen, The Laws of War in the 
Late Middle Ages (London, 1965), p.246; S.Painter,
French Chivalry. Chivalric Ideas and Practices in Medieval 
France (Baltimore, 1966), p.60; F.J.C.Hearnshaw, "Chivalry 
and Its Place in History", in Chivalry ed. E.Prestage,
pp.25-7; R.Rudorff, The Knights and Their World (London, 
1974), p.10; S .Shellabarger, The Chevalier Bayard: A Study 
in Fading Chivalry (London, 1929), p.22.
2. For example, J.Barnie, War in Medieval Society. Social 
Values and the Hundred Years War 1337-99 (London,1974), 
pp.56-8. Barnie is particularly critical of the 
assumption made by Huizinga that chivalry became merely
a game or an illusion because it did not answer to the ideals 
formulated for it by the Church or courtly romances.
reasons for involvement in the wars of both 1513 and 1544 
as remaining basically chivalric.
...in reality his sovereign concern remained what 
it had been at the beginning, namely, some "notable 
enterprise" against France.^
But there are major difficulties with either of 
these two ways of describing early sixteenth century noble 
military behaviour: that is, the replacement of decadent 
chivalry by a modern lifestyle, or, alternatively, of the 
continuation of chivalry as the predominant behavioural 
characteristic of the nobility.
In the former case, the proponents of the theory 
of decline admit that there was a continuation of many 
aspects of the way of life which they have identified as 
chivalric, although they explain this by arguing that the 
forms of chivalry survived while divorced from reality.
Whether this was in fact the case is a matter for further 
discussion.
At the same time, however, the concept of chivalry, 
by itself, does not seem to be an entirely adequate means of 
depicting the way of life of the early sixteenth century 
nobility. Chivalry is, for one thing, an extremely 
indistinct idea which frustrates any attempt to use it in 
any precise way, although this has not deterred its frequent 
employment by historians as a convenient label for the actions 
and attitudes of groups of people during many centuries
2throughout widely differing societies in Europe and Asia. 
Barnie, in his recent attempt to define chivalry as it applied 
to a particular group of nobles during one era in medieval 
history, concluded that even at its simplest level it was a
/5. . .
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1. J .J .Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), pp.424-5.
2. It has even been used to describe events in China. See 
J.J.Y.Liu, The Chinese Knight Errant (London, 1967).
"...confusing and contradictory code which cannot be
confined within a single coherent pattern." There have
been numerous different and often conflicting definitions
of chivalry, both from modern and contemporary theorists/
none of which is completely satisfactory. Highly specific
definitions, such as the idea that chivalry was a clearly
formulated code of behaviour, do not encompass the widely
varying types of distinctively noble behaviour manifested
throughout the centuries. There simply never was a single
recognised and observed European code of chivalry. But,
on the other hand, the more general definitions of chivalry,
such as the idea that it was the whole knightly system of
the middle ages with its religious, moral and social codes
and customs, or that it was both a historical movement and
a poetic fiction, are too broad to cast much light on the
2recorded details of noble life.
It would appear that neither of the two theories 
outlined above - of the decline or the continuation of 
chivalry - is adequate as a means by which to understand 
noble behaviour during the early sixteenth century, 
particularly in the military sphere.
Instead, I would propose trying a different 
perspective, attempting to shed some light on the behaviour 
of nobles using models constructed by social scientists.
The most relevant of these to this study concern themselves 
with the examination of elites, those groups which,‘in any 
society, dominate positions of influence and decision making.
/ 6 . . .
- 5 -
1. Barnie, War in Medieval Society, p.70.
2. Barnie, for example, admits that it is extremely 
difficult to evaluate the nature and significance of 
chivalry in late medieval society, or how seriously 
it was taken as a basis for social and political 
behaviour. Ibid., p.56.
It has been suggested that such elites employ particular
types of behavioural characteristics. These characteristics,
which include ways of understanding the world, and certain
expectations about the way things should be done, make up
a kind of code of the elite, to which all its members are
required to adhere. Adherence to such characteristics, and
the sharing of powers and abilities possessed by the group,
mark the members of the elite. They allow people, both
inside and outside the elite, to determine who is a member
of the group, and accord the person an appropriate degree
2of status. Such status is also known as honour, which has 
been defined as both a claim and a right to an estimation
3of worth by society.
The traits by which a member of the elite may be 
recognized include characteristics such as unflinching 
bravery, inevitably possessed even by the youngest and
4weakest members of the group.
They may also include the right to perform certain 
actions or to participate in certain institutions, rights 
that are possessed only by members of the elite.
- 6 -
/7...
1. H .D .Lasswell, D.Lerner and C.E .Rothwell, The Comparative 
Study of Elites. An Introduction and Bibliography 
(Stanford, 1954,) p. 12.
2. P.L.Berger, B.Berger and H.Kellner, The Homeless Mind. 
Modernization and Consciousness (Harmondsworth, 1973), p.80.
3. J .Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status" ,in Honour and 
Shame ed. J .G.Peristiany, p.21.
4. ...well born persons of good family are courageous enough 
from childhood to think little of their own lives when 
honor calls them to put themselves in danger.
The Huguenot Wars ed.J.Coudy(Philadelphia, 1969),p.162: 
Viscount de Thurenne on the reasons for his bravery.
It is as a result of this practice that members 
of the elite may act in a way in certain situations which 
may not always appear to be most rational and reasonable 
from the viewpoint of an observer. Depending on the degree 
to which the individual is influenced by the demands of 
his desire to be a member of the elite, he will perform 
actions which may place him and others in great jeopardy, 
or cost him a great deal of time, money and effort."*-
Each of these considerations would appear to 
correspond with.elements of the behaviour of the Tudor 
nobility. It was an elite group, recognised by society 
through both formal and informal means as being above the 
common run. And it appears to have been of a particular 
kind of elite, as identified by the social sciences. This 
is the military elite, which controls the armed forces.
And further than that, it was an aristrocratic military 
elite, as defined by M.Janowitz. This differs from other 
types of military elites in a number of ways, particularly 
in that, because the leading soldiers are the same men who 
control government and head society, there is an identity 
of interest between aristocratic and military groups. This 
might be compared to the situation where, in a democratic 
military elite, there is a clear differentiation between 
those who control the army and those who lead society and 
run the government. In the democratic state, the soldier 
is a professional who fights out of a sense of professional 
duty rather than because he agrees with the goals of 
civilian men. In the aristocractic state, however, birth,
/ 8 . . .
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1. Lasswell et a_l; The Comparative Study of Elites, p. 11.
family connection and common ideology ensure that the 
motivations and aims of the military and civilian 
authorities are the same thing.^ In other words, there 
is a continuity of thought, behaviour and attitudes in 
peace and war time activities of the elite, in this case 
the nobles of early Tudor England. This becomes of 
importance when an attempt is made to distinguish what 
were the main aspects of that code of the elite by which 
the members of the Tudor elite were defined. This, in 
turn, may also indicate why the nobles behaved as they 
did during war, for their actions did not always accord 
with those which one might expect to operate in Pollard's 
ruthless, Machiavellian world. It may also show why 
institutions such as orders of knighthood continued to 
exist, and how, in fact, they were very much a part of 
contemporary reality, directly influencing, for example, 
the conduct of war.
Tudor nobles were members of an elite. They lived 
in a world of fierce competition and inter-family rivalry, 
especially at court. As a result of both these considerations 
they frequently needed to demonstrate their status as members 
of the elite, or even to improve that status. They 
expressed this motivation as a concern for their honour.
But they were also a special kind of elite, a military elite 
which also controlled other areas of society such as 
government and finance. As a military elite, a group 
supremely important in war as well as civilian life, it 
followed that the possession of military power, and the badges 
of military eminence, were mairks of the nobility and status 
of an individual. The performance of particular military 
tasks, and the possession of high rank in the army, became
-  8 -
/9
1. M.Janowitz, "Military Elites and the Study of War", in 
War Studies ed. L.Bramson and G.W.Goethals, p.339.
ways in which the individual made his claim to membership 
of the nobility, and by which society was able to recognise 
him as noble, both in civilian and military situations.
As it happened, many of these badges of military 
eminence were inherited from the previous age, such as the 
honour of knighthood, and many had been associated with the 
concept of chivalry. But, despite the claims by historians 
that such aspects of behaviour were by this time decadent 
and without contact with reality, the Tudor nobles adopted 
them as part of the code of their elite, aspects of the 
group of characteristics that identified the noble. Membership 
of an order of knighthood, or participation in a tournament, 
clearly marked members of the elite.
But those elements of the noble lifestyle which 
some may wish to categorise as chivalric were not the sole 
features of the lifestyle of the Tudor nobility. Numerous 
other aspects of society also made up the group of 
characteristics associated with the elite, and influenced 
their behaviour in war. The presence or absence of so-called 
chivalry does not by itself make clear the reasons for noble 
behaviour. Rather, to understand noble military lifestyles 
it is necessary to see them as an outcome of the participation 
of nobles in society in general. It is possible in the light 
of this to accept that nobles could have behaved in a wide 
variety of ways in both peace and war, including often in 
fashions that may seem, from an outside point of view, 
perhaps somewhat irrational.
It is also possible in this way to begin to 
understand the course taken by what have been labelled as 
chivalric institutions. They were not declining, or 
continuing unchanged from the previous centuries. Instead, 
they were being adapted to perform functions for society as 
aspects of the typical behaviour of the Tudor military elite.
-  9 -
/ 1 0 .
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Several considerations have prompted me to 
concentrate mainly on the records of military campaigns 
where possible in describing the Tudor nobility and its 
behaviour. Not least of these has been the desire to 
provide a balance, however limited, to the practice of 
many historians of the nobility of the late medieval period, 
who have often tended to focus their analysis on evidence 
from romances, treatises and other such sources which may 
perhaps be fairly represented as creative literature. The 
only two monographs in English entirely devoted to a study 
of the forms of aristocratic military behaviour during its 
so-called decline were deliberately confined to evidence 
supplied from such sources. Both authors assumed that there 
was a direct connection between the evidence of decline they 
found in these documents and the actual events and attitudes 
of the period. ^
I have tried to examine the military behaviour and
attitudes of the early sixteenth century as far as possible
2from the records of participants in campaigns. The documents 
in which nobles voiced their attitudes and recorded their 
practices fortunately survive in greater bulk than for 
previous centuries, although they are still quite sketchy.
At the same time, this study of the elite, has been 
centred basically on the events surrounding two wars, that 
of 1513 and of 1544. This was partly to keep the survey
/ 11 . . .
1. Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry; Kilgour, 
Decline of Chivalry, especially p.313, where he uses a poem 
in which a fictional knight is outwrestled by a monk as proof 
that the nobility of fifteenth century France were physically 
decadent.
2. Because this thesis was researched solely in Australia, I have 
been limited mainly to printed sources, and in particular to 
the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, the arrangement of which 
has been criticised by historians such as G.Elton, The Practic 
of History (Sydney, 1967) , pp.68-9.
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within manageable bounds. But the selection of these two 
dates was also founded on the consideration that the events 
contained enough similarities and differences to allow 
considerable comparison and contrast. The wars were widely 
enough separated in time for two generations of Englishmen 
to participate in them, and hence, to permit change to 
manifest itself, especially as the dates straddle an event 
which has been identified as of profound significance in 
shaping English society, the Reformation. Yet although 
separated by a generation, in an historical perspective they 
present a relatively specific and unified appearance, 
sufficient to permit an overall estimate of the nature of the 
elite at a particular time, that is, the first half of the 
sixteenth century.
The study has been confined to the English experience 
for similar reasons: otherwise the field of examination 
would become too large and too general.
The expeditions of 1513 and 1544 shared not only such 
characteristics as their theatre of operation and involvement 
of much the same countries in conflict. They were also the 
only two overseas campaigns in which Henry VIII participated 
personally. They are therefore the only opportunity to study 
the behaviour of the chief amongst the elite at war against 
a foreign backdrop. And, as an outcome of Henry's 
participation overseas, there was a great deal of letter writing 
between his person and the court, a matter of obvious benefit 
to the historian.
/ 1 2 .
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CHAPTER ONE
HENRY VIII'S MILITARY EXPEDITIONS, 1513 AND 1544: AN OUTLINE
The chapters that follow involve a detailed 
consideration of events surrounding the wars with France and 
Scotland in 1513 and 1544. In order to avoid repetition and 
confusion, a chronology and description of the wars, their 
backgrounds, their similarities and differences are set out in 
this chapter.'*'
The 1513 and 1544 campaigns involved actions on 
several fronts. These various actions were themselves the 
outcome of changing alliances and events throughout virtually 
the whole of Europe. During both campaigns England was 
simultaneously at war with France and Scotland and was at least 
nominally allied with Imperial German and Spanish armies. The 
invasion force of 1513 was landed at Calais and attacked several 
strong points in northern France, while at home another English 
force repulsed a Scottish invasion at Flodden. In 1544 there 
was an even larger two pronged attack by Imperial and English 
forces from eastern and northern France directed at Paris. 
Earlier in the same year an English army had ravaged southern 
Scotland, and subsequently a smaller expedition was sent to
2install one of Henry's Scottish adherents as ruler in the north.
/13. . .
1. It is perhaps also necessary to establish dates and movements 
correctly, as these are frequently stated incorrectly in both 
contemporary and modern resumes. Unless otherwise noted the 
description is based on either The Anqlica Historia of 
Polvdore Vergil A.D. 1485-1537 ed. D.Hay (Camden, Third Series 
LXXXIV) or E.Hall, Henry VIII ed. R.Grafton (1550), (2 vols, 
London,1904), hereunder as Vergil, Anglica Historia and Hall, 
Henry VIII. These have been supplemented particularly by 
Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of 
Henry VIII ed. J.S.Brewer et al (37 vols, London, 1862-1932), 
Vols I and XIX parts i and ii, hereunder as L .P .
2. See Map.




• St Omer's 
• Aire TournaLille
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The immediate background to the 1513 expedition was 
a series of abortive attempts by Henry to launch an effective 
attack on a Continental adversary. In a wider perspective the 
expedition was a minor part of the continuing struggle for 
dominance of southern Europe by several northern powers, a 
contest renewed in 1494 when Charles VIII of France invaded 
Italy. Kenry was merely one of a number of rulers who became 
involved in the constantly shifting alliances whicn were formed 
in the decades following this invasion, as the Koly Roman 
Emperor, France, Spain, the Papacy and numerous minor rulers 
fought for security or ascendancy. Intermingled with this was 
the current unease at incursions by the Ottomans, against whom 
a number of expeditions were launched, especially by Aragon. 
Henry’s first major involvement with war was when he despatched 
an army to fight the Moors in north Africa in 1511. The force 
was to have joined with the strength of Ferdinand of Aragon, 
Henry's father-in-law. But as was usual with Henry's 
alliances with Ferdinand, nothing came of the venture, for 
after a long delay Ferdinand eventually made a truce with the 
Moors and Henry's men sailed home. Other minor military 
ventures of the early years included the sending of a small 
army to aid the Emperor in his continuing war with the Duke 
of Cleves. In December 1512 Henry became a Crusader when 
Pope Julius II granted a plenary indulgence to anyone who 
fought for six months against Louis of France.'*' The papal 
incitement to English involvement in war was itself the direct 
outcome of the League of Cambrai, which had been formed in the 
year before Henry's accession, in December 1508. Julius, the 
Emperor Maximilian, Maximilian's heir the Infant Charles, King 
Ferdinand and Louis XII had joined to dismember the territory 
of Venice, an objective achieved when the Venetians were 
defeated in May 1509.
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After their victory the members broke up the League and 
realigned. By 1510 Rome, Venice and Aragon had joined against 
France. But by 1511 France began to get the better of the 
papacy, so a new Holy League was formed between Rome, England, 
Aragon, Venice and the Swiss. France was placed under a papal 
interdict, ostensibly because Louis called a Council at Pisa 
with his friends amongst the cardinals, who deposed Julius.
Open war between Rome and France culminated in the siege of 
Bologna, where Julius was trapped. An expedition to divert 
French attention from the Pope and Italy sailed from England 
in May 1512. It was to have been an attack on Guienne in 
concert with Ferdinand, and was to have been under the leader­
ship of the Marquis of Dorset, Thomas Grey. But after some 
minor skirmishes, the invasion came to a halt while Ferdinand 
used his army to invade Navarre. The soldiers felt that they 
had been duped by Aragon. Disgruntled and ill, they mutinied 
and forced their leaders to take them home, where Henry proved 
exceedingly angry.
During the years leading up to 1513 Ferdinand 
acquired a reputation amongst the English - and others - for 
untrustworthiness and self-seeking. He had failed to support 
papal forces during the siege of Bologna at a time when it 
appeared as if an equilibrium had been reached between the 
French and Italians. Instead of sending his army to aid 
Julius, he brought his men in Italy home. In 1512, having 
captured Navarre while the English waited around Bayonne, he 
proposed that instead of advancing into France, the English 
should join him on a campaign through Navarre to the Meditteranean.
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Dorset refused this offer, saying that such a campaign was 
outside his instructions. It was probably no great surprise 
therefore when Ferdinand finally deserted the English 
altogether during the planning for the 1513 invasion.
According to Vergil, Ferdinand reached a truce with France 
in order to secure his conquest of Navarre and to permit him 
to intervene in Italy if he saw the need or chance.'*'
The English expedition of the following year, 1513, 
was planned to make up for the disasters of 1511 and 1512.
All the organisational skill of the court was put into 
equipping a large army shipped to France by an unprecedented 
fleet. While this army was being raised Henry negotiated to 
enlist the lukewarm support of Maximilian and Ferdinand, while 
an English flotilla swept the Channel and ravaged Britanny.
This fleet was under the command of Admiral Edward Howard, 
son of Thomas Earl of Surrey.
Henry tried to retain the Emperor by bribery, 
offering 125,000 gold crowns through the agency of Maximilian's 
daughter, Margaret of Savoy, Regent of the Netherlands during 
the minority of Maximilian's nephew, the Infant Charles.
Margaret gave the consistent appearance of sympathy 
with the English, but her father Maximilian had his interest 
centred elsewhere, on war with Cleves and Venice. But when 
Ferdinand signed his truce in April 1513 and when Julius was 
replaced by the more pacific Leo, Henry's need for allies 
seem more crucial than ever, so negotiations pressed on. 
Maximilian was finally secured by bribery, but his support 
remained largely moral. He was impoverished by a lifetime of 
war, and was able to serve only as a private soldier - albeit 
an experienced general - under Henry's banner.
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While the preparation continued, Edward Howard 
attacked the coast of Brittany and engaged the French navy.
In August 1512, to the horror of both sides, the carrick 
The Cordeliere burned when grappling the English Regent, a 
ship captained by Sir Thomas Knyvet. There was great loss 
of noble life, and the French admiral, Rene de Clermont, was 
disgraced for fleeing from the fight, to be replaced by a 
prior of the Order of St.John, Pregent de Bidoux. The French 
fleet was then blockaded in Brest harbour during the early 
months of 1513. In March the English Admiral was killed 
during a vain attempt to board the blockaded fleet. The 
English fleet scattered for home, where Edward's brother 
Thomas - later Earl of Surrey and third Duke of Norfolk - 
took command. Thomas helped lead the 1544 expedition, together 
with his son Henry, Earl of Surrey and sometime favourite of 
Henry VIII.
England was not concerned merely with France at 
this time, however, as diplomats were nervously engaged with 
the Scottish problem. The English council was conscious that 
the Scots would almost certainly invade as soon as the 
English army sailed for France. James IV of Scotland and 
Henry were brothers-in-law, due to the Scottish king's 
marriage to Henry's sister Margaret. But the alliance was in 
itself a cause for hostility, as there was constant bickering 
over England's failure to pay Margaret's dowry. The English 
tried to use the long-delayed payment as a lever to ensure 
Scotland's quiescence, but it was obvious to all that the 
negotiations were of no avail. James had been expanding his 
armoury for years, building ships, buying harness and cannon, 
training his pikemen with the aid of French nobles, and 
toughening his own nobles in tournaments.
An additional cause of animosity was constant 
clashes between the ships of the two British kings, including 





In Italy, warfare was already in progress by the 
time Henry's men were nearly ready to leave England. The 
Duke of Milan, Maximilian Sforza, the Emperor's ally, 
surprised and defeated the French at Novara on 6 June 1513, 
his Swiss exterminating the lansknechts under the command 
of the veteran leader Louis de la Tremouille. This victory 
left the Swiss free to threaten the southern approaches to 
France when the invasion began in earnest in July. During 
the summer, Henry crossed to France with the English army, 
slowly advancing towards the city of Therouanne, inland from 
Boulogne. By the time Henry arrived before its walls, the 
leaders of the vanguard, George Talbot Earl of Shrewsbury and 
Charles Somerset Lord Herbert, had already invested the town. 
After meeting the Emperor at Therouanne amidst lavish 
spectacle, Henry took part in the battle of 16 August at 
nearby Guinegate, where, in a skirmish known as the Battle 
of Spurs, his cavalry routed the French nobility.
Once Therouanne had been captured and razed, Henry 
turned north east towards Flanders, passing near Lille 
where he was royally entertained by Margaret of Savoy. 
Eventually he reached Tournai, an important mercantile centre 
which was regarded as the key to England's approach to 
eastern France.
Henry had received Scotland's declaration of war 
while still before Therouanne. The Scots had assembled a 
huge army on 13 August at Edinburgh, a few days before their 
allies were defeated. They then marched south to devastate 
the eastern Marches. James met with success at first, 
capturing the Bishop of Durham's castle of Norham before 
advancing to Flodden Edge, also known as Branxton Moor, where 
he encamped and awaited the English. The Earl of Surrey, 
Thomas Howard the elder, a veteran of Bosworth, had been 
marshalling the English reserve forces since 22 July. The 
armies met at Flodden on 8 September, complete victory 
going to Surrey. James and most of his nobles were killed.
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Henry, rejoicing in the news of victory at Flodden, 
captured Tournai after a brief siege. Once he had set in 
motion the complicated business of occupying his prize and 
had taken part in numerous triumphal shows, he journeyed 
home from Calais on 21 October, promising to return with 
another army the following year. It was in fact 31 years 
before he once more led an army on the Continent.
Many of the elements that distinguished the 
campaign of 1513 were present during the summer of 1544, when 
Henry led his last overseas campaign. His enemies were much 
the same as in 1513, as were his allies. Once again an 
unusually large army sailed to France, accompanied, as in 
1513, by Henry and the magnificence of his court. The 
background to the campaign was also just as complicated as 
in the previous war.
But much had changed during the intervening years, 
giving the 1544 war a less festive appearance than the 
previous invasion.
Henry was no longer the lively young prince ignoring 
the restraints of elderly councillors in order to lead his 
band of favourites to war. By 1544 neither he nor his first 
group of intimates were young men. Henry was an aged, 
chronically ill man regarded as a burden by his commanders, 
and he was served by captains who were frequently the sons 
of his old companions, or were newly elevated peers, or were, 
as with Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk and Thomas Howard 
third Duke of Norfolk, men who had grown old and cautious in 
his service. In 1513 Henry had been the wonder of Christendom, 
his appearance and ability described in glowing reports by 
ambassadors.
"...when he moves the ground shakes under him..."'*'
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He had been the Defender of the Faith, his service 
in 1513 crowned by the pope sending him the Sword and Cap of 
Maintenance.
But by 1544, in contrast, Henry was merely yet 
another monarch who had defied Rome. Indeed, he had become 
the great heretic and enemy of the Church. His country had 
witnessed the deaths of queens, nobles, clergy and commoners 
because of the divorce question. England had become all 
but isolated from Europe and had, in the 1530's, been 
threatened by the combined forces of the Empire and France.
Henry was not only an old man ruling England. He 
was the senior monarch of Christendom. He had been leading 
armies in 1513 when Charles was little more than a child and 
when Francis I was merely the young Due d'Angouleme, who 
remained in the French camp during the fighting at Spurs. 
Nevertheless, his chief ally and rival were by no means 
children whom he could overawe or dupe, as his father-in-law 
Ferdinand had once done to him. Charles and Francis were 
both experienced and somewhat disillusioned monarchs by the 
time of the 1544 invasion. Charles was unable to heal the 
divisions within the Church and his own dominions, while 
trying to control an empire too widely scattered and disparate 
in composition to allow effective government. Francis was 
ill in mind and body. His early promise as a dashing soldier, 
with the potential to cement France's claims in Italy, had 
been shattered by his capture at Pavia in 1525 by Charles' 
army. The French king's failure was compounded by his 
unthinkable behaviour in bringing the Moors into Western 
Europe when he concluded an alliance with the pirate Barbarossa 
which allowed the infidel harbour at Marseilles.
The threat posed by the Ottomans had been 
relatively remote in 1513, but they were of real and immediate 
concern to Charles and Italy in 1544. Not only was Barbarossa 
in France, but the bulwark against the Ottomans in the east,
- 20 -
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Hungary, had been lost when the Hungarian nobility was 
decimated at Mohacs in 1526. The death of King Louis of 
Hungary in battle with Suleiman the Magnificent had thrown 
the Danube area into turmoil. The country was partitioned 
between John Zapolya and the brother of Charles, Archduke 
Ferdinand of Austria. This led to civil wars which broke 
out once more in 1540. The Turks used such occasions to 
thrust more deeply into Europe, so that during the 1540's 
there were constant rumours of the invasion of Germany
i tself.
In Northern Europe, warfare was endemic between 
Charles and Francis, Europe's major powers. Charles 
attempted to invade France in 15 43 with the aid of a small 
English force led by Sir John Wallop. This proved to be a 
prelude to a major enterprise in 1544, which was to involve 
the combination of the two largest armies seen in France for 
many years. The English force was perhaps the largest it 
had ever sent across the Channel.
The English excuse for joining in the war was its 
long standing claim to the French crown, as well as the non 
payment of a pension arranged by Henry's father.
In Britain itself there was the beginning of a 
major conflict with Scotland. Scottish strength had revived, 
and the country was now ruled by James V, another active 
soldier. Skirmishes were a way of life on the Marches, with 
relations worsened by the defeat of an English raiding party 
at Halidon in August 1542. The enraged English launched a 
full scale war which culminated in the overthrow of the Scots 
at Solway Moss, where many Scottish nobles were captured.
James' death soon afterwards was attributed to grief and shame, 
as well as the cares of state.'*' His death broke Scotland into
/ 22 . . .
- 21 -
1. G.Buchanan, The History of Scotland (c.1578) trans. 
J.Aikman (4 vols, Glasgow, 1827), Vol.II, p.323.
factions centred on the possession of the successor to the 
throne, the child Mary. She was seized by the Earl of Arran, 
self styled governor of Scotland, and Cardinal Beaton, who 
had been appointed to execute a papal bull against Henry.
Meanwhile Henry extorted promises from his Scottish 
captives that they would arrange the marriage of Mary to 
his son Edward, and that in the meantime they would support 
his own rule in Scotland. But Henry's hold on the north was 
never secure. Some, such as Beaton, openly supported a 
French alliance, while others, such as the Douglas family, 
seemed to shift with every new offer. Henry's negotiators 
were never sure whom to trust.
While Henry's representatives tried to reach a 
settlement in Scotland, plans continued for the combined 
invasion of France. An official treaty was signed late in
1543, although Henry, Charles, and the Emperor's sister Mary, 
Regent of the Netherlands, continued to haggle over details, 
each wishing to involve the other side in ventures outside 
the specific scope of the original contract. Henry wanted 
Charles to declare war on Scotland, Charles wanted Henry 
to fight with him against Denmark. Eventually neither monarch 
was required to do more than he had originally agreed. Charles 
reached peace with Denmark during spring, while in the first 
months of 1544 a sea and land invasion was launched on 
Scotland by the Earl of Hertford, Edward Seymour, brother of 
the late queen. The fleet sailed from Newcastle to Leith 
while light horse moved from border garrisons to the 
rendezvous outside Edinburgh. The Cardinal and Arran were 
put to flight outside Leith before Hertford's men attacked 
Edinburgh, where they burned the suburbs but were unable to 
seize the castle. Hertford then marched home by a circuitous 
route burning the country as he went.
With Scotland apparently crushed, Henry continued 
his preparations for France. The frenzied operations 




the already doubtful alliance, as well as on the finances of 
England and the Empire. Henry and Charles were to have 
35/000 infantry and 7,000 horse each, the Emperor to supply 
Henry with 2,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and both countries 
to provide ships with an army of 2,000 men each to guard the 
Channel. Henry was to march on Paris from Calais, Charles 
to advance west through Champagne.^
In the midst of the problems involved in raising
these forces hostilities flared once more on the Marches,
even as the triumphant English army returned home from
Edinburgh. Typical of the skirmishes was a raid by the
English against Jedworth on 12 June and a battle with 900
Scots horse and 100 foot. Hertford wrote to Henry soon
2afterwards that he expected a Scottish invasion. A new 
attempt was made to control the Scots in the following month 
when the Earl of Lennox, Gavin Douglas, was sent to Scotland 
with an English fleet to establish him as ruler. The mission 
to make him governor failed because the Scots refused to 
surrender their castles as many of them had previously agreed 
to do. By August, severe damage was being done once more by 
Scots raids along the Marches.
The allies were more fortunate with operations in 
Italy, where Imperial forces were continually trying to 
outmanoeuvre the condottiere Piero Strozzi and his French army. 
He defeated the Spanish leader Marquis del Guasto at Ceresole 
in April, but the French were in turn defeated at Cremona in 
August.
Eventually the main armies began to move, the English 
crossing to France in June and July, while Charles advanced 
from the Diet of Spires, which he had called to raise money and 
men. The English vanguard, led by the rivals Thomas Howard and
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John Russell, Lord Privy Seal, marched from Calais to the 
unsuccessful siege of Montreuil, a city inland from Boulogne. 
Charles Brandon meanwhile besieged Boulogne which was 
eventually captured. Henry arrived at Calais on 13 July and 
reached Boulogne on 26 July, which surrendered on 14 September, 
shortly before Henry sailed for home for the last time.
Charles' expedition was even more shortlived. He 
attacked several strongpoints, including St. Diziers, and his 
advance had the people of Paris erecting barricades. But 
he was eventually forced to halt because of a combination of 
shortage of provisions, bad weather, and lack of support from 
Henry. Despite his previous agreement. Charles concluded a 
peace with Francis.
This left Henry deserted once more by his allies.
His borders were under threat from the Scots, his army in 
France was troubled by illness and rivalry, chronically short 
of provisions, and threatened by the advancing army of the 
Dauphin which was near the hastily repaired walls of Boulogne.
Negotiations for peace between France and England 
continued with Charles as mediator, but the results were 
not impressive. The Emperor had signed the Treaty of Crespi 
on 18 September, gaining advantages such as* the promise of 
free trade, the restoration of land claimed by Henry, the 
reunion of Christendom against the Turk, as well as a marriage 
between his daughter and the Due D'Orleans, but the English 
could only arrange a shaky truce for the winter.^
The French army was only kept out of Boulogne with 
great difficulty and luck. Some of the Dauphin's men actually 
entered the town during the night of 7 October in a raid 
known as the Camisade of Boulogne. Winter and lack of food 
eventually broke the impetus of the French attack, forcing
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them into winter quarters. Raids and skirmishes flickered 
around Boulogne and Calais during the next few years, the 
English led by the dashing Henry Howard Earl of Surrey and 
later Edward Earl of Hertford.
Once he had returned to England Henry busily 
prepared for the French invasion which was to come with 
summer. The French assembled their fleet and sailed along 
the south coast of England, where Henry waited at the head 
of an army of perhaps 100,000 men. But after blundering 
along the seaboard during July 1545 the French retreated, 
lucky not to have been trapped by the English army.
Henry's affairs in 1544 ended in stark contrast 
to the situation in 1513. His terrible raid into Scotland 
had failed to subdue the north, probably serving merely to 
harden resistance. The capture of Boulogne meant that 
another important harbour fortress had been gained in France, 
but its retention was at the cost of constant vigilance and 
a continual supply of men and money from a realm that was 
going bankrupt. The army of 15 4 4 broke up at the end of the 
season, demonstrating the inability of English organisation 
to maintain such a large force abroad. In any case it had 
proved inadequate for the conquest of French territory, 
having to be hastily reinforced by shire levies during the 
siege of Boulogne.
His army in dire straits, his realm in financial 
difficulty, Henry was once more alone and besieged, without 
the comfort of the many triumphs of 1513.
This, briefly, was the framework of events in 







i. Numbers and Types of Nobles.
The nobility, England's military elite, was the 
mainstay of the English army during the early sixteenth 
century, not only in terms of filling the higher echolons 
of command, but also in supplying the bulk of the troops 
for the army, and making important personal contributions 
by joining in hand to hand combat.
The nobility was composed of families which were 
regarded by themselves, by their subordinates and by the 
king as being above the common run, or which were given some 
formal mark of recognition as noble. The latter category 
included people who were described merely as gentlemen (in 
itself a vague term not always confined to the lower nobles), 
but who had been given the right to a coat of arms by the 
College of Heralds, an institution revived by Henry. The 
former category was much less definite in its limits. People 
recognised as noble could be distinguished in a variety of ways, 
even amongst the highest levels of nobility, the peerage.
It had not been clearly established at this time, for example, 
on what grounds a noble should be able to claim the rank of 
peer.'*' As during the past five centuries, not all the peers 
of England were accorded their position by a royal act, nor 
could nobles always be recognised as peers because they were 
separately summoned to parliament. People who were thought 
to be both noble and peers were frequently addressed as "lord",
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as signifying a peer, even though they had never been
summoned or created, such as the sons of the Earl of Surrey
in 1513, Thomas, Edward and Edmund Howard, or their
contemporary John Grey, brother of the Marquis of Dorset.'*'
Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain a broad idea of who
was noble and who held which rank from the examination of
documents such as subsidy returns and lists of summonses to
parliament. The peerage is somewhat more clearly defined
than some other groups because the names of the same people
tend to recur over lengthy periods in lists of summonses,
and a general stability amonst the highest level of the
nobility is shown by a comparison of numbers of peers from
the beginning and end of the reign. Summonses were sent
to one duke in 1511, as well as one marquis, nine earls
and 25 barons, whereas in 1542, the chancellor, himself a
baron, summoned to parliament two dukes, one marquis, 14
2earls, one viscount and 26 barons.
Below the peers,or as they were known to contemporaries, 
the major nobles, were the minor nobles, a group now often 
described as the gentry. At the head of this body were the 
knights, and below them the squires. These two ranks, and 
the knights in particular, were distinguished from the mere 
gentlemen by their wealth in property and money, and, as will 
be shown below, by their military strength. A study of the 
gentry of the 1520's has shown a clear gap between the wealth 
of the knights, squires and armigerous gentlemen.. At the 
same time, this study, by J.Cornwall, indicates that the nobles
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as a whole made up less than about 2^ per cent of the
population. Their group was even smaller, about 2 per cent,
if wealthy merchants were not classed as nobles, as they
1were in some areas.
Contemporaries made an objective distinction
between the nobles and the rest of the population according
to the wealth, functions and appearance of the elite. Nobles
were distinguished by sumptuary laws which tried to govern
with precise detail the types of clothing and food to which
each rank was entitled, as well as the place and form of
entertainment permitted to each rank. That there was a need
to pass such laws indicates that people who were considered
to be other than noble may have been assuming the appearance
of a noble, but this does not obviate the fact that a man
who wore a certain costume, ate food of high quality and
who amused himself at aristocratic pastimes would be
2recognised by a contemporary as a noble.
Because they were a military as well as a 
civilian elite, nobles were also distinguished by their 
military attributes. During the early sixteenth century 
English society was still largely although not exclusively 
categorised according to the traditional functions of the 
three estates: praying, fighting and working. An Italian 
visitor noted that
There are three estates in England, the popular, the 
military and the ecclesiastical. The people are held
/29 . . .
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in little more esteem than if they were slaves.
The military branch is employed in time of war 
in mustering troops.^
The military elite, the nobles, were also recognised
by official documents, such as the laws which distinguished
the graduations of society according to the individual's
ability to provide warhorses, an estimate based on the
economic standing displayed by the appearance of the noble or
his family. A wife, for example, who wore a silk gown, a
French hat, a velvet bonnet or golden ornaments obliged her
husband, as a gentleman, to maintain one good horse for war
2service.
Horses were a living symbol of the power of the
military elite, and they indicated the status of the owner
in the military elite, as people of the time were quite aware.
The English ambassador, Nicholas Wotton, for instance, in his
description of the arrival of German nobles at the Diet of
Spires in 1544 assessed the lords according to the number and
quality of their warhorses, particularly noting the Landgrave
of Hesse, whose horsemen were "...warlike appointed with
3spears and guns at their saddlebows..."
When Sir Nicholas Vaux went to take up his post as
commander of the fortress of Guisnes, an essential aspect of
his display of office was a train of 40 horses decorated with
4scarlet cloth. Holinshed'.s obituary of the old soldier and
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Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Sir Thomas Cheyne, gave 
mention before anything else to the maintenance by Cheyne 
during the last 20 years of his life 20 chargers and about 
24 geldings, all with complete war harness, all kept ready 
about his stables and grounds for use by men at arms.'*'
And when arrangements were being made for meeting Charles V 
in 1522, the organisers considered it necessary that King 
Henry should be
...in the most honorable maner appointed with 
horses, apparell and folowers, as t^ his estate 
and royall dignitie apperteyneth...
The nobles were a body recognised by contemporaries 
as the dominant military group. This dominance was embodied 
in legislation and noted in descriptions of society. The 
terms in which legislation was framed, as in the case of 
providing warhorses, reflected the reality whereby the nobles 
were the group which was most likely to have such animals, 
partly because the nobles announced to all their rank and 
function by the possession of such animals.
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It would appear that there was little substantial 
change in the structure of the nobility during the 1513-1544 
period, at least amongst ranks above the armigerous gentlemen.
A thorough statistical analysis of the early Tudor 
nobility by H.Miller has shown that despite the effects of 
the civil wars and the Reformation there was a basic 
stability about the nobility at the more prestigious level 
of the group. The total number of peers did not vary greatly 
throughout the period from 1485 to 1547. There was a rapid 
turnover of titles, but this was no greater than for most 
other eras - less in fact than for some other times - and 
was due mainly to factors outside the control of any monarch 
bent on destroying the greater nobility. That is to say, 
the 33 per cent extinction rate of peers' families occurred 
largely because of their biological inability to provide a 
male heir. This was the most important reason for the failure 
of noble families. The use of attainder to extinguish such 
families was only of secondary importance, and was applied by 
Henry VIII at an intensive level for only a brief part of his 
reign, only to the more influential peers, and often, as in 
the case of Cromwell and Anne Boleyn's brother, to men newly 
recruited to the peerage. Almost without exception, 
elevation to the peerage for these new men was due to service 
to the Crown either in administration or military duties, and 
frequently in both. This will be shown to be a common pattern 
of reward for the nobility as a whole, for clerics as well as 
temporal lords. Wolsey, the most eminent spiritual peer of 
his time, came to prominence initially because of his work 
during the 1513 war.'*'
ii . The Continuing Stability of the Noble Class.
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1. Miller's unpublished thesis is summarised in the Institute 
of Historical Research Bulletin XXIV (1951) , pp.80-90. 
Extinction rates are also discussed by Stone, Crisis of 
the Aristocracy, p . 169 and McFarlane, The Nobility of 
Later Medieval England, p .146.
The point should also be made that a great many 
of the new peers of the early Tudor era can be identified 
as members of Henry's intimate circle of courtiers, soldiers, 
servants and jousting partners. This circle included men 
such as Charles Brandon; William Fitzwilliam Earl of 
Southampton and Admiral of England; John Lord Russell/
Lord Privy Seal and later Earl of Bedford; Henry Lord Marney; 
William Lord Eure; Nicholas Lord Vaux; Maurice Lord Barkley; 
and William Lord Sands. Numerous mentions will be made of 
such men and their importance in Tudor war.
Amongst the lower ranks of the nobility there does
appear to have been some change/ even amongst the knights and
squires. There was a considerable increase in numbers, not
only amongst the newly rich families who wanted to improve
their status by acquiring arms, but also at the middle level,
where many squires and important gentlemen became knights.
There was a large increase in the absolute number of knights
at this time as an accompaniment to the greater involvement
in war during Henry's reign as compared to his father's.
Before Henry's first venture into war in person there were
200 or more knights in England.'*' About 200 knights were
created during the years 1512-3, which would indicate that in
1513 and the years immediately afterward Henry would have had
well over 400 knights in his realm, as the figure of 209 knights
alive before 1513 is only a minimum, and does not include, for
example, the peers, most of whom were knighted. Even if only
the minimum figure is considered, the total is still larger





2. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy/ p.71. These figures also 
correspond with those of H .H .Leonard,"Knights and Knighthood 
in Tudor England", (Ph.D., London, 1970), pp.94-6/ who 
estimates that there were between 220 and 258 knights in 
1500, whereas by 1523 there were 336 and, by 1550, 539.
During the early sixteenth century, as in earlier 
times, there were considerable fluctuations in the size of 
the knightly group. The number of knights depended on 
factors such as the king's enthusiasm to wage war, for which 
he needed knights and where there was the greatest opportunity 
for knights to be created. Other influences were the 
frequency of ceremonial occasions such as royal births and 
marriages, or plagues and other events which could increase 
or decrease numbers.
The only factor which did remain constant was that 
the knights continued to play a role in warfare of an 
importance out of all proportion to their size as a group in 
society. The knights, as a body, were always an infinitesimal 
part of the populace, even during the earlier middle ages.
In fact, the knights may have increased as a percentage of 
the population during the early sixteenth century as compared 
to the years immediately before 1349, when plague had not 
yet drastically reduced the population. This can only be a 
vague estimate, however, because of the unreliability of 
figures for population totals. The population of early 
sixteenth century England has been estimated at between two 
and three million. A knighthood of, at the outside, about 
500 in 1513-4 would thus have represented .025 per cent of the 
minimum population. The fourteenth century population, in 
contrast, could have been between four and six million, while 
the knights living in 1324 were about 1,250, or .021 per cent 
of a population of six million. Even if the lower estimate of 
fourteenth century population is used, there is no substantial 




1. Figures for sixteenth century population from S.T.Bindoff, 
Tudor England (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp.24-6; figures for 
fourteenth century knighthood from Stone, Crisis of the 
Aristocracy , p.71; figures for fourteenth century population 
from M.McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford,
1971), p.313 and J.Z.Titow, English Rural Society 1200-1350 
(London, 1969), p.68.
Considering the tiny size of their coterie in 
relation to the number of men that they raised for war, the 
numbers of their group who held high positions in the army, 
and the number of them who served personally as soldiers, 
their importance as a military body is remarkable, although 
it has been overlooked by most historians of the knights 
and the sixteenth century.^
The recognised functions of the knights were not 
confined simply to wartime activities, however, as they also 
led the community in areas such as the administration of 
justice and, as will be examined in more detail later, other 
aspects of royal government.
This, in general terms, was the ruling elite of 
early sixteenth century England. To use the jargon which 
was employed by Janowitz in his definition of an aristocratic 
military elite, the civilian and military elites were 
socially and functionally integrated, and they shared a 
narrow base of recruitment, while the low specialisation of 
the military profession at the time - which will be described 
more fully in subsequent chapters - made it possible for the 
political or civilian elite to supply the bulk of the 
military establishment's leadership. This applied to the 
spiritual nobles as well as the lay nobles. English bishops, 
abbots and priests did not usually don armour and fight in 
the front ranks, as did their Scottish counterparts - although 
the Abbot of Vale Royal did lead 300 of his tenants- to fight 
at Flodden - but they were nonetheless a major part of the 
military aristocracy. The more eminent spiritual peers were 
most likely to be the relatives of temporal lords, and
- 34 -
/35. ..
1. Leonard,"Knights and Knighthood in Tudor England", for
example, operates from the premise that the military duties 
of knights were moribund by the sixteenth century.
churchmen such as Wolsey aped the noble life style with 
large retinues of gentlemen, and lavish hospitality. Great 
men such as the Bishop of Durham held key fortresses in 
their possession and were responsible for the defence of 
their sees. Especially in 1513, and to a slightly lesser 
extent in 1544, they controlled many of the major court 
military posts, and when the king invaded France men such 
as the Bishop of Winchester raised retinues which they 
personally led overseas. James Stanley, a member of the 
Earl of Derby's family, and Bishop of Ely, despatched 
1,800 liveried tenants to join Surrey's army at Flodden.'*' 
The dominance of the nobility in war was made even more 
complete by such an identity of interest between the clergy 
and the noble laymen.
The nobility of which the great churchmen formed 
a part was a flourishing group within Tudor society, their 
ranks tending to swell rather than to shrink under the rule 
of Henry. They were a military body which was recognised 
and defined as such, and which dominated decision making 
and administrative positions at both a national and a 
regional level through their prerogatives of wealth, both 
landed and monetary, and of government. They dominated the 
military world for similar reasons, as will be shown.
There was thus a continuity between the two areas 
in which the nobles moved, that is, in civilian life and 
military life. The following sections indicate some of the 
ways in which the civilian and military lifestyles of the 
nobility impinged on one another.
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C.Knightly, Flodden. The Anqlo-Scottish War of 1513 (London, 
1975), p.10.
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The education of the nobility seems to have 
fostered, or at least not to have discouraged, an interest 
in military careers and in acquiring honour through war 
service.
The quality and effect of the education of the 
English nobility of the sixteenth century has been fervently 
debated by recent historians, just as it was by sixteenth 
century theorists. The argument largely revolves around 
whether the influence of humanism helped create a new ideal 
for the nobility in which a literary career was seen to 
be as much a characteristic of a member of the elite as was 
a military life.'*' The humanists were themselves quite 
forceful about the need for England to create a populace 
which was more educated, as it was only in this way, they 
believed, that a moral resurgence could be created in the 
community. They were highly critical of the time spent by 
nobles on their traditional peacetime pursuits such as 
hunting, gambling and brawling, and they also attacked the
2emphasis currently placed on skill at arms in noble education.
This view was shared by people outside the humanist circle,
such as the king's minister, Edmund Dudley, who warned that
the children of poor and ignoble men were gaining office at
court because "...the noble men and gentlemen of England be
3the worst brough up for the moste parte of any realme..."
iii. Education.
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1. Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry, pp.75-93, 
169-73; J.H.Hexter, "The Education of the Aristocracy in 
the Renaissance", Journal of Modern History XXII, i (1950), 
p. 4.
2. Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order, p.126, Hexter, loc. 
cit., p p .1-2.
3. Dudley, Tree of Commonwealth, p.45.
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It is difficult to discern whether the urging of
reformers had an significant effect at this time on broadening
the horizons of nobles, and hence of turning them away from
military pursuits. The reformers certainly claimed that they
were successful. Erasmus praised More in 1521 as the man
who had done more than any other to make nobles think their
children unfit for their rank unless they were well educated.'*'
But according to Hexter's analysis, nobles did not begin to
attend places of higher education in larger numbers until the
second half of the century, and then the increase was mainly
during Elizabeth's reign. Of a sample of 50 old Etonian M.P.'s
2of the period 1444 to 1600, only 10 were educated before 1544.
Perhaps of greatest significance was the dismal
failure of the main aim of the humanists in encouraging noble
education. As Erasmus claimed, the first and principal task
of educating a prince was to render the arts of war forever
3unnecessary by teaching him wise government. If this was the 
great ambition of the humanists for king and nobles then it 
was markedly unsuccessful, because there was not a decade of 
Henry's reign which was not affected by war, and the elite as 
a whole showed no signs of abandoning its military lifestyle.
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1• L.P. Ill, ii (1527).
2. Hexter, "The Education of the Aristocracy", p.6. As Hexter 
points out, criticism of the illiteracy of the nobility was 
a centuries old custom. The influence of the humanists may 
have been exagerrated also, as it may actually have been 
the involvement in war which fostered some interest in 
education. Thomas Howard claimed as early as 1513 that he 
was improving his writing skills so that he could write his 
own reports as Admiral. L .P .I (4076).
3. D.Erasmus, Erasmus' "Institutio Principis Christiani" 
trans.P .Corbett (London, 1921), Ch.III, p.19.
There are also reasons for believing that even 
though some people may have observed the form of the humanist 
aim for better education, in practice a classically based 
education did little to divert the interest of the rising 
generation from hunting, the main noble peacetime interest 
- known as "little war" because it was considered good 
practice for warriors - or from an interest in war in general. 
Even though a young noble might be from a family sufficiently 
impressed by More and his fellows to give him an education 
according to humanist precepts, this did not necessarily 
mean that the inculcation of classical learning was the main 
outcome of that education, or that learning as such was 
pursued with any seriousness. This was the experience of 
Henry's own son, the Duke of Richmond. He was heir to the 
throne, he was the son of a ruler who prided himself on his 
own learning and who kept humanists at court, and his 
education was under the supervision of Thomas Wolsey, whose 
first step in public life had been his successful education 
at Oxford of three sons of the Marquis of Dorset. But 
Fitzroy's education, at least during the time of his progress 
to take up a post as Lieutenant of the North, was one blighted 
by idleness, poor supervision, and extra-curricula activities. 
His tutor, Richard Croke, recorded a long battle to ensure a 
satisfactory education for the heir. Croke complained to 
Wolsey that although Fitzroy had progressed satisfactorily 
until the age of eight - when he could freely translate 
Caesar - his studies were now disturbed by the boy's usher, 
George Cotton. Cotton was said to deliberately show enmity 
to the boy's studies, particularly Latin, and constantly 
cancelled lessons so that the boy could go outdoors with his 
companions, mainly to hunt. Cotton would not let Fitzroy 
rise at six o'clock, nor allow him to learn anything at all 
before mass. He put aside virtually the whole schedule of
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1. G.Cavendish, The Life of Cardinal Wolsey by George
Cavendish, His Gentleman Usher ed. S.W.Suger, second e d . 
(London, 1827), p.67.
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lessons throughout summer, and opposed the Cardinal's will 
by protecting the boy and his fellows from punishment and 
by letting them have fools, players and bawdy ballad singers 
in their bedrooms. The only time when Cotton allowed the 
boy to do his lessons was when it was late or the child was 
tired. One of the reasons why the boy was tired was that 
Croke frequently interrupted his regimen to make him 
practice archery. If Croke tried to correct Fitzroy by 
admonishing him, Cotton interfered and abused the tutor.
This catalogue of complaints accords with the 
criticisms of humanists rather than with their highest 
precepts, and, in its emphasis on outdoor, military activity 
seems to have foreshadowed a soldier's life for the heir, 
who was at the time on his way to assume one of the most 
important military offices in the kingdom, if only nominally. 
As it happened, Cotton eventually won control of the heir's 
education, so there was no likelihood of much change.'*'
A youthful companion of Fitzroy was Henry Howard, 
son of Thomas Howard. Henry was educated by scholars such 
as John Leland and John Skelton. He wrote poetry and built 
a classically styled mansion. But he grew up to be a brawler 
and a hawkish courtier. His poems in themselves often reflect 
an interest in life which was widely separated from the 
desires of humanists. The vision of childhood in one of his
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1. Croke's letters are printed in Inventories of the Wardrobes, 
Plate, Chapel Stuff etc. of Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond, 
and of the Wardrobe Stuff at Baynard's Castle of Katharine, 
Princess Dowager ed. J.G.Nichols (Camden, O.S., Vol.LXI), 
p p .xxxv-xliii. An education with a similar emphasis on 
sport and military training was given to Gregory, son of 
Thomas Cromwell: see J.A.Froude, History of England From 
the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada
(12 vols, London, 1892), Vol.I, pp.47-50.
poems did not dwell on schoooroom Latin, but on dalliance, 
dancing, sport and the tilting ground, which he claimed as 
the main interests of his youth.
The Gravel-Ground, with sleeves tyde on the helm,
On foaming horse, with swords and friendly hearts,
With chere as though one should another whelm, ^
Where we have fought, and chased oft with darts.
The influence of humanists and other advocates of
reform in turning the nobles from war should not be over-
2emphasised, as Ferguson admits. Even the humanists 
themselves were not averse to sharing in the fruits of war.
Sir Richard Pace, for example, was a humanist, but he was 
also Henry's representative in negotiations for continental 
mercenaries, and even took part in Maximilian's invasion of
3Italy. Humanists were the friends and servants of military
men such as Lord Mountjoy, governor of Tournai, and Thomas
More himself wrote an epistle in praise of Henry's capture4of that city in 1513.
Humanist education thus does not seem to have had
a pacifying effect on the young Tudor nobles. In fact, their
youth, with its emphasis on hunting, archery and tilting,
seems to have been largely a preparation for a life of war.
This emphasis was also reflected in the literary tastes of
the adult nobles. The only two books recorded amongst the
personal property of Edward Seymour Earl of Hertford in the
late 1530's, for example, were a copy of Froissart's Chronicles,
5and the Bible.
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2. Ferguson, The Indian Summer of English Chivalry, p.93.
3. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.59.
4. T.More, The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More ed.L.Bradner and 
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There were few avenues of public employment open 
to a noble apart from the army, or, if he did go to court, 
in royal offices that were frequently connected with war.
The major nobles in particular tended to congregate
at court, where they served as privy councillors, lords of
the privy seal, chancellors, treasurers, ambassadors,
tournament marshals (a duty performed by the Earl of
Northumberland at the Field of Cloth of Gold), regional
commanders such as Wardens of the Marches, castellans and
as administrators of the king's properties. As well as the
posts that had a recognised and formalised degree of influence
attached to them, as in the case of a chancellorship, there
was also a network of important but ostensibly unofficial places
at the court, as favourites of the king. These nobles can
often be identified because they held sinecures during peacetime
and important military offices during war, as in the case of
William Compton, who was given the wages and profits of a
groom of the counting house during the early years of the
reign, and became a leading figure during the 1513 war.'*' Men
such as Compton were the constant companions of the king in
both peace and war, wielding power far above their rank and
origins. One of them, Charles Brandon, who had only recently
risen from relative obscurity to the status of Viscount Lisle,
was described as a "second king" during the 1513 war, and
Margaret of Savoy was advised to establish good relations with
him because it was he who did and undid everything in the 
2English army.
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The coincidence between nobility, the holding of 
court office, and control of the army, was perhaps never 
closer than during Henry's reign. For the secular nobles, 
this was particularly the case during the 1544 war when 
clerics such as Wolsey had been largely displaced from the 
highest offices. It was through such official channels, 
as well as through favourites, that royal authority was put 
into practice. The same men who advised the king in peace­
time about the advantages or disadvantages of going to war 
were the commanders who led his armies when his mind was 
made up. Successive lords of the privy seal, for example, 
were William Fitzwilliam, Admiral of England (1540-42) and 
John Lord Russell, who helped lead the vanguard in 1544 
(1542-55). Russell's fellow leader of the 1544 vanguard 
v/as the Treasurer, Thomas Duke of Norfolk (1522-47), a post 
he took over from his father, while the Chancellor in 1544 
was Thomas Lord Wriostheley, who had helped negotiate the 
terms of the 1544 war. Sir John Gage, who had been promoted 
to captain of the castle of Calais for bravery at Therouanne, 
was Comptroller of the Household in 1544, and the Lord 
Chamberlain of the Household, William Paulet Lord St.John, 
led a retinue of 400 men to France in that year.
The supremacy of the nobles was thus all but 
unchallenged in the military sphere. As is shown below, 
they not only supplied most of the soldiers for the wars, 
but they also had exclusive control of the highest echelons 
of command in the army, and, to a large extent, at court.
Despite the influence of some favourites, the rank 
which a noble held in the army was mainly, although not 
exclusively, dependent on his civilian rank. There were 
exceptions to the practice of allotting posts according to 
the social rank of the recipient. Brandon's power in 1513 was 
out of proportion to his title, although, when he was again 
supreme commander under the king in 1544, his rank and title - 
Duke of Suffolk - were evenly matched. Amongst the middle
/ 4 3 .
ranks of officers the system was less clearly manifested.
Many officers, such as Arthur Plantagenet (later Lord Lisle) 
and William Fitzwilliam, had not even been knighted when they 
took command of ships during the 1513 Channel war. And in
1543 a mere knight was given command of an English army in 
the war with France/ although it was a small army and he was 
one of the most experienced soldiers in the kingdom and 
former ambassador to Paris, Sir John Wallop. In 1511 Sir 
Edward Poynings had led a similarly small army of 1,500 
archers to serve in the Netherlands. But in 1521, when an 
army of 6,000 archers and many gentlemen was to be sent to 
France, Henry ruled that Sir William Sandys - one of his 
favourites and soon afterwards made Lord Sandys - was not 
an appropriate leader. Honour demanded, said the king, that 
no less than an earl should command such an army, and besides, 
no other knights would serve under a knight commander, even 
though he had the Garter, the highest English order of 
knighthood. Sandys was replaced as leader by Henry Bourchier 
Earl of Essex.'*' Peers and the members of peers' families thus 
dominated the highest military positions. The same Earl of 
Essex had commanded the King's Spears in 1513, while members 
of the Howard family had variously held many of the key 
military posts in 1513 where the king was not personally present. 
The father of the family, Thomas Earl of Surrey, had led the 
army against the Scots, having been left in charge of the 
defence of the realm. His sons Thomas and Edmund led divisions 
of the army under him, Thomas having charge of the vanguard. 
Before the battle of Flodden, Thomas had succeeded his late 
brother Edward as Admiral of the royal fleet. Members of the 
family had therefore been in immediate command of English 
forces in two out of the three main areas of conflict in 1513.
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Nobles, whether they were men of military background 
through family tradition or personal inclination, were advanced 
in their careers and in apparent royal favour by their services 
in war, or else they were penalised if they did not perform 
their military obligations to the king's satisfaction. Some
24 knights are recorded to have personally led their retinues 
to France in 1513 as part of the King's Ward. All were at that 
time servants of the Crown in some capacity, even though some 
of their offices may have been mere sinecures. Of these 24 
knights, more than half were rewarded during the expedition 
by being elevated to the rank of knight banneret. And of 
27 gentlemen who led their retinues in the King's Ward, 18 were 
knighted and one, Wolsey, was made Bishop of Tournai and Lincoln. 
At least 12 of the 27 held court office when they went on the 
expedition.^
Such figures indicate that there was a direct 
connection between a career at court, participation in warfare, 
and worldly success. The effect of this nexus was most 
impressive when the careers of great nobles and intimate 
favourites were involved. The Earl of Surrey became Duke of 
Norfolk with an augmentation to his crest of the arms of 
Scotland as a reward for victory at Flodden; Charles Brandon 
became Duke of Suffolk at the end of the 1513 expedition; the 
younger Thomas Howard succeeded his father as Earl of Surrey; 
Charles Somerset, one of the divisional commanders in France 
in 1513, became Earl of Worcester; and Sir Edward Stanley, 
whom some credit with deciding the outcome at Flodden with his 
personal daring and leadership, was made Lord Montegle.
Those outside the most fortunate circle of the elite
were not forgotten, however, as the king took the trouble to
reward all the nobles who had fought at Flodden by writing them
individual letters "...wyth suche thankes and favorable words
2that everye man thought him selfe wel rewarded."
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But refusal to help with war by personal participation, 
money, men, or an apparent lack of ardour brought anger, 
suspicion and sometimes much worse on the recalcitrant. One 
of the few men to refuse war service, a London alderman,
Richard Reed, discovered that in 1544 when he would not give 
financial aid. He was punished by being compelled to raise 
a band of men at his own cost which he had to lead to the 
Scottish Marches, where he was to be given the most onerous 
and dangerous tasks to perform. Henry mercifully took steps 
to arrange for Reed's ransom back from the Scots shortly after 
the alderman began his tour of duty.'*'
When punishment was so harsh it is perhaps not 
remarkable that there were few recorded cases of people refusing 
military service, and that Reed's case was a matter of some 
comment in contemporary chronicles.
Even a great noble's loyalty was measured by his 
readiness to supply men for the army and to serve in his own 
person. A letter was sent to the Earl of Shrewsbury from 
Brandon in 1544. Earl Francis Talbot was the son of the 
commander of the 1513 vanguard, but was in semi-retirement 
because he had failed as a soldier. Yet although he was out 
of the court round, he was required to supply men for the 
Scottish invasion. There can be no mistaking the threat barely 
concealed beneath the official language of the message that 
ordered him to supply a certain number of men of specified
2quality, "...and will avoid the contrary thereof at your peril".
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The loyalty of the Earls of Cumberland and 
Westmoreland, two northern nobles who were also currently out 
of favour at court, was also carefully assessed by Henry's 
northern deputies during the 1544 campaign against Scotland 
according to their willingness to serve personally and to 
send retinues.'*'
Personal service when the king went to war was a 
duty only to be avoided by a royal exemption. The nobles, 
and especially the peers, flocked to his banner in 1513 and
1544. At least 40 peers went to war in 1513 - 33 to France,
7 to Flodden - while in 1544 a total of 41 are known to have 
joined the army. Of these peers, 30 went to France and 14 
went to Scotland. In addition, a number of children and 
close relatives of these peers, whom contemporaries could 
well have regarded as being of the same rank, also served in 
the wars. Three peers, Hertford, Lisle and Clinton, served 
both in Scotland and France in 1544. Some 85 per cent of 
the approximately 47 peers alive in 1513 were therefore 
involved in war, 70 per cent of them in France. There were 
about 54 peers in 1544, of whom 76 per cent were soldiers,
55 per cent of them in France. A higher percentage of peers 
fought in the Scottish expedition in 1544 than were present 
at Flodden: 25 per cent of the peers went to war in the north 
in 1544 as compared to 15 per cent who were with Surrey in 
1513.2
A high proportion of the peers were apparently 
willing and able to accompany the king to war.
It is not so easy to be certain about the amount of 
participation amongst the lesser nobles because of the 
incompleteness of the records, although it would seem that there 
was a high involvement in particular categories of the gentry.
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A major international event such as the Field of Cloth of 
Gold could attract 131 knights, over one third of the knights 
then alive. More than have been recorded were probably 
present in the followings of the great nobles. Wolsey, for 
example, had a following of 50 "gentlemen" which could well 
have included knights.'*'
The knights were the most "visible" category
amongst the minor nobles, yet even they tend to be obscure
in the records of major events such as wars. They often
served in the retinues of peers, rather than in their own
right, so their names would not always be individually listed.
Only 24 knights appear in the surviving details of the King's
Ward of 1513, and a further 9 in the vanguard, including
one member of Sir Rhys ap Thomas' retinue who happens to be
mentioned separately. But is is probable that a number of
others were present in either the vanguard, the mid ward or
2the rearguard. The elite cavalry body, the King's Spears, 
for example, would have had knights amongst its members:
Sir John Pechy, who has not been counted as a member of the 
knights of Mid Ward because he was with the Spears, was 
deputy commander of the elite cavalry.
The army at Flodden had at least another 35 knights 
in its ranks. The 69 knights known to have been in the 1513 
war thus represented about one third of England's approximately 
200 knights living in 1513.^
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The records for the 1544 expedition are slightly 
more complete. The vanguard is recorded to have had 5 2 
knighted captains of retinues, and about 30 in each of the 
other two divisions of the army. These figures include the 
members of the elite cavalry, which was now called the 
Gentlemen Pensioners.'*' A further 41 knights sent men to 
join the Scottish invasion, which presumably they led in 
person. This would make the total number of knights who 
had some direct form of participation in the 1544 war about 
150, or, once again, about one third of a knighthood of 
between 4-500 men, the usual estimate for the number of 
living knights at the end of Henry's reign.
Even if only these minimum figures are accepted, the 
usual rate of participation of one in three by the knights 
indicates the extent to which they were a group with a high 
degree of involvement in war.
The interest in war shared by the knights applied
not only to men who had founded their careers on military
service, but also to those knights whose service had been in
administration rather than arms. Cromwell, for example,
displayed an interest in war and in the trappings of the
omilitary elite's lifestyle. Not only did he make plans to 
strengthen England's army but he also surrounded himself 
with his own army and encouraged his son to participate in 
the military pastimes of the old nobility. He displayed his 
status as a royal minister and a new noble by parading his 
army during the 1539 London musters. His gentlemen retainers 
led 1,000 liveries footmen - gunners, pikemen and bowmen -
3past the king. And, during the 1544 war, the carpet knight,
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2. There is no proof that Cromwell was ever a mercenary in 
Italy before taking up court service.
3. C.Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England During the Reigns
of the Tudors from A.D.1485 to 1559 by Charles Wriothesley, 
Windsor Herald ed.W.D.Hamilton (2 vols, Camden, Second Series, 
Vols XI and XX), Vol. I,p. 96. The author of this chronicle was 
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Sir Richard Riche, who had risen to power through other than 
military service, not only personally led a large retinue to 
France, but was active in negotiations with the enemy, and 
acted as treasurer of the army.
There was no clear distinction at this time between
civil servant, soldier and courtier. An educated diplomat
could be found leading a charge against the enemy, a hardened
warrior might be ambassador to France, and a courtier might
be commanding a garrison on the frontiers. In 1513, for
example, Thomas Howard the elder, Earl of Surrey, was appointed
to conclude leagues of alliance with the ambassadors of
Ferdinand.^ Sir Richard Wingfield, who commanded English
expeditionary forces, was also one of Henry's most experienced
diplomats on the Continent. Wolsey, who presided over the
bureaucratic details of the 1513 war, on one occasion advised
Henry on the best tactics when large numbers of archers were
2on the battlefield.
Warfare was thus very much a noble profession, on 
which the fortunes of many old families grew, and which was 
the starting point for the rise of a large number of the new 
nobles. Some of these have already been mentioned, including 
the most outstanding of all the new nobles, Charles Brandon 
Duke of Suffolk. Others who were nearly as fortunate were 
numerous, however, including William Fitzwilliam. He was the 
son of a Yorkshire knight and the grandson of a marquis, a 
genealogy which was of sound but clearly second rate status. 
Fitzwilliam's fortunes really began when he was made a court 
page - a common form of education for the nobles - and spent 
his boyhood as one of the heir's companions, or henchmen.
He first gained prominence when he served as a King's Spear 
in the 1513 war, his name frequently occurring in court records. 
He was wounded while serving with the fleet, and was afterwards 
granted the office of Squire of the Body, together with grants 
of land such as a manor forfeited by Lord Lovell. Fitzwilliam 
was knighted at Tournai, and on his return home became a sheriff 
After this initial rise through the court ranks he continued in
/50...
1- Sp.P. II (99).
2 • S . P . I (xxi i) .
- 49 -
- 50 -
long service to the Crown, holding many important posts in 
later years, culminating in the offices of Admiral of England 
and Lord Privy Seal, as well as the title of Earl of 
Southampton. He was one of England's wealthiest men at the 
time of his death.'*'
A nearly parallel life was that of William Compton,
who had beginnings which were more humble than those of
Fitzwilliam. Compton was a ward of Henry VII. He also became
a page at court, and a friend of the heir. When Henry VIII
was crowned, Compton became in rapid succession groom of the
bedchamber, chief gentleman of the bedchamber, and castellan
of a number of fortresses. He was given an honourable
augmentation in 1512, and, having taken a leading part in the
1513 expedition, was knighted in France. He briefly held the
post of Chancellor of Ireland after his return to England, he
attended the celebrations at the Field of Cloth of Gold, he
fought in the 1523 Scottish campaign, and died a wealthy man
in 1528. Compton was one of the prominent tourneyers of
Henry's court as well as a successful soldier, as was the
2greatest of this type of noble, Brandon.
Brandon's origins were better than either Compton's 
or Fitzwilliam's , yet still relatively minor. His father 
William, Henry VII's standard bearer, had been killed at 
Bosworth by Richard III. The fatherless child was raised 
with the new king's children. He achieved early prominence at 
court as a jouster, and, as mentioned, was a "second king" by 
1513. His rise to power may also have been helped by the 
network of family alliances which were common at court. Not 
only did the Tudor dynasty have much to thank his father for, 
but his uncle, Sir Thomas Brandon, was Marshal of the King's 
Bench. When Sir Thomas died in 1510, Charles took over the 
perquisites of his office. Brandon became Marshal of the
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(22 vols, London, 1908), entry for Fitzwilliam, VII,230-2. 
Hereunder D.N.B.. L.P.I (3825), (4303), (4468), (4544);
R.E. Brock, "The Courtier in Early Tudor Society, Illustrated 
from Select Examples", (Ph.D.,London, 1963), p.316.
2. D.N.B., entry for Compton,IV, pp.908-9.
Household in 1511, and in 1512 became both a Knight of the 
Body and Viscount Lisle. The latter was a title obtained by 
one of several quasi-marriages which he went through. These 
marriages were sufficient to gain him a title or a dowry, but 
were easily annulled because of their irregular form. Charles 
received his dukedom on his return from the 1513 expedition 
for his service as commander of the army under Henry and for 
his negotiations with the Regent of the Netherlands for a 
new invasion in 1514. The new war did not eventuate: instead . 
Brandon once more distinguished himself by leading 15 other 
nobles in a jousting team at the celebrations of the wedding 
of Henry's sister Mary to King Louis. Brandon shortly 
afterwards took advantage of the king's death to marry the 
widowed French queen, a bold step which capped him comet-like 
career, and which demonstrated that the warrior duke had 
obtained a position from which he could weather the outrage of 
the established nobility and the displeasure of the king.
The remainder of his life was relatively subdued.
He continued as one of the kingdom's greatest men and as the 
king's trusted servant. He led many other military ventures, 
arranging the defence against Scotland in the 1540's and leading 
the army to France and the victory at Boulogne in 1544.^
The careers of many other such courtiers consistently 
demonstrate the intimate connection between military service 
and success at court, though rarely in such an outstanding 
manner.
As mentioned, military service and royal service 
was a family matter for the nobles. Sons accompanied their 
fathers to war or court, and sometimes succeeded them in their 
offices, or even mounted to higher positions from the groundwork
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prepared by their fathers. In the case of some of the older 
families, war service was a family tradition. The Earls 
of Shrewsbury, for example, were amongst the most prominent 
members of the military elite. Their family name, Talbot, 
had become familiar to the French during the Hundred Years War. 
As the Venetian ambassador noted in 1512, Shrewsbury, the 
leader of the vanguard, was a man of ancient and noble family 
whose name was used until this day by French mothers to 
frighten their children. The hereditary right to command the 
vanguard was lost by Shrewsbury's son because of his lack of 
martial qualities.'*'
A son who mounted higher on the services performed
by his father for the Crown was Thomas Lord Poynings. Thomas
was the illegitimate issue of one of the most experienced
soldiers and diplomats of the reign, Sir Edward Poynings.
Thomas was raised at court, where he held minor posts while his
father served in Henry's wars. When he was an adult, Thomas
distinguished himself as a soldier, particularly during the
1544 campaign. A grudging contemporary critic, and an
experienced soldier, Ellis Gruffydd, praised him as the best
2English soldier, saving the king. Poynings commanded Boulogne 
for a time after its fall, and received a title as a reward 
for his service shortly before his death in early 1545.
Family ties such as these were an important element 
in court life, another of those informal networks which cemented 
the elite as a group, and through which its members could exert 
influence. At the same time, it could be a source of disruption,
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2. E.Gruffydd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne. A 
Contemporary Narrative", ed.M.B .Davies Bulletin of the 
Faculty of Arts, Fouad I .University XI (May 1949), pp.10-11. 
Hereunder as Gruffydd, ii. Gruffydd participated in a number 
of Tudor military ventures. He later wrote a chronicle 
which is the most extensive contemporary account surviving.
however-/ because of the faction fighting between the great 
families, as is shown in subsequent chapters.
The gentlemen who supplied the backbone of the army
were joined by a tangle of family alliances. Nicholas Lord
Vaux, for instance, was related not only to the family of the
Lord Warden, the Cheynes, but to another prominent military
and diplomatic family, the Guildfords.  ^ These kinds of
alliances are also shown in the records of the 1513 army. At
least 12 of the 46 captains of companies in the vanguards had
sons or brothers as their deputies, and a number had close
relatives serving elsewhere in the army. One of the captains,
2Sir Gilbert Talbot, was the son of the Governor of Calais.
The Earl of Northumberland, who served in France, had a brother, 
Sir William Percy who commanded a division of the Flodden army.
In another section of Surrey's army the commander was Sir 
Marmaduke Constable, who led a retinue that included his sons
3and kinsmen. One of these sons was knighted after the battle.
There are also instances where sons succeeded fathers 
in some military post. Sir Thomas Wyndham, treasurer of the 
1513 army, privy councillor and vice-admiral, was succeeded by 
his son as vice-admiral. Sir Thomas's own father, Sir John,
4had been knighted in 1487 for bravery at the battle of Stoke.
Apart from this type of family tradition, there were 
numerous other families where members were virtually all 
soldiers. One of Henry's prominent soldiers was Sir Edward 
Hungerford. He was the son of Lord Hungerford, who, together
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with Edward's brothers Sir Thomas and Sir Walter, had fought 
in the civil wars, Sir Walter having been knighted on the 
battlefield by Henry VI I. ^ The Carew family was similarly 
active in Henry's wars. Sir Edmund, Lord Carew, was killed 
during the siege of Therouanne. His father was Lord Carew 
of Devon, whose barony and castle of Carew happened to be 
leased to one of the greatest of Henry's soldiers, Sir Rhys 
ap Thomas. Sir Edmund had been knighted at Bosworth: he is 
said to have appeared at the funeral of the Earl of Devon in 
1511 in full armour, riding his charger up the nave of Exeter 
cathedral to present the dead earl's battle axe to the bishop.
A cousin of Sir Edmund, Sir Richard Carew, also served on the 
1513 expedition, together with Sir Richard's son Sir Nicholas.2
The nobles were aware of and indeed proud of such 
family involvement in war, as was shown by William Fitzwilliam, 
who enjoyed a complex and extensive set of family relationships. 
His widowed mother had married Sir Anthony Browne, Master of 
the Horse and standard bearer to Henry VIII. Amongst his 
relatives through the Browne connection was Thomas Cheyne,
Lord Warden and treasurer to Norfolk in 1544. Fitzwilliam was 
apparently very conscious of these military family connections. 
His manor at Cowdray - destroyed in the eighteenth century - was 
decorated with large paintings of his relatives and ancestors, 
many of whom were shown in martial costume, as well as his own 
exploits in the wars such as the raid on Treport in the 1520's. 
Many of these paintings carried Fitzwilliam's own descriptions 
of the people and events. One picture was of his brothers 
John and Thomas Fitzwilliam, who were killed at Flodden. Both 
were painted in armour, one killed by a spear, the other by 
a sword, and underneath Fitzwilliam had written: "In doing 
their duty against the Scots'1.^
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2. Ibid., III, pp.958-9, 965-8.
3. Gentleman's Magazine LXIII, ii, pp.996-9. The paintings were 
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death of Edward Howard, at which Fitzwilliam was present, 
fighting at Spurs and Tournai, meetings with Francis and 
Charles which Fitzwilliam attended, and Suffolk's expeditions 
to France.
These family histories and the biographies of some 
eminent soldiers have been quoted in some detail in order to 
show the similarities between the careers of many nobles who 
were in the forefront of court and military activities in 
1513 and 1544. Men such as Fitzwilliam, Sir John Wallop,
Sir John Russell, Sir Richard Pace, Sir Thomas Wriothesley,
Sir Thomas Cheyne, Sir John Gage, Sir Anthony Denny, Sir John 
Audley, and Fitzwilliam's step-brother Sir Anthony Browne, 
combined many abilities in order to rise through court ranks, 
but most frequently their success was due to three main factors. 
These were that they were often favourites; they assisted in 
the king's divorce and its aftermath; and they were servants, 
as soldiers, diplomats and administrators. Often, as in the 
case of Brandon, there was a combination of all three elements 
in their rise to power and the maintenance of their eminence.
The nobles were a group which shared an interest in 
the military profession. Service to the king in war was a 
major avenue to advancement, and was something which was 
expected of them as nobles. This service was often a matter 
of family tradition amongst the nobles, and was something in 
which they took pride. At the same time, a particular group 
within the elite took an especially heavy responsibility in 
warfare, particularly in providing troops, a responsibility 
which was out of all proportions to their numbers. This was 
the knights, as a group distinct from the knighted peers.
The common histories of traditional family military 
service, of a rise to power through soldiering, and of the 
network of alliances that ran through the upper echelons of 
the army, suggests several things about the nobility. The 
primary implication is that for such men participation in war 
was likely to be a personal or a family matter, as much as it 
was service to their country. Not only was the warfare between 
nations whose armies were led by elite family groups still 
likely to be seen in personal terms, but such warfare was also 
often a field of action in which individuals could be seen to 
search for personal honour for themselves, or for renown to add 
to the prestige of their families. The ramifications of both 
these considerations will be considered more fully in the final 
ch apter.
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v * Rewards.
The courtier noble could hope to build a 
substantial public career through service in the king's 
wars. For such a man, the great expenditure involved in 
performing such duties could be recouped through wages and 
other sources of financial reward. But a number of nobles 
were never greatly involved with court life and public 
careers, including great peers such as the Percies of 
Northumberland, yet they too participated in the wars. What 
could such nobles hope to gain by their huge outlays of time 
and money on the wars?
Not only did a noble have to provide lodgings for 
himself and his servants in a style suitable to his status, 
but he also often had to equip his men, not to mention provide 
himself with elaborate suits of armour. And at the same time, 
he was sometimes presented with peremptory demands for war 
subsidies when other revenue sources were used up. The 
records of a sheriff of Norfolk, Sir Thomas Lestrange of 
Hunstanton, for example, indicates the demands on time and 
finances that could result from a royal expedition. Sir Thomas, 
husband of the daughter of Lord Vaux, was by no means prominent 
in court records. His accounts indicate that he divided his 
time between hunting, entertaining his social equals, and 
attending assizes. But his normal round was interrupted in 
1520 when he was required to make several trips to London, 
apparently in preparation for the forthcoming journey to the 
Field of Cloth of Gold. He spent a total of five weeks in 
London at an average weekly accommodation bill of £1/2/2, 
during .which time he made many purchases. These centred 
mainly on buying materials to enhance the appearance of himself 
and his entourage, including items such as cloth of gold, 
crimson velvet for horse harness, saddles, bridles and 
ornaments. These cost him at least £11, or more than a year's 
wages for a common soldier.'*'
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Lestranges of Hunstanton , From A.D. 1519 to A.D. 1578", 
ed. D.Gurney Archagdogia XXV (1833-4) , p.431.
It was rumoured that some peers, including the 
Percies, bankrupted themselves and placed their estates in 
pledge in order to attend this meeting of Henry and Francis, 
although this belief has recently been questioned by Bean's 
analysis of the Percy accounts.'*'
The Field of Cloth of Gold involved heavy expenditure 
on the trappings of rank by the nobles, but, as shown in 
Chapter Six, it was by no means untypical of the costs placed 
on the nobles by the style of their behaviour in such 
expeditions.
Except for a select few who might be fortunate
enough to collect a substantial ransom through war service,
to gather substantial plunder or be remunerated by a practical
sign of royal gratitude, official wages from military ventures
are unlikely to have been large. The Admiral of England,
Edward Howard, for example, was paid the substantial bonus
of £66/13/4 for his participation in the sea battles of 1512.
But most of the money would probably have passed through his
hands, as the usual practice with bonuses, or regards, paid
2to a noble was to divide them up amongst his subordinates.
The regular salary of officers was by no means 
generous in the majority of cases. The governor of Tournai,
Sir Edward Poynings, was paid a comparatively large wage of 
£6/13/4 per day - about £2,400 a year - when he was appointed 
in 1513, but as a senior officer he was expected to entertain 
his fellow officers lavishly, and supplement the rations of 
his soldiers. And in the case of financial stringency, such 
wages could be cut arbitrarily, as his successor, Lord Mountjoy, 
discovered when his wage was cut to £1/16/6^ per day.
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A noble who was simply the captain of a retinue
received a standard wage which does not seem to have been
sufficient in itself to justify his going to war. Sir
Robert Willoughby, Lord Broke, for example, was paid only
6/8d per day in 1513, scarcely a handsome remuneration
compared to 4/- per day for his captains, or even 2/- per
day for his petty captains.'*' This wage represented a monthly
income to Lord Broke of only £8/8/-, at a time when the
mean income from land revenue alone for a peer would have
2been over £100 per month.
Participation in war must have had other attractions 
than the hope of a steady wage for the noble, considering 
the costs and effort involved. Two such attractions suggest 
themselves. These incentives may seem, at first sight, 
antithetical, as one is the sense of duty, honour and family 
tradition which has already been mentioned, while the other 
is the opportunity which the army presented for large scale 
peculation. But although these motives may seem contradictory, 
it is not necessarily the case that they would have appeared 
to be so to the nobles. After all, for many of them, military 
service was a career from which they might gain riches, wealth 
which it was obvious would not be forthcoming from mere 
salaries. And, as nobles, the perquisites of office were 
theirs by right, even if it meant somewhat irregular dealings. 
This was the kind of mixture of attitudes voiced by Viscount 
Lisle, John Dudley, when replying to the offer of a post at 
Boulogne in 1544. He appears to have regarded the office as 
a sinecure appropriate to his rank in the army. He demanded 
that he should retain the appurtenances of his existing duty 
as Admiral, "...for it is an office of honor, of estimation 
and profit...", and that as a sign of his rank he should be 
allowed to keep 50 horsemen and 50 footmen in his service, in 
addition to the 400 footmen actually necessary for his post.
/5 9...
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Apart from these privileges, he wished to have arable land, 
pasture, mead and woods to provide for his household, as well 
as his choice of captured sporting lodges for gentlemen, as 
sites for his recreation. He also wanted to be appointed 
steward and master of the game, and to have provisions for 
his household shipped from Calais custom free.'*'
Gruffydd was highly critical of the English nobles
such as Dudley who garrisoned Boulogne during the 1540's
because they blatantly profiteered from their offices. Goods
shipped custom free, for example, could be resold to the
2troops at a handsome profit.
The former attitude, the sense of honour and duty,
is perhaps best embodied in a letter from Fitzwilliam written
when he was Admiral. He wrote to court in 1522 that he would
serve the king in the current strife with France for no wages
at all, or for whatever the king wished to pay him, apparently
3considering the honour accorded by the post sufficient.
It is all but impossible to ascertain which of these 
two motivations might have been the dominant one for nobles. 
But in either case, the encouragement to the nobles to serve 
in war came from their being members of the elite, whose 
reward for participation was an outcome of their status giving 
them opportunities for acquiring either monetary or social 
benefits.
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It may be impossible to discern whether greed for 
honour or money was a greater incentive to the noble to go 
to war. But there was one kind of reward for military service 
which was not only purely honorary in the benefits it conferred, 
but was also somewhat onerous in that it placed obligations on 
its recipient to take greater responsibility in the community 
and in warfare. This was the honour of knighthood, which was 
probably the single most commonly conferred reward for war 
service for which records survive. It was an honour that was 
extended throughout the ranks of the nobility from the greatest 
peers to the minor gentlemen, such as the London spinner, John 
Jennings, who was knighted during the 1544 attack on Edinburgh. 
Whereas the greatest of the nobility were rewarded with titles 
in addition to being knighted, the distinction of knighthood 
remained the most frequent form of reward for the minor nobles. 
If a noble was already a knight, but not considered worthy of 
a peerage, he might be promoted to a higher grade of knighthood, 
such as knight banneret or the Order of the Garter.
Henry's creations of knights occurred at the average 
of 17 per year, about twice the normal rate. They usually 
consisted of the relatively simple dubbing ceremony at or near 
the field of battle. The other main occasion on which he 
created knights was at a major court ceremony, such as a royal 
birth or marriage, at which time the ritual of dubbing was much 
more elaborate.^
About 393 knights, or more than half the 740 knights 
bachelor made during his reign, were created near the 
battlefield, during a campaign, or in the immediate aftermath 
of an expedition. When there was no war current the number
/61. ..
v i . Knighthood.
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the latter category, is rather complicated and sheds little 
light on the practice of knighting nobles in battle. See 
the discussion by Leonard, "Knights and Knighthood in Tudor 
England", especially p.80.
of creations was negligible, except for the rare great 
ceremonial events. The number of knights which might be 
classified as military creations could be expanded if a 
looser categorisation is used. Some 48 knights were created 
after the suppression of the Pilgrimage of Grace, for example, 
which might well be classed as a military event. If the 
knights who were made on these occasions were classified as 
military creations, the total knighthoods conferred in return 
for military service would represent a proportion of about 
60 per cent.^
The eras of the 1513 and 1544 wars were the periods 
when the greatest number of new knights were made. Between 
1511 and 1513, 183 knights bachelor and 28 knights banneret 
were made, 15 4 of them at the sieges of Tournai and Therouanne 
and the battles of Spurs and Flodden. Some 9 4 new knights 
originated in the war of 1544.
As well as the military creations at the lowest 
rank of knighthood, there were many similar creations of 
members of the Order of the Garter. Of the 52 knights who 
were invested with the Garter during Henry's reign, 41 were 
nobles who were prominent in the wars, and frequently, only 
recently returned from military duty. These included Arthur 
Plantagenet, a Spear and Governor of Calais, Edward Howard, 
who was killed before he could be installed, and Sir John 
Wallop, who was elected to the Garter shortly after his 
return from leading the army against France in 1543.
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England. A Complete Record From the Earliest Time to the Present
Day of the Knights of All_the Orders of Chivalry in England,
Scotland, and Ireland,and of Knights Bachelors (2 vols,London,
1971),11. Shaw does not always give precise accounts. For 
example he lists "ten or more" anonymous knights who were 
created at the siege of Morlaix. But he has employed a wide 
range of manuscripts, wider, for instance, than that used by 
C .G.Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai 1513-1519 
(Oxford, 1971),p.11, who relied on only one document, L.P. I 
(4468), when calculating the number of knights made at Tournai, 
and, as a result, came to a different total than did Shaw. See 
also N.Williams,Henry VIII and His Court (London,1971),p.212, 
and Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p.71.
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The honour of knighthood, and the paraphenalia
which accompanied it, would seem to have been taken seriously
by the nobles. Henry himself completed the erection of the
Garter Chapel at Windsor which had begun during the fifteenth
century. When Henry's old comrade Brandon made his will before
leaving for France in 1544, the duke requested that in the
event of his death his last gift to the king should be his
Garter collar, melted down and made into a cup.'*' During the
early years of the reign, four courtiers risked their lives
and the wrath of the king when, at the end of the disastrous
1511 expedition, they left the English army and went to court
2of Ferdinand to seek knighthood from his hands. And Gruffydd
claimed that 60 gentlemen were on board the Mary Rose when it
sank in the Channel in 1545, having gone on board to win their
3knignthoods in action against the French. Their eagerness to 
win the title in such a way may well have been prompted by the 
difficulty of obtaining it when England was at peace. Apart 
from the few royal occasions, knighthood was basically an 
honour accompanying war, the number of knights tending to 
shrink during lengthy periods of peace. Knighthood was thus 
one of the hallmarks of having performed satisfactory military 
service, and, hence, marked its bearer as a prominent member 
of the military elite.
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The last opportunity which the nobles had to make a 
statement about themselves and their function in society was 
in their funerary monuments, the instrument through which they 
transmitted the image in which they wished to be remembered by 
posterity.^
The nobles had an image of themselves as a group of 
noble warriors, and so the most common type of memorial which 
they erected to themselves was that of the gentleman soldier.
The common form of memorial adopted by the military
elite since at least the sixteenth century had been the incised
brass or stone slab, or the three dimensional effigy, showing
an armoured figure. The brass slab in particular had come into
use at almost the same time as the knights emerged as a
relatively clearly defined social class, during the thirteenth 
2century. Because this group was considered to be a military 
force its brass memorials depicted warriors. But the brass 
effigy of the soldier was gradually adopted by superior and 
inferior grades of society who also considered that they were 
noble warriors. By the next century, peers as well as knights, 
squires and gentlemen had similar brass memorials, their 
splendour varying according to their rank. The earliest 
surviving brass effigy of an armed peer is that of Maurice Lord 
Berkeley (d.1392), and was laid down just over a century after 
the first recorded English military brass of 1277. •
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similar funeral monuments were still popular: "...sepulchres 
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The nobility continued to use military memorials, 
and the brass in particular, until beyond the end of Henry's 
reign. Most military brasses actually date from the period 
1485-1547. The 220 surviving brasses of warriors from the 
largest single category of Tudor brass memorials. It may 
be that the relative frequency of such brasses from the Tudor 
era has been due to the vagaries of time destroying a higher 
proportion of earlier brasses. But in the corresponding 
period only 100 years before the Tudors the rate of laying 
down brasses was not significantly smaller. A total of 80 
military brasses survive from the 24 years of Henry VII's 
reign, representing an average of 3 new brasses per year, the 
same as for his son's era. This was approximately the same 
as for the years 1409-1447, from which period 132 military 
brasses are recorded.
A number of the brasses from Henry's era were 
erected by members of his household and court circle, such as 
that of a former Usher of the Chamber, John Leventhorpe (d.1510), 
William Thynne(d.1546) Master of the Household, and Sir Humphrey 
Stafford (d.1548) a Squire of the Body. Amongst the peers who 
erected military effigies of themselves were Thomas, father of 
Anne Boleyn (d.1538), Sir John Touchett Lord Audley (d.1525) and 
John Lord Marney (d.1549).
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(Wakefield, 1975), pp.216-7 and M.Clayton, Catalogue of 
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It has not been possible to compile figures for the other 
major types of memorial such as the three dimensional effigy, 
but several of these, including those of Thomas, third Duke 
of Norfolk, the Earl of Rutland, the first Lord Marney and 
the Hoby brothers, are pictured in L.Stone, Sculpture in 
Britain: The Middle Ages second ed. (Harmondsworth, 19 72) , 
plate 191 (A) and M.Whinney, Sculpture in Britain 1530-1830 
(Harmondsworth, 1964), plates 2 (B), 3(A) and (B), 4, 7.
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The funerals which occasioned these effigies were 
in themselves an affirmation of the affinity between the noble 
lifestyle in general and the imagery of war. Descriptions of 
most of the major noble funerals that occurred during the 
middle of the century are recorded in the diary of a London 
merchant, Henry Machyn. Entirely typical of these funerals 
was that of Greqory Lord Cromwell in 1551. His funeral 
procession was embellished by the presence of a herald, a 
standard, a banner of arms, a coat of arms, a helmet, sword, 
shield and numerous escutcheons. The martial ornaments were 
presented at the altar and then hunq around the church.'*'
There were differences in the splendour of such 
funerals and monuments, dependinq on the wealth and personal 
inclination of the individual. Some wealthynobles chose to 
have no memorial whatsoever, while others, such as Sir Anthony 
Browne, whose magnificent three dimensional military effigy is 
in his chapel at Battle, chose elaborate monuments.
But the great similarity of such military monuments 
which were chosen as the memorials of the nobility indicates 
the extent to which they considered themselves to be a military 
group, and shows how a common iconography was shared amongst 
peers, knights, squires and armigerous gentlemen.
/ 66...
1. H.Machyn, The Diary of Henry Machyn, Citizen and Merchant-
Taylor of London From A.D. 1550 to A.D. 1563 ed.J.G.Nichols
(Camden, O.S., Vol.XLII), p.7.
- 66 -
It is not always easy to establish clearly who was 
a noble, and a member of the military elite, and what rank 
he held within the nobility. But it does appear that 
contemporaries had some quite definite ideas about the kind 
of behaviour which was appropriate to a noble/ by which they 
could identify the eminent members of society. These categories 
of behaviour encompassed such things as dress, eating habits, 
and recreation, and placed considerable emphasis on the military 
nature of the noble.
At the same time, the nobility, as a group, was 
a thriving division of society, with no signs of decadence 
under the jealous and vindictive rule of the early Tudor. In 
fact, the opposite was perhaps the case, with Henry actually 
actively encouraging the influx of fresh recruits into various 
ranks of the nobility.
There was a great importance placed on the military 
qualities of the nobles in a number of key areas of its 
activity. These areas included the education of nobles, an 
emphasis which was completely against the desires and aims of 
the humanists, for whom some historians have claimed such a 
great influence on the education of Tudor nobles. The nobles 
continued to seek employment in offices which were frequently 
connected with warfare, often as a matter of family tradition. 
The rewards which they gained from such service could be 
substantial. Sometimes these rewards were somewhat intangible, 
such as the fulfilling of a sense of honour and duty. But 
there were also more tangible rewards which their rank could 
gain them, such as the benefits of large scale corruption.
But knighthood remained the most frequently dispensed tangible 
reward for war service.
And at their death, the military nature of the 
nobles was acknowledged finally by the military effigies which 
were often placed on their tombs.
vi i i. Conclusion.
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A general picture of the nobility as a warrior 
caste emerges from considerations of their composition, their 
education, their careers, the rewards which they sought and 
obtained for their service in war, the titles which were 
conferred on them, and the memorials which they built for 
themselves. Those nobles who left traces of themselves in 
the records usually conform to this pattern of the military 
elite. Unfortunately only a small proportion of the nobles 
make any consistent mark in the records. Others who presumably 
shared their attitudes and their life style often leave no 
trace at all of their thoughts and behaviour, except by 
occasional accident. One of these, for instance, is Sir John 
Clerk, who died in 1539. Sir John's name does not appear in 
connection with the 1513 war, and he was not even knighted until 
the parliament of 1529. Yet on his brass memorial, underneath 
his portrait as a kneeling knight, he recorded what he 
apparently considered the most significant event of his life. 
This was the day on which he captured the Due de Longueville, 
deputy commander of the French cavalry, at the battle of Spurs, 
some 26 years before his death.'*' There were probably many- 
other such minor nobles who were on the fringe of court life 
whose interest in the military life has not been recorded.
This in itself suggests the major difficulty involved 
in depicting the main features of the noble lifestyle during 
the early sixteenth century. The type of evidence which 
survives tends to record the more obvious aspects of noble 
life, behaviour which may on occasions have been obvious merely 
because it was somewhat abnormal, and hence worthy of note.
It should be borne in mind when considering the nobility as a 
military elite that they were also civilians. As well as being
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courtiers and soldiers, they were also fathers, husbands, 
and the owners and administrators of large properties. There 
were many areas of social activity in which the noble moved, 
each demanding a different role from its participants. There 
were long periods of official peace on occasion, and the 
expeditions of 1513 and 1544 stand out partly because there 
was such a concentrated involvement in war by the nobility 
as a whole.
But it can also be argued that aspects of noble life 
such as wars, tournaments, knighthoods and memorials were 
indicative of large portion of their social activity, both 
in terms of their money and their energy. The wars and 
tournaments were, at this time, not clearly differentiated 
from peacetime activities, as is shown in Chapters Six and Seven. 
And they were not isolated occurrences. A war was not confined 
merely to the few months spent on expeditions. It also 
spanned the time, albeit unofficially, during which the nobles 
planned and negotiated treaties of peace and hostility, and 
the months and even years during which navies were built and 
armouries filled, as well as decades of border skirmishes and 
raids, and, when war was ended by a truce, the seasons spent 
garrisoning fortresses in newly conquered territory. There 
were few years during Henry's reign free from war or rumours 
of wars.
As a result, the noble lifestyle tended to be 
dominated by the demands of war, and the court life with its 
politics, tournaments and pageants both mirrored and fostered 
an interest in martial pursuits. Wartime roles were continued 
in peacetime as lavish displays and large entourages remained 




THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ARMY: PART I
One of the reasons why historians have been so 
persistent in trying to identify a new lifestyle amonst the 
nobles is the common belief that early sixteenth century 
warfare was substantially different to that of previous 
centuries. Sixteenth century warfare has been portrayed by 
military historians as more rational, more egalitarian, and 
as a result, less the preserve of the nobility than it had 
been previously. Perhaps the most respected English military 
historian, C.W.C.Oman, concluded his study of medieval war 
with the comment that during the sixteenth century
...the modern world was working a transformation 
in military matters which was to make the methods 
of mediaeval war seem even further removed from 
the strategy of our own century than are the 
operations of the ancients. . .
Because of such pre-conceptions about the nature of 
sixteenth century war, it has been thought that military 
activity was a less important element of the noble lifestyle, 
and that a more literary emphasis arose in the typical 
patterns of their behaviour.
But, as is shown in the following three chapters, 
early sixteenth century was was still far from highly rational 
in its administration or practice, and the nobles remained of 
paramount importance in nearly all its aspects. There 
continued to be a profound influence by traditional procedures 
and attitudes not only in the ways in which battles were 
fought, but in the equipment used, strategies, recruitment, 
finance, regulations, fortification, logistics and many other 
important elements of Tudor warfare.
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1. C.W.C.Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515 
(1885) ed. J.H.Beeler(Ithaca, 1973), p.165.
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There has been a tendency to date back to Henry's 
reign the effect of significant change in military practice 
which did begin to make itself felt by the reign of 
Elizabeth and which had brought about a change in English 
military practice by the end of the seventeenth century.
J .W.Fortescue, for example, included Henry's armies in what 
he considered to be a time of innovation, conditioned in 
manoeuvre and organisation by revived classical models. He 
wrote that
Every soldier steeped himself in ancient military 
lore, and quoted the Hipparchicus of Xenophon... In 
a word Europe for two centuries, went forth to war 
with the newest pattern of musket in hand, and a ^
brain stocked with maxims from Frontinus and Vegetius.
There was indeed innovation, such as the development 
of firearms. Men with the knowledge of new methods of war 
came to England as soldiers, architects and technicians. An 
Italian craftsman wrote to Henry in 1544 offering his own 
services and the skills of several other "artists" in making
2new weapons such as silent gunpowder, suitable for ambushes.
/71. . .
1. J.W.Fortescue, A History of the British Army. First Part - 
To the Close of the Seven Years War (3 vols, London, 1899),
I, p.106. It is perhaps because of the influence of such 
assumptions that so little attention has been paid to 
Tudor military history. The only extensive studies of 
early sixteenth century English war yet published are those 
by C.G. Cruickshank. H.Belloc, Warfare in England (London, 
1912), for instance, passes over Henry's army altogether.
It is perhaps fair to say that the military history of 
the early Tudors has been regarded as something of a 
backwater.
2. L.P. XIX, i (219) .
- 71 -
But Fortescue was forced to express amazement 
because, given the wealth of technical innovation available, 
Henry seemed reluctant to press ahead with the military 
reforms which Fortescue considered would have obviated the 
need for change in the army for 150 years. To Fortescue's 
apparent annoyance, Henry neglected his infantry, except for 
the archers who would be obsolete by the end of the century, 
and paid more attention to increasing the heavy cavalry by 
taking steps to improve the breed of warhorses.'*'
Henry's reign was in fact quite conservative in
its approach to the organisation of the army, tending to
trust to past usages rather than unproven methods and
equipment. The administration of the army was mainly on the
basis of tradition and experience, rather than any scientific
or regulated basis. What was apparently the first manual of
instructions for the English army only appeared in the 1540's
and covered the regulation of both the army and navy in a
2score of small pages.
The earliest printing of a Continental treatise on
3war was not until the second half of the century.
Despite some qualifications, historians have usually 
regarded the warfare of the early Tudor period as being a kind
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of modern war. One of the essential characteristics of 
this new war was that there was said to be an almost total 
eclipse of the heavily armoured noble cavalryman, who, 
theoretically, dominated medieval warfare but who ceased to 
do so in the sixteenth century. He was said to have been 
displaced by more highly disciplined, non-noble infantrymen 
armed with pike and musket.
The records of Henry's military expeditions, 
however, indicates that the replacement of the heavy 
cavalryman was neither so extensive nor as novel as has 
generally been assumed. It may be that the writings of 
theorists such as Machiavelli rather than the records of 
actual practice have influenced modern views of Tudor war. 
The theory of the decline of the noble cavalryman often 
seems to take its language and its assumptions from writers 
such as Machiavelli. He wrote that infantry was superior 
to cavalry, which was a force to be retained only as the 
second strength of the army. Cavalry, he believed, was 
useful for raiding, scouting and harassment, but of little 
use on the battlefield, apart from pursuing a routed army, 
and a knot of infantrymen was unconquerable by horsemen.'*'
As will be shown, Henry's era was relatively 
traditional in most areas of military activity, including 
the use of cavalry.
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i• Cavalry in Henry VIII's Army.
Several types of troops were available to Henry,
but clearly the most prestigious was the noble, mounted and
in complete armour. The noble cavalryman was still accorded
the greatest prestige during the reign of Elizabeth, when a
serving soldier, Sir Roger Williams, wrote that to serve as
a man at arms was the most honourable charge that a person
might have in war.*' Because the equipment of a man at arms
was expensive only the more wealthy, and hence noble, members
of the community could afford to serve in such a position.
Those who did serve as men at arms included peers, as well
as lesser nobles who wished to make a mark at court. These
nobles were often formed into exclusive bands based on branches
of the royal household, such as the King's Spears (1513), the
Gentlemen Pensioners (1544), or the Knights and Squires of
the Body. Such cavalrymen constituted an insignificant
proportion of the army in terms of sheer numbers, but their
scarcity belied the services which they performed. There were
perhaps no more than 200 of them attached to the household at
any one time. The Spears, for example, consisted of 50 nobles
attended by an archer (who might well have been a medium
2cavalryman), a groom and a page. The number of Knights and 
Squires of the Body is somewhat vaguer, but was more than 100 
in 1516.3
Apart from the extremely heavily armed men at arms, 
who were protected from head to foot, there were many more 
demi-lances available for the army. These were similar to the 
men at arms in appearance and function, but were usually without 
heavy defences for the limbs. Nobles would also have been 
found amongst their ranks, although in what proportions is not 
clear.
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The rest of the army was made up of light cavalry, 
pike and billmen, archers, arquebusiers, gunners and pioneers, 
as well as non combatants such as cooks, hunters and other 
common soldiers who were not members of the elite group, 
although they were commanded by noble captains.
Such was the poor state of the contemporary
organisation for war that the men who raised the armies
actually had little idea of the amount and quality of troops
available. But they did have definite ideas of what should
have been the composition of an army, as a note in Wolsey's
hand indicates. He expected the English army of 1513 would
have 1,000 barded horse - the nobles - each with a page and
groom, who would both be fighters, a further 1,000 nobles on
unbarded horses, each with a page and groom, 3,000 demi-lances,
each with light armour except for the legs, and an infantry
force of 10,000 archers, 4,500 bills and pikes from England
and Wales, 5,000 German pikes, 500 cannoneers and 1,000
pioneers."*" Wolsey's planning probably did not correspond
to the army that actually assembled, although it is not
possible to be certain because of the nature of the records.
The English always had trouble getting enough horsemen. Sir
Edward Poynings complained in 1513 that there were few trained
denvlances to be found in Kent, and seven nobles who raised
1,119 men in the same year could only supply 19 men at arms
2and 25 demi-lances.
This, however, was not new or unusual for the 
English, nor did it mean that the cavalry were insignificant 
on the battlefied. The continuing importance of the horseman 
is described in Chapter Five. There had been a continual 
shortage of heavy cavalry since at least the twelfth century,
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and for over two hundred years the largest and, some consider,
most effective portion of the army had been the archers and
billmen. One recent historian, J.Schlight, has even argued
that mercenary infantry were as important and much more
numerous than the heavy cavalry as early as the late eleventh
century.^ Henry V appears to have taken 2,300 men at arms
to France in 1416, or about one heavy cavalryman in seven
2soldiers. Depending on the circumstances, the heavy cavalry 
may have been a major or miniscule segment of the army, both 
in the medieval period and during Henry's reign. One army 
raised in 1306 contained 40 light cavalry, 8 constables of 
foot, and 826 infantry, a force which joined in a Scottish 
campaign to which the king brought only 88 paid heavy cavalry. 
At the battle of Falkirk, in contrast, perhaps as many as
3.000 heavy cavalrymen were present, together with an infantry3force reckoned at 25,700. Henry VIII had similarly varying 
forces of cavalry in his army. He left 5,000 horsemen and
6.000 infantrymen to guard Tournai in 1514, although not all
the horse would have been heavy cavalry. If he actually
managed to assemble 2,000 men at arms for his 1513 army - which
would seem unlikely - it was by no means an inconsiderable
4cavalry force compared to previous centuries. It would appear
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that Henry actually managed to put 700 cavalry into the field 
at the battle of Spurs, or at least enough heavy cavalry to 
overthrow 2,000 French men at arms.^
The noble heavy cavalryman was equally as evident
in the early sixteenth century army as he had been in previous
centuries. Although he had not been absolutely predominant
in the field either numerically or tactically for several
centuries, his equipment and rank still made him extremely 
2important. At the same time, the methods of recruiting heavy
cavalry in particular and troops in general remained essentially
traditional. The general recruitment of troops is discussed
in the next chapter. The identity between the nobility, the
court, and their role as soldiers is shown by the way in which
much of the heavy cavalry was raised and regulated directly by
the royal household, through the creation by Henry of bodies
such as the Spears and the Gentlemen Pensioners. The formation
by Henry of groups of nobles each supported by several
attendants and possessing three warhorses was in itself a copy
of the fifteenth century French system of compagnies d 1ordonnance.
As with most aspects of contemporary war, it does not seem to
have become particularly systematic. The composition of the
bodies of horsemen, for example, was never fixed. Audley wrote
in the 1540's that he thoughta spear or lance should have up
to five men as well as a man at arms, as was current practice
3m  France, but not in England.
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Centuries before Henry came to the throne, Edward I 
had been forced to augment his own scarce heavy cavalry by 
retaining nobles in his household, largely relying on them 
for most of his wars. The traditions which he and other 
English warrior monarchs had fostered were followed by Henry 





The weapons of early sixteenth century armies also 
indicate the predominantly traditional nature of war, while 
at the same time showing that new methods and implements were 
fitted into already existing practices.
Armaments, with one or two notable exceptions, were 
much the same as they had been for several hundred years.
Cavalry was armed with lance, sword, axe and mace, and, more 
frequently by the middle of the century, a handgun. The heavy 
cavalry had lances that weighed as much as 20 pounds, whereas 
a lighter, but still sturdy, boar spear was used by the javelins 
and demi-lances.*'
The sword and mace were virtually unchanged from
those of previous centuries, as was the axe. The English were
conservative in their choice of weapons, and this sometimes
caused difficulties when dealing with Continental allies, some
of whom had adopted other implements of war. In 1544 some
Imperial mercenaries were delayed in joining the English army
because the English insisted that they buy heavy lances for
horsemen presently equipped with boar spears and saddle guns,
2and pikes and halberds for men armed with arquebuses.
Infantrymen were classified according to their 
weapons. These arms were of two main categories: missile 
weapons and hand combat weapons. One type of footsoldier would 
carry a pike, bill, halberd, glaive, partisan, sword or axe, 
the other a bow, crossbow, or gun.
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The pike and bill were probably used in approximately 
equal proportions by the English at this time, although the 
bill was more evident at Flodden, where it was shown to be 
more wieldy than the long pikes of the Scots. An inventory 
of weapons supplies for the 1544 army shows that equal reserves 
of both these major kinds of hand combat weapons were held.*-
The weapon which at this time was considered to be
traditionally English was the longbow. Its rapid rate of
fire, its ability to pierce armour, and its lightness had made
it an excellent weapon against the French, who relied more
heavily on armoured cavalry than had the English. The longbow
was still seen as the weapon of the English at this time.
A proclamation by Henry repeating the Statute of Westminster
urged men to practice with the bow because it "...ever hath
been the most sure and natural feat of war for his said subjects
in and for the defense of their persons and of this his realm..."
Archery practice was compulsory, although the need for the
reiteration of this in many proclamations indicates that it
had to compete with gambling and other games, as well as with
2guns and crossbows, as a national pastime.
Despite anxiety about a decline in English ability 
with the longbow - and perhaps its effectiveness against 
improved sixteenth century armour - the bow continued to be 
a major element of sixteenth century armies, at least until the
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reign of Elizabeth. The 10,000 infantry archers provided
for in Wolsey's note exceeded the projected combined strength
of the English and German pike that was to be raised for the
1513 expedition. Only gradual adoption of the handgun as an
alternative occurred during Henry's reign, although the king
and some other nobles showed some interest in the gunpowder
weapon. During the later years of his reign, for example,
Henry ordered Sir Peter Meawtes to raise a force of 100 gunmen
for use in the 1544 war.^ But although arquebusiers saw some
service during 1544, they were only to be found in equal
proportions to longbowmen in the king's personal guard. There
were 75 of each type of missile armed soldier about the royal
2person during his march to Boulogne.
The arquebus did not in itself mark any major change
in tactics at this time. Except under exceptional circumstances
it was too crude a weapon to influence the outcome of battles.
Its development as a major weapon of war, bringing about changes
in tactics, occurred much later, and particularly during the
seventeenth century when it forced the cavalry to wear armour
3which was too ponderous to be endured.
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The role of armour in early, sixteenth century war 
indicates several things about the noble lifestyle, as well 
as current military practice. It indicates the importance 
placed by contemporaries on the noble in war, and, conversely, 
the significance which the trappings of war held for the 
noble. At the same time, it shows how the military practice 
of the time built and improved on past examples, rather than 
looking to the future when, by the end of the seventeenth 
century, armour had largely been abandoned.
Rather than being regarded as obsolete, armour was 
being used more extensively than ever during Henry's wars.
The higher ranks had used armour for centuries. But during 
this period it became more commonly used amongst the less 
exalted soldiers rather than merely for the nobility. No army 
of the time ever completely adapted itself to the use of armour 
by all its soldiers. But by the mid-sixteenth century a 
large proportion of the common soldiers would have had at least 
the basic harness of a metal hat, a breastplate and defences 
for the arms and legs. The 1544 muster book shows that about 
a quarter of 30,261 men reviewed in three counties had 
harnesses.*- Audley recommended an increased use of armour.
He wrote that out of every 100 men, 20 should have white 
corselets (unpainted polished breastplates) worn by the front 
ranks in order to strike fear into the enemy when seen from 
afar. This was not to say, he added, that other men should 
be without armour - except for missile troops -but rather that 
armour should go to the men with the greatest strength and 
experience, and not to those men chosen by their captains out 
of favour. This distribution of armour by favouritism would
2appear to have been the current method of allocating defences.
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Audley also warned that the English would never 
be strong in the field until this ceased, and that if his 
suggestions were ignored the army could be in grave danger 
one day. In the opinion of this serving soldier, therefore, 
armour was of great importance.
Henry's reign in fact saw a vigorous policy of
purchasing armour, an activity which was shared by his fellow
monarchs. Richard Jerningham wrote to Henry in January 1513
from Milan, a major armour producing centre, that countries
such as Spain had bought all the available Almain rivets
(suits of armour), but he had managed to contract for 5,000
rivets.*’ A month later, Henry managed to buy 2,000 Almain
rivets, consisting of breast and backplate, arm and neckguards
2and helmets, for his footmen from a Florentine merchant.
This purchasing policy continued into the 1540's,
when rising prices for locally made armour forced the English
to once again buy European harness. English stocks of armour
were probably made expensive at this time because of its
sudden scarcity after a decade of relative peace. Purchases
of Continental harness continued even as the invasion force
sailed. Thomas Lok reported purchases in the Netherlands in
June, while two weeks before he wrote his letter, Venice
granted an export licence for 1,050 suits of cavalry and
3infantry armour made for Henry in Brescia.
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While attempts were made to provide better
protection for the infantry as well as the cavalry, armour
continued to become more elaborate, and hence more effective,
for the higher ranks. The heavy cavalry of this time in
particular had more complete armour than ever before, so that
the weighty bards of the horses began to hamper freedom of
movement. During the flight from Guinegate in 1513, the
French hacked off their bards in order to increase the speed
of their flight. It is a mark of the conservatism of Henry
and his administrators that the English were disappointed
during the later war by the poor results of their attempts
to hire barded horse in Europe, as the practice by mid
century was generally towards an abandonment of horse defences.
Henry's commissioners reported in 1544 that none of the 1,200
horse brought to the muster by one German commander had bards.
The Germans told the commissioners that they had ceased to use
bards because they were considered too heavy and only for show.
The English had expected that 200 of the band of horse would
have been barded. After the war, Audley recommended an
increased use of barded horse - one in every four - because
he considered it was the barded steed that frequently meant
2the difference between safety and disaster for its master.
Nevertheless, the most elaborately equipped men at
arms remained hard to recruit, Wotton reporting in 1544 that
3the emperor expected not 5 0 in 1,000.
Although the use of horse bards had not proved 
successful, armour for the nobleman did prove effective. The 
weight of a complete armour was not significantly greater than
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for previous periods, at between 40 and 100 pounds, yet 
continuing refinements made it more adaptable and efficient. 
Armour could now be obtained for most of the varying kinds 
of combat in which a noble could expect to participate. There 
were armours for field and tilt, for foot or horseback contests, 
and for all the sophisticated variations of war and tournament 
fighting which were recognised by contemporaries, as well as 
armour for parades and pageants.
It was only during the last decades of the century 
that many amongst the senior ranks of the army began to dispense 
with complete armour, and even then the horseman continued to 
be well protected with helmet, collar, breast and backplate, 
as well as various kinds of arm and leg defences.*- Henry and 
his fellow nobles continued to employ armour, both during 
peacetime and wartime, not only as an efficient protection for 
their persons, but as a mark of their rank in the army, and, 
more generally, in society. The complete armour of the early 
sixteenth century provided great physical protection. The Scots 
nobles at Flodden were impervious to English archery in their 
fine new German armours, and had to be killed with bills which 
were used to crack open their harness. At the same time, the 
nobles were clearly marked on the battlefield by their 
magnificent armour, which was gilded and decorated without 
regard to cost. As a result their enemies were usually more 
careful to preserve the lives of wearers of such armour in the 
hope of obtaining a large ransom by capturing the noble alive.
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These two functions of armour were assumed, for example, by 
a soldier who reported on the battle of Pinkie which was 
fought between the English and the Scots in 1547. In writing 
down his memories of this battle, the soldier claimed that 
there were three reasons why there was a mass slaughter of 
the Scots after the battle. These were: the vow by Scottish 
soldiers to kill any Englishman they captured; their cruel 
killing of Lord Eures and others who they could have spared 
after the battle of Ancrum Moor in 1545; and because
...their armour among them so little differing, 
all clade alike in jacks covered with white leather, 
doublets of the same, or fustian, and most commonlie 
all white hosen, not one with either chaine, brooch, 
ring, or garment of silke...
This lacke of difference in apparell was the chiefest 
cause that so manie of their great men and gentlemen 
were killed, and so few saved. The outward shew, the 
resemblance of signs, whereby a stranger might discerne 
a poore man from a gentleman, was not among them to 
be seene.
The English nobles, in contrast, were clearly marked with 
their magnificently decorated armour.^
The important role played by armour was recognised
by the nobles, who took the trouble to obtain armour which
was not only increasingly efficient, but perhaps more lavishly
decorated than ever before. Henry set up his own armoury in
Greenwich which he staffed with foreign craftsmen. It became
a mark of his favour for a noble to be allowed to purchase the
2extremely costly armour produced by the workshop. -For over 
two hundred years armour continued to be a badge of nobility. 
Kings, princes, commanders of armies and gentlemen soldiers 
had their portraits painted showing them in armour, as well as 
having military effigies placed on their tombs. One of the
/ 8 6 . .  .
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Titian portraits of Charles V, for example, shows him on 
horseback armed as a demi-lance, and there are numerous 
portraits of Francis I in similar poses.
As will be shown in Chapter Six, the use of 
military equipment as a mark of nobility was a practice 
which the noble continued even during ostensibly peacetime 
occasions, especially at court events.
/ 8 7 .
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One of the most confusing aspects of sixteenth 
century war is the way in which new skills and instruments 
of war were introduced without an apparent immediate revolution 
in the art of war. Such a new instrument was the cannon, a 
weapon of unprecedented firepower. Despite its dramatically 
novel nature, evidence of its influence on the strategies 
and tactics of war at this time is equivocal. Opinions on 
the use to which cannons should be put were still varied, as 
no systematic means of employing the weapon had yet been 
devised. The first treatise on gunnery was not written until 
an Italian publication appeared in 1537, and England did not 
receive a translation of the book until 1588.*" The manufacture 
and use of cannon continued to be haphazard, especially in 
England, throughout Henry's reign. Current methods of making 
cannons were still crude, and there was as yet no standardization 
of calibres. The first attempt to set some standard calibres 
was actually made in 1544 by Charles V. But meanwhile cannons 
in Henry's armies were of many arbitrarily decided shapes and 
sizes. His mortars for the 1544 army had a shot capacity of 
anywhere between 30 and 200 pounds. This meant that a great 
many weapons had to have their shot made for them individually.
It probably meant also that gunners had to re-learn the 
characteristics of any weapon other than the one which they 
customarily used.2
England was also in a vulnerable position as far as
supplies for its heavy armaments were concerned. As late as
Elizabeth's reign virtually all its gunpowder had to be
imported from Spain, and the first cannon made in England was
3not cast until 1521.
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The current state of technological development
of cannons meant that by the early sixteenth century the
skill of fortification makers had surpassed that of attackers.
The larger cannons had a very slow rate of fire, owing to
the danger of them bursting. Bombards which could fire as
much as 260 pounds of shot could only fire 5 times a day,
whereas the smaller 8 pound pot guns, ineffective against
thick walls, could fire almost continuously.*' The result
was that even the large siege trains of the 1513 and 1544
armies still had great difficulty in battering the walls of
even minor castles and cities. It was estimated, for example,
that the city of Boulogne received about 100,000 shots from
Henry's cannon in 1544 before being reduced. The city held
out for two weeks longer than had been required of it by
2Francis. Hertford made only a token effort to besiege 
Edinburgh castle in the same year because he knew he had not 
the means or the time to breach its walls. The same conditions 
had also applied in 1513, when Henry's siege train could not 
breach the walls of the minor provincial centre Therouanne 
even after a six week siege, a matter of some comment at the 
time.3
The poor administration of the army also limited 
the effectiveness of cannon because there was usually a 
shortage of powder and shot. In 1513, Henry only had enough 
powder for 16 days of continuous firing, and there were constant
4complaints of shortages in 1544.
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Despite such limitations, cannons had probably 
had their most significant effect in the area of siege warfare, 
the dominant form of war at the time as is shown in Chapter 
Five. But this effect was largely in the area of forcing 
military architects to take account of cannon fire when 
designing their defences, rather than shortening sieges or 
causing warfare to be more a matter of field operations.
Cannons were probably less significant in the field
than in siege warfare, although contemporary opinion seems
to have varied. The rather doubtful theory of Machiavelli
held that 10 cannons were sufficient for a siege and that
in the field cannons should be used to guard the encampment,
and if they were used in a battle, one salvo was sufficient.*"
A similar opinion was shared by the soldier Audley, who
recommended only that the cannon should be kept charged during
the course of a battle in case any misfortune should befall the
2cavalry or infantry. But Henry himself seems to have regarded
cannon as an essential component of a field operation. In
1523 he altered his tactics in order to allow for the
requirements of his cannon. He abandoned manouevres around
Boulogne during the winter because of the difficulty of
transporting siege and field artillery over wet roads. He
claimed that he was afraid that his men would be left
vulnerable to attack from larger forces if they could not take3their guns with them. Henry had also taken great pains to 
ensure the safety of one of his twelve apostles during the 
1513 expedition. The apostles were giant cannon forged 
specially for the invasion, and each was given the name of 
an apostle, a common practice of the time when cannons were 
still rare enough to be named individually. Henry's rage and
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anxiety when the apostle was overturned in a ditch and in 
danger of capture might also indicate that cannons were as 
much a status symbol for the king as an instrument of war. 
Henry had taken great pains during the prelude to the war 
to build up a siege train worthy of a monarch, as had his 
rival James of Scotland, whose artillery was a matter for 
admiration amongst the English. But the limited development 
of the cannon, and the generally unscientific handling of 
the weapon meant that cannons were generally of no great 
significance during the battles fought by the English at 
this time. At the battle of Flodden, for example, the poor 
placement of the Scots guns meant that they were unable to 
depress their muzzles sufficiently to fire on the English, 
while the English guns, more fortunately firing uphill, 
caused some initial losses amongst the. Scots, but fell silent 
when the serious fighting began.*-
Despite its imposing presence, the cannon was 
therefore only of limited effectiveness during the early 
part of the sixteenth century, and was perhaps a symbol of 
the prestige of its owner as much as a key weapon of war.
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The navy was no more systematic or more efficient 
than was the army of the time. The navy was actually regarded 
more as an adjunct to the land forces than as a separate 
force, and as a result was manned and commanded by men who 
were soldiers rather than marines. Admiral Thomas Howard, 
for example, came ashore in 1513 in order to lead his men 
against the invading Scots, and in the same year the French 
vice-admiral was captured amongst the French cavalry at Spurs. 
Tactically, the ships were thought of as mobile platforms for 
seaborne soldiers. Ships would grapple at the first opportunity, 
even though heavily laden with cannon, in order to allow their 
companies of soldiers to come to blows. One of the most 
tragic aspects of the sinking of the Cordeliere in 1513 was 
that it had contained so many nobles who had gone to sea in 
order to seek such hand to hand combat. In contemporary 
documents the navy was still referred to as the army by the 
sea, rather than as a maritime power which called for a 
different style of war.*
As with cannon, it would appear that the navy was
as much a matter of prestige as a key weapon of war. Henry's
programme to expand the fleet paralleled the English king's
rivalry with James in other areas, at least according to some
contemporaries. James had greatly expanded his fleet during
the early years of the century. He denuded the forests of
Fife and spent £30,000 in building the Great Michael, the pride
2of his fleet. According to Buchanan, both Louis of France
and Henry VIII "...stimulated by emulation, endeavoured to
outvie her...". Henry also expanded his fleet, and commissioned
3the even larger Henry Grace a Dieu.
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Despite such rivalry, the fleets of the time 
remained small. The English fleet in February 1513 consisted 
of 23 ships owned by the king and 5 hired ships. James had 
13 large ships, 10 small ships, plus the three vessels which 
were counted the pride of his navy, the Michael, the Margaret 
and the James, plus a ship of Lynn captured from the English.*
The handling characteristics of these vessels had
to be learned once war began, as the usual practice was to
neglect the use of the navy during peacetime, and in addition
there were many new ships. One of the first duties of
Admiral Edward Howard was to stage a race between the vessels
under his command, the details of which were minutely reported
2to Henry. Once the fleet was tested in this manner, it was 
employed in semi-piratical forays in the Channel. The 
fighting between English and Scottish ships in 1512 was, as 
mentioned, a further cause of friction between the British 
kingdoms. The only relatively systematic use of the navy was 
to raid the Breton coast in 1512 and 1513, which actually only 
achieved the burning of a few coastal villages. The fleet 
also skirmished with the French navy, resulting in the blockade 
of Brest and eventually the disastrous attack by Howard.
One of the main reasons why the fleet was unsystematic 
in its operations was that it continually suffered from a 
shortage of victuals which meant that it could not keep at 
sea for long periods. Henry took an occasional interest in 
improving the navy. He sometimes boarded his vessels in order 
to personally test their cannons. But when there was no 
immediate danger of war, his fleet was neglected. A statute
/9 3. . .
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of 1531-2 claimed that the navy was greatly decayed, 
apparently because it was not much used at the time, and 
that many sailors had lost their jobs, so that in a few 
years not many English would be expert sailors, to the 
great peril of the realm. In order to correct the situation, 
English vessels were to have a monopoly of the Gascon wine 
trade. After another lengthy period, the statute was 
repeated, so there was apparently not much improvement in 
the meantime.* Henry was only able to send 11 of his own 
ships to transport the army to Scotland in 1544, the rest 
of the fleet being made up of some 50 hired vessels. The 
king's navy was never adequate to transport the entirety 
of his army to France. In both 1513 and in 1544 hundreds 
of small private vessels had to be hired to transport the 
king and his minions.
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Contrary to the impression that is often given by 
historians - sometimes simply because they pass over Henry's 
wars - Tudor war was not basically the same kind of warfare 
which was waged during the next century, when artillery and 
the scientific handling of infantry troops armed with firearms 
became predominant. There was much that was traditional about 
warfare during Henry's reign. Troop types, weapons and armour 
were all much as they had been for centuries, although there 
were changes in details. The elite cavalry was scarce 
numerically, but it always had been, and proportions of 
infantry to cavalry showed no marked signs of change. Weapons 
types were much as they had always been, although the pike 
was more common than in the past, and gunmen were becoming 
more frequent by the end of the century. Armour was just as 
important as ever, and perhaps more efficient than in previous 
centuries, and its more elaborate forms continued as a badge 
of nobility, giving special privileges to its bearer.
Artillery was considered by some to be a key weapon, but its 
effectiveness was limited by its crudity, as well as lack of 
theory for its use.
At the same time, early sixteenth century war 
presented a somewhat chaotic appearance, at least viewed in 
retrospect. War tended to be unsystematic, haphazard, and, 
from a modern viewpoint, somewhat irrational.
There were two main reasons for this. One was the 
inadequate systems by which the army had to be administered. 
These did not allow for long term planning or flexible 
handling of an army. The other reason was the attitude shared 
by the elite that war was very much their preserve, a theatre 
in which they could demonstrate to all their station in society.
The first of these aspects of war is described in the 
next two chapters, although the influence of the noble attitude 
to war can also be found in administrative documents. 3ut the 
most detailed consideration of the influence of the noble 





THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ARMY: PART II. THE ADMINISTRATION OF WAR.
Warfare during Henry's reign rarely involved much 
detailed long term planning, or close adherence to the strategies 
and tactics which were worked out. Planning often appeared to 
be on the basis of a matter of weeks or even days once the army 
was in the field, rather than planning for a period of military 
activity covering a season of campaigning extending over six 
months or more. Such short term warfare could not achieve much 
against a country such as France, where a campaign of three 
months would do no more than allow an advance of a few days' 
march towards Paris. An invading army would have needed several 
seasons of steady advance to penetrate French countryside which 
was protected by a plethora of fortifications which had to be 
subdued in some way by an army passing nearby.
Henry's armies were not capable of such progress, one 
of the main reasons being the paucity of the systems of 
military administration, the means by which armies were raised, 
equipped, and kept in the field. Military administration was 
amongst the major impediments to any efficient war effort during 
Henry's reign. Inefficiency caused by corruption, poor 
organisation of the bureaucracy, and lack of foresight by 
administrators and most commanders extended into almost every 
aspect of sixteenth century campaigns. The systems of 
organisation showed no improvement until the last years of the 
reign, when Henry began to institute some reforms, such as the 
setting up of a Navy Board to supervise provisioning of the navy. 
For most of his reign the organisation of war depended on the 
energy and foresight, or lack thereof, of those in some position 
of power. In 1513 it was fortunate for Henry that his Almoner, 
Wolsey, was an energetic man, who gave the army at least some 
small degree of coherence and organisation, an achievement 
testified to by the number of war documents which passed through 
Wolsey's hands. This was largely a unique occurrence, due to 
Wolsey's personality. He took some trouble to ensure that 
ships were victualled and soldiers equipped. But the
/ 9 6 .
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administration of the army was centred on the king and his 
household staff, a practice which continued longer than for 
perhaps any other aspect of government. As a result, even 
G.R.Elton was compelled to admit that
...the administration of naval and military matters 
remained very incomplete, occasional, and unbureaucratic, 
until the era of wars and imperial government after 
1660 forced government to attend to it.-*-
This also meant that much of the burden of 
administration fell on the nobles, who were appointed to 
posts such as Master of Ordnance, where they were responsible 
for supplying the army with its munitions. The presence of 
the nobles can be seen in all the areas of administration 
which are described in the following sections.
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(a). MONEY, MEN AND FOOD.
i. Finance.
Providing finance for the king's many military 
operations proved both difficult for the king's servants 
and ruinous for his country. The eagerness of the king to 
wring more money for his wars is a mark of his enthusiasm 
for war, as it is also a sign of how limited was his sense 
of the effects of his actions. Henry and his advisers 
seem to have had no concept of the amounts of money which 
they poured into war, or else they did not particularly care* 
Henry may have actually been demanding more money at some 
periods than there was coin in circulation.*
The early years of Henry's reign saw a rapid growth 
in military expenditure which had become an explosion by the 
1513 period, when expenditure on war increased by more than
1,000 per cent compared to the first years of his rule. This 
growth is shown in records of income and expenditure from 
Exchequer rolls. In the first complete six monthly period of 
records for Henry's reign, income was £2,658/5/3^ and
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expenditure was £2,247/17/4. By the time of the occupation 
of Tournai in 1514 - which involved not only keeping a 
garrison but also building a massive castle - income was 
£44,845/19/7^ and expenditure £35,00 4/0/10^. As indicated 
by these figures, income was keeping slightly ahead of 
expenditure, but money had to be extorted from the country 
by continual subsidies.* England may even have been raising 
more money for war from its small population than was its 
larger enemy, France, during the 1513 war. A Florentine 
ambassador calculated that Henry was spending 50 per cent
?more per month on war than was Louis.
Profligate expenditure on war was not the particular 
vice of the English king, however, as his rival, James, was 
said to have been forced to sell all his plate and gold chains 
in 1513 to finance the war, eventually being forced to eat off 
pewter, a mark of some ignominy for a king. The nobles of the 
time were quite aware of the meaning of conspicuous consumption, 
and that the possession of certain qualities of household goods 
indicated the status of the owner. The Earl of Moray in later 
years deliberately destroyed a fine dinner service in order to 
impress his guests by producing an even better set of plates3for their dinner. James' willingness to forgo such a mark of 
honour in order to finance his wars indicates the value such an
4involvement as war with England held for him. But whereas 
this type of expenditure ceased in Scotland for a time after 
the disaster of Flodden, it continued almost uninterrupted in
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England until the 1520's, despite occasional moves at court 
to control expenditure more closely. It began once more in 
the 1540's, by which time inflation had made war an even more 
expensive pastime. Wolsey had estimated that the total cost 
of the 1513 invasion was about £372,000. This included the 
cost of the main army, the wages of the Calais garrison for 
six months, the cost of Surrey's army against Scotland, the 
fleet and victuals.* Increased costs, the debasement of the 
coinage, and the sheer magnitude of the operations involved
2made the 1544 invasion much more costly, at around £2,200,000.
Such huge expenditure was beyond the country's 
resources, and was not even comprehensible to the king's 
economists, Wriostheley and Paget, who dealt in figures a 
fraction of the size of Dietz's estimate. They thought the 
war would cost only £250,000, of which, however, they believed
3only £134,000 was readily available. The English knew what 
this meant. A similar problem in the 1520's had resulted in 
the imposition of heavy taxes, which led to the rebellion 
that threatened the security of the kingdom. The king's means 
of raising money was basically limited to loans and grants 
from the parliament. Although these grants were formulated 
in all embracing terms and couched in severe language, they 
were usually evaded, even during the early years of the reign 
when the populace had not become inured to demands for money. 
When Henry returned from the 1513 expedition the parliament 
granted a supplementary subsidy to one which had been given 
in November 1511. The original grant had taxed everybody
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over the age of 15 years. But it had proved inadequate to 
meet the costs of the war, so the supplementary subsidy was 
granted in 1513. But according to the terms of a further 
grant made in 1514, less than £50,000 of this grant was in 
fact collected, so another grant of £100,000 had to be made.
This subsidy was also avoided, so that finally another subsidy 
to raise over £60,000 had to be made.*
The continuation of similar subsidies into the 
1520's lead to the rebellions mentioned above.
After the Dissolution, Henry had more avenues from
which to raise revenue. He could sell his new properties and
the valuables of the church, and he could also raise loans
against the security of his recently acquired land. Much of
this new property was used by Henry on his wars and court
occasions which were commonly connected with war. In 1540, for
example, he seized the property of the Knights of St.John in
order to distribute it amongst the nobles who had participated
in a court tournament, an event discussed in more detail in
Chapter Six. Henry's inability to capitalise to the full extent
on his seizure of church land, as well as the inefficiency of
financial administration, was demonstrated during the 1544 war.
One of the ways in which the government tried to make up for
the anticipated shortfall in finance was by selling church lead.
This project was begun in the very middle of the expedition
itself, in July 1544. Huge quantities of lead were assembled.
There were 5,000 cart loads at Hull, 184 at Whitby, 245 at
Scarborough, 687 at Hartlepool, 100 at Brisow, 1,500 at Lynn,
22,000 at Boston, 1,519 at Grimsby and 360 at Newcastle. 
Apparently Henry and his men had not realised that such a huge
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influx of lead into the Lowland markets would force down
prices, especially at a time when there was a shortage of
ready cash because of the costs involved in the Netherlands
supporting Charles, and when Henry was already having
difficulty in raising loans from the Netherlands.* A glut
was precisely what happened, as one of Henry's commissioners
2informed him in August. Henry was thus faced not only with 
the prospect of a low price for his lead, but also the costs 
involved in assembling and carting it. The result was, having 
already gone to a considerable amount of cost and expenditure 
in preparing the lead for sale, Henry decided not to sell it 
after all.
Administrative inefficiency did not come merely
from short sighted economic planning, however, as the raising
and spending of finances was also hampered by corruption.
Office meant an opportunity for graft, as indicated in Chapter
Two. Only occasionally, when the graft of officials became
too obvious, was the king's interest in making better use of
his money manifested. The Treasurer of the army, Sir Richard
Riche, discovered this in 1544. He was apparently making
money out of his post by making false estimates of the costs
of transporting the army. He claimed that the cost of
transporting the king's section of the army, exclusive of
horses, was £6,000. But the king proved too alert for Riche.
He wrote pointing out that the cost of transporting 8,000 men
was only £800 at 2/- per man. He brusquely asked for more
details. Riche tried to excuse himself by claiming that he
had calculated the transport rate at 5/- per man. Even this
excuse did not clear him, and Henry ordered a more detailed
3examination of his behaviour.
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Riche had tried to take advantage of an unusually 
lucrative opportunity for embezzlement. The other nobles 
had positions which were frequently less gainful, but they 
pursued their chances with an enthusiasm that earned them 
a reputation for notable corruption.* Funds which were meant 
to pay soldiers' wages and living allowances frequently became 
diverted into the pockets of nobles. As a result soldiers 
were often ill fed, ill clothed and broken in health, as well 
as close to mutiny on any campaign that lasted more than a 
few months. This happened in the first expeditions to France, 
the naval war of 1512-3, and during the overseas operations 
from 1544 to 1547.
Inefficient handling of finances thus hampered 
military ventures. This was due, in the first war, to the 
limited resources of the already established means of raising 
cash, and in the later war to the inability of Henry and his 
government to administer the greatly expanded avenues of 
raising revenue in a manner that took full advantage of their 
potential. It was as a consequence of this that many of the 
financial advantages gained by the Reformation for the Crown 
had already been lost by the time Edward VI took the throne.




Financial shortcomings were ruinous for the kingdom 
and crippling for any prolonged military venture. But the 
recruiting of men for the army was perhaps equally as 
devastating for the mounting of an invasion, especially when 
it came to hiring foreign mercenaries: recruitment of men 
by the nobility was perhaps marginally less harmful. Recruitment 
by the nobles also clearly demonstrated their weight as a 
military elite.
Perhaps nowhere else is the state of early sixteenth 
century warfare more obviously manifested than in recruitment 
methods. They were both haphazard and essentially traditional, 
based on forms and customs dating back at least to the Conquest. 
There were some signs of the beginnings of a militia system 
which could be used overseas, of the type which was dominant 
by the end of Elizabeth's reign. But the militia came to 
prominence only in the last years of Henry's reign, and then 
only to a limited extent. There remained the four traditional 
avenues of recruitment for the greater part of this era.*
These were: the shire levies; the dependents of magnates; 
the king's personal army; and foreign mercenaries.
Everyone aged between 16 and 60 was obliged to serve
at the king's command, and, depending on wealth and rank, to
possess certain arms. These obligations were stated at
strategic intervals by means such as the restatement of the
Statute of Westminster in 1511, and a proclamation of 1509
2which ordered the muster and review of troops. The latter
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muster was one of the intermittent occasions when Henry 
authorised his commissioners to take musters throughout 
the kingdom to assess his military strength and to make 
sure that everyone was armed. Amongst the common people, 
in contrast to the nobles, there does not seem to have been 
much enthusiasm to prepare for war. Not only did they rebel 
at war taxes, but surveys sometimes found that they were not 
well armed. This was the case in 1541, when Hertford had 
some of his tenants surveyed. Out of 1,400 households,
183 guns, 433 bows and 317 crossbows were found, less than
one per home, and those that were found usually needed repairs.*
The proclamations ordering musters commanded that 
each man should prepare for war according to. his means and 
rank. The burden of providing men for the shire levies was 
graded according to status, the higher ranks to provide the 
most. A commoner, for example, worth less than £100 could 
be required to send one horseman, while a baron worth 1,000 
marks was to have three horsemen prepared. This may not appear 
to be much in comparison, but a baron would probably also have 
other men serving simultaneously as part of his personal retinue 
in other theatres of war.
This system formed the basis of the shire levy, from 
which Henry's commissioners of array could raise an army for 
use only within the boundaries of England. This was a custom 
which had applied since the reign of John. Henry broke this 
tradition in 1544, when he ordered that 4,000 men of the shire 
levy be sent to Boulogne. This was a matter of desperation 
rather than policy, as the combined means provided by the other
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three systems of recruitment had already been exhausted. 
Gruffydd's description of the levies who arrived in Boulogne 
suggests that the more warlike and able bodied men had 
probably already gone to serve in lords' retinues or with the 
king, as the levies consisted of
...many a flatfooted crooked ankled, squint-eyed 
crooked shoulder, skewheaded, unshapely man, unfit 
to carry arms in fact many admitted they had never 
carried any. Over them were the captains, the dregs, 
short in body shorter in sense, vulgar, ignorant and 
young, who like the soldiers wandered about the 
streets chewing berries as if they were children... 
which is one of the most objectionable and filthy 
spectacles in a man who intends to pursue righteousness 
and honour.1
In future reigns the importance of levies raised 
directly by the king grew steadily. But during Henry's 
reign it was almost purely for national, and usually regional, 
defence.
The single most important means of raising troops 
was through the agency of the military elite. This was one 
of the main ways in which the nobility retained their rank 
and strength in society, a visible demonstration of their 
individual status and the position of their group.
This means of raising troops meant that the king 
had no direct control over the recruitment of large bodies 
of men. Unlike the shire levy system, where soldiers were 
raised direcly by his commissioners, the raising of the 
retinues of magnates was carried out through the agency of 
the nobles. Official letters were sent to men who were 
presumed by court officials to have local prominence. These 
included peers, both spiritual and temporal, knights, squires,
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gentlemen and clerics, as well as institutions such as
colleges and monasteries. The letters ordered the recipients
to provide a specified number of men equipped in a certain
fashion. In 1513 the government appears to have merely-
guessed at who could provide a given number of soldiers, but
in 1544 there was an estimate provided by each of the nobles
before numbers were decided upon.* On occasion these demands
were sent out on the authority of one of the king's regional
commanders, such as Brandon or Hertford when they were
defending the Marches. More usually, they were on the
2authority of the king himself.
A typical order of 1513 was the command from Henry
issued at Greenwich requiring Sir David Owen to provide
100 men for war before April, as the king intended to pass
into France with an army royal. The letter was issued on
22 February, so it allowed 5 weeks for the receipt of the
letter and the mustering and equipping of troops. This was
shown to be over optimistic for most of the army, as it was
3not finally assembled until the beginning of June.
Local lords such as Owen were able to raise men 
from their manors, as part of the customs of the manor, or 
because of tenancy agreements to that effect. Some people 
still received their leases in return for promises of
•1*4- • 4military service.
Another controversial means of raising troops was 
by the noble bringing with him his personal retinue, men who 
wore his badge and livery. This was a system which the Tudors 
had been trying to stamp out for 50 years by the time of the
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1544 war, but which showed no signs of dying. Royal armies
could not have operated without the nobles and their retinues,
and when necessary, the practice was given royal sanction.
This was the case, for example, on 24 July 1513, when George
Talbot Earl of Shrewsbury, as commander of the vanguard, was
instructed by Henry to retain as many people as possible under
the rank of baron for the war from Derby, Staffordshire and
Shropshire. It is perhaps a sign of Henry's eagerness to
exert some control over such retinues that he ordered Talbot
to send him the names of the people he retained as well as
descriptions of the badges, tokens and liveries they would
1wear.
This system of licencing of retainers continued
during the 1540's. John Lord Russell, at the time Admiral of
the fleet, for example, was licenced in September 1542 to
2retain 70 men in his livery.
The result of relying on the nobles to raise men for
the army was that there were huge sections of Henry's army
composed of soldiers who were primarily in the service of his
powerful subjects, rather than directly in the service of the
king. These soldiers wore the uniforms and carried the banners
of nobles, and received the wages paid by the crown through
the hands of their lords. They often, though not always,
actually fought under the direct command of the nobles who
recruited them. Virtually the entire navy for the 1512 Channel
skirmishes, for instance, was in the personal service of the
Admiral, Edward Howard. Under the terms of his three monthly
contract with the king, he was to provide 3,000 men for the
fleet, 18 of them to be captains, 1,750 soldiers and 1,233
sailors and gunners. The king was to provide a further 700
sailors and gunners in his ship the Regent, as well as 17 other
3ships, wages, and money for a surcoat for each man.
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Large retinues were typical of the 1513 war. One
of Henry's favourites, Sir Henry Marney, Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster and commander of the left wing of the
king's ward, brought with him 2 5 demi-lances, 200 archers,
200 bills and 75 pikes.* Thomas Percy Earl of Northumberland
brought 500 men who were either his own tenants and servants,
or men who had come to serve under his banner, to fight in
France, and meanwhile had 1,500 men from his estates in
2Cumberland fighting for Surrey at Flodden.
Others to provide huge bodies of tenants and servants 
for the wars included the Earl of Wiltshire (1,500), Lord 
Bergavenny (984), the Duke of Buckingham (550), and, most 
outstanding of all perhaps, the Stanley family, including the 
Earl of Derby, who had about 6,000 men from their estates at 
Flodden, as well as others in France. These were matched by 
the followings brought by the nobles to the 1544 war, such as
the 100 horsemen and 1,200 infantry who served under John Lord
, 3Russell.
These groups formed the bulk of the manpower, and 
brought with them a great deal of equipment from the private 
arsenals of the nobles. The vanguard of 1513, for example, 
had at least 5,000 men in the service of nobles, according 
to a document in Wolsey1s writing. A notable exception from 
the list was the following of the Earl of Shrewsbury, who would 
almost certainly have had some hundreds of his own men with 
him. Other nobles in the vanguard, such as Sir Sampson Norton, 
Master of the Ordnance, had 1,079 men, while the veteran 
soldier, Sir Rhys ap Thomas, had 2,993 men. If Shrewsbury had
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a following commensurate with his status, the vanguard may 
have had over 6,000 men who wore the badges of nobles, 
nearly double the total amount formed by the other type of 
troops in the advance force, the mercenary soldiers 
consisting of 1,050 Burgundian horse and 2,500 lansknechts.*
As mentioned, troops often brought their own
equipment with them. Most of the nobles appear to have kept
substantial private arsenals with armour and weapons, and
if they were not able or anxious to send men, they could
apparently substitute equipment. Sir Edward Poynings found
himself only able to send 6 men at arms and 9 barded horse
in 1513, instead of the 100 men ordered by the king. He
pointed out in excuse that he had provided 100 sheafs of
2arrows, 100 bills, as well as various kinds of tents. The 
more normal practice with equipment, however, was to draw 
it from the vast stocks built up by the king.
A remarkable aspect of this system of recruiting 
is the light which it sheds on the function and military 
strength of the knights. It shows that the knights - here 
a distinction should be made between the knights as the upper 
rank of the minor nobility, and knights in general, including 
peers - had an important role to play in war. This role was 
apparently linked to their status in society. Several instances 
of knights bringing large retinues have already been mentioned, 
although some of these were of unusual wealth and influence.
Sir Rhys ap Thomas, for example, was virtually a Welsh baron 
without a title. Others were important and wealthy courtiers, 
such as Sir Henry Marney, the king's favourite. But at a 
shire level, away from the distorting influences of court life, 
the knights still remained a major force in raising armies.
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The knights in fact usually occupied an importance 
disproportionate to their numbers amongst the minor nobles 
who supplied troops. They were 14 out of the 34 gentry 
who sent troops to France from Norfolk in 1544; 13 out of 
34 in Suffolk; 8 out of 23 in Bedfordshire, and 2 out of 
15 in Sussex.* There were similar figures for the supply 
of troops from the north for the invasion of Scotland. In 
Yorkshire, the knights mustered more than either the lords 
or the other minor nobles. Between them 35 Yorkshire knights 
and squires raised nearly 2,000 out of the Yorkshire 
contingent of 4,500 men. The overall tendency was for the 
knights to be able to raise bodies of troops which were 
between those available to the peers and to the squires and 
gentlemen. The largest body of troops available to a 
Yorkshire knight in the 1544 muster was 300 men, the largest 
available to a lord 400; the smallest following available 
to a knight was 20 men, the smallest for a gentleman was 10 
men. There was a considerable variation amongst the size 
of the knight's retinues, which probably reflects differing 
levels of wealth and influence. Eight of the retinues were 
of 20 men, 1 was of 30, 1 of 40, 2 of 50, 1 of 60, 5 of 100,
1 of 200 and 1 of 300. These followings were significantly 
above those of the gentlemen, of whom 43 out of 55 supplied 
bodies of 10 men each.
That these followings often related to the wealth 
of the individual knight, squire or gentleman is also indicated 
by the returns of musters. The largest retinue to be sent to 
Scotland by a gentleman belonged to John Tempest, a member of 
an old and eminent Yorkshire family. He was elevated to the 
rank of knight during another expedition in the following year,
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as were several other gentlemen, both during the 1544 and 
15 45 expeditions, who also brought the largest retinues with 
them. These included men such as William Calverley, who 
brought 20 men, and Christopher Metcalf, who brought 30 
soldiers. The squires with the largest retinues were also 
more likely to be knighted during the ensuing campaigns than 
were their fellows with smaller followings. Two squires with 
larger than normal retinues in 1544 who were knighted during 
the subsequent wars were William Englebe, who brought 50 men, 
and William St. Quentin, who was accompanied by 20 men.
This would suggest that there was a link between the 
size of a gentleman's retinue, his wealth, and the prospects 
of his being knighted during an expedition in which he served.
It might also suggest that men anxious to become knights would 
have taken the trouble to gather large retinues for their war 
service, as they could bring more men to war than was demanded 
of them from the king if they so wished. What it does indicate 
clearly is that the institution of knighthood was, at this time, 
by no means completely divorced from the reality of war, at 
least in this aspect.*
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The third source of men for the wars was from 
Henry's own household and army, which has already been 
mentioned. This was extremely limited, as, apart from elite 
bodies such as the Gentlemen Pensioners, who numbered 75 
plus their attendants in 1544, there were only the Yeomen'of 
the Guard and the permanent garrisons in various castles 
such as Berwick and Calais, amounting altogether to only a 
few thousand men.
The fourth and more important source of men was 
through the hiring of continental mercenaries. The procedures 
adopted in hiring these men is worth examining in some detail 
because it demonstrates the limited ability, perspectives and 
training of those involved in operating this particularly 
inefficient system.
Henry sent his commissioners to scour the Empire in
1544 for high quality horse and foot. The enterprise was
characterised by greed, bungling and ill will. Henry's original
agreement with the Emperor was that Charles would provide
England with 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot to be led by the Dutch
admiral, Maximilian d'Egmont Count de Buren. But almost
immediately that the agreement had been struck, Henry began
to negotiate for an extra body of horse and 2,00 foot.* It
should have been apparent that this would make the already
shaky relations which Henry enjoyed with his ally even more
fragile, as he was trying to raise a large body of troops from
the same area in which Charles was also trying to raise an
army which was by contemporary standards of huge proportions.
Besides the Count de Buren, Henry began to treat for 1,000
horse from a mercenary captain, Christian van Landenbergh, and
1,000 troops from a Baron Hadecke, who had become one of Henry's
2pensioners several years before.
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Henry was thus trying to raise 4,000 horse and
8,000 foot from the pool of Continental mercenaries. But 
there were several difficulties which proved insurmountable, 
apart from the sheer ambition of Henry's project. The 
primary trouble was that Henry's agents had no idea of how 
to go about raising the men, where to fix muster dates, and 
what rates of pay to offer, or even where the money was to 
come from. Apart from this, both sides tried from the 
beginning to cheat each other, and Henry kept interfering 
to change his instructions. The final factor which continually 
intervened was the intransigence and frequently open hostility 
of the Regent of the Netherlands and her officials.
The English were almost completely ignorant about
how they should go about raising mercenary troops in 1544,
as the last major occasion on which foreign troops had been
recruited was in 1513. They did not know who was the best
intermediary to approach, or even what type of men were
available. Henry had to send them instructions that they
should begin by getting a manual on rates of pay translated
from German. He also described to them a step by step system
for negotiation.* This included the advice that they should
offer different rates of pay to the various leaders in order
to win them over. The result of this was that the captains
began to compare the offers amongst themselves, and the
commissioners soon reported that the English offers were being
2scoffed at.
Bungling, crossed intentions and mistrust were 
becoming apparent by the middle of April. Wotton wrote to 
Henry that he had interviewed Hans von Sickengen, whose father 
had served Henry in 1513. The mercenary demanded a higher 
than normal pay and a surety from Henry. He claimed that since 
his father had once been cheated of pay, he now always asked
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for the security of a town, such as Frankfurt, or a company,
such as the Fuggers. Wotton was of the opinion that von
Sickengen was unsuitable for service because his face was
garnished with "rubies" as if his mother had never taught
him to water his wine. He noticed, however, that the Imperial
Chancellor, Granvelle, was most courteous towards him,
uncovering his head and bidding him leave on his own hat.*
The arrogance and intransigence of mercenaries such as von
Sickengen eventually led to a complete breakdown in negotiations.
Charles intervened because recruitment was taking too long,
and ordered Wotton to hire von Sickengen's 1,000 horse without
2Henry's leave.
This brought a reprimand for Wotton - one of many 
for the commissioners - because Henry considered the German 
"unmeet" to serve. Henry displayed his wishful thinking by
3ordering Wotton to recover the money already paid.
The friction caused by this misunderstanding between
Charles and Henry was compounded when German captains began
to revoke contracts to serve Charles because they wished to
enter Henry's service, on the grounds that he would compensate
4them for the loss of horse and harness.
Negotiations and the details of administering the
musters, where men and weapons were inspected and hiring fees
paid, continued into June, when dissatisfaction on both sides
came to a head. The commissioners were displeased with de Buren
because he was apparently deliberately delaying mustering his
5men and was collecting insufficient numbers. But Henry was
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himself plotting against other mercenary captains. He planned
to separate van Landenbergh from his men even though van
Landenbergh claimed his musters were well in hand. Henry had
gradually become aware that the German was swindling both his
own men and the English.* The mercenary was short on musters,
but still asked for bonus payments in the form of double pays,
2which he did not pass on to his followers. His disgruntled 
men blamed the English agents, and threatened to hack them to 
death, so that the commissioners fled. By this time the 
negotiations had deteriorated so much that Norfolk believed
it would be impossible to fit the Germans into the army amicably,
3even if they were split into small groups.
The privy council ordered the commissioners to 
dismiss van Landenbergh, if necessary with his infantrymen as
4well, but to secretly retain his horsemen. But a week later
Henry changed his mind, countermanding the order and
instructing Norfolk to retain Landenbergh if he seemed sorry
for the insulting remarks he had made about the king. His
horse were definitely to be retained, but the foot were to be
5dismissed if they were not already on the march.
By mid-June the war already in progress, and the
planned muster dates of May were well past, yet no significant
mercenary forces had yet been assembled. The forces brought
by de Burens were found to be inadequate because 200 of his
horsemen were pages, which the count refused to rectify, and
the commissioner was doubtful of the quality of those yet to
6come.
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Van Landenbergh, despite his reprieve, continued 
to bargain for more money. The commissioners discovered that 
not only did he not have the specified barded horse, but he 
was asking for bonus payments at an exorbitant rate, that is, 
1,700 more per 3,000 men than the Emperor paid. This was 
despite Henry's already having raised the bonus payments from 
60 per ensign to 100 per ensign.*
Once more rumours became rife of the imminent
2dismissal of van Landenbergh for his arrogance and greed. These 
stories horrified the Regent of the Netherlands, who had long 
complained of the damage being done by van Landenbergh's 
mutinous infantrymen around Liege. She feared that her country 
would be wasted if they were dismissed altogether.3 Granvelle 
and Charles were both writing to Henry urging him to retain 
van Landenbergh lest he defect to the French. Granvelle 
suggested that if he was retained he could then be executed,
4while Charles suggested he might be punished in some other way. 
The king's agents shared the fears of the Regent and the
5Emperor, as they had already experienced some skirmishes. The
English were in a quandary, however, as they were now faced with
the difficulty of getting two months back pay for van
Landenbergh's men, as he had embezzled all their wages. Henry
turned on his commissioners, blaming them for the bungling of
payments, and started direct negotiations for more horse from
another mercenary. This man was later described the Imperial
ambassador, Chapuys, as a bankrupt merchant by the name of
7Lightmaker who now dabbled in war. But Henry's own negotiations
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also went astray, and throughout July there was a flurry of 
correspondence as the court and commissioners tried to get 
mercenaries to join the army in time for the war, and to make 
arrangements for payments.*
Lightmaker eventually joined the king at Boulogne
with 100 horsemen, at the same time as some 500 Flemish
infantry and three ensigns, or between 3 and 500 horsemen, whom
the commissioners had managed to raise elsewhere. This was on
221 August, only weeks before the end of the campaign.
Van Landenbergh's horse joined the army at about
the same time. But instead of going to Montreuil, where he
was told to go, and where there was thought to be more
provisions for his horses, he insisted on going to join the
king at Boulogne, who in any case wanted his horse for a
3bodyguard.
Months of frustrating and often bitter negotiations 
had brought the English a mercenary cavalry force of slightly 
more than 3,000 men, the bulk of whom arrived too late to be 
of any use. They were deployed inefficiently, and much of the 
money used to raise them would appear to have been diverted 
into the treasuries of their leaders. A major section of 
Henry's army of 1544 was thus perhaps more a hindrance than an 
asset because of the chaotic recruitment methods which were 
employed.
The drawbacks involved in recruiting mercenary forces 
indicates, at the same time, the great importance assumed by 
the nobles as suppliers of men for the army. Not only were 
they the chief agents in assembling the major body of troops, 
but they were also a relatively reliable source of men.
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It was only with the greatest difficulty that an 
army could be financed, and the recruitment of men, particularly 
of mercenaries, could be an irksome task with poor results.
But once the army had been assembled and financed, lack of 
provisions was almost certain to cripple any extended campaign, 
especially on overseas expeditions.
Neither administrative practice nor the quality of 
materials were adequate for the supply of food, munitions or 
clothing. When the Earl of Surrey, for example, marched towards 
Flodden on the day of battle in 1513, his troops had been hungry 
and thirsty for a day because there were no provisions 
available.*
The supply situation might be slightly better if the
king was with the army, because his presence demanded abundant
food supplies. Even so, provisioning remained chaotic in
France, particularly in 1544. Wolsey had struggled to impose
some order in 1513, but was hindered by poor communications,
inefficiency and theft. Bishop Fox reported a critical shortage
of beer barrels at the Southampton embarkation point. He
believed that this was due to pilfering, and recommended that
2the pursers be hanged. In addition, victuals were being sent 
to the wrong place, apparently because of poor communication 
between court and the cocks, "...and noon knoweth what another3dothe, nor what yche of them sendeth hidder..."
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He recommended that the distribution of supplies 
should be put in the hands of the Admiral, Thomas Howard, but he 
too was having major problems at this time reorganising the 
remnants of the fleet which had straggled home from Brest.
He described it as the worst ordered and most unruly army 
he had ever seen, half of which had deserted.*
Detailed records of the disorder of 1544 are even
more apparent. They include the records of the feud which
developed between Hertford, in command of the invasion fleet
for Scotland, and court officials. Hertford was delayed for
crucial weeks in the northern ports while waiting for his
supplies to arrive. When they did come, they proved inadequate,
due to the gross negligence, or worse, of Stephen Gardiner,
2Bishop of Winchester, and his subordinates.
The administration of provisions for the French
invasion proved even more disastrous, being virtually
sufficient by itself to cripple the whole invasion. One
example of this, and of the limited nature of contemporary
concepts of the scale of operations involved, was the attempt
to hire carts from the Netherlands for the transport of
victuals. The king despatched one man at arms from Calais
to the Regent of the Netherlands to negotiate for the raising
of a body of horses and carts. This amazed the Regent, as
well as annoying her, as she considered that one man was
insufficient for such a task, not to mention that Henry was
3asking for too many vehicles. Not only did the man at arms 
have to raise and conduct 1,100 draught horses, 500 carts 
and their drivers singlehandedly, but when he came to her he
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was acting in complete ignorance of his mission because his 
instructions were in sealed orders to be opened only at her 
court.*
Mary's complaints and hard bargaining caused Henry
to threaten that he would call off the expedition because he
would not have enough vehicles for the number of troops he had
2agreed to send.
Such misgivings over provisioning proved correct,
because from the opening days of the campaign provisioning
proved inadequate, as is shown by the misadventures which
befell Norfolk and the vanguard. At first, and somewhat
unusually, there appears to have been a concern amongst the
nobles to make sure that their men were well fed. The
vanguard was issued with a new invention, carts containing
ovens and a geared device for grinding grain. The theory was
that flour could be made and bread baked while the army was
on the march. But Norfolk had to report almost immediately
that the machinery fell to pieces soon after the journey
3began. After this initial setback, Norfolk and his fellow
officers seem to have lost their enthusiasm for safeguarding
the men's welfare, and soon virtually left them to fend for
themselves, especially as there was a crucial shortage of
provisions almost from the outset. Within two days of the
failure of the wagons, Norfolk found that he would have to
venture into enemy territory during his march because of
a shortage of hay and grass for the cavalry in English
occupied areas. He was also short of armour and weapons for
4his soldiers, apart from the shortage of provender. The
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infantry was forced to live on its wages because there were
insufficient provisions accompanying the army. The locals
made the best of this by charging outrageous prices.* One
of the reasons why there was not enough food with the army
was that the wagons were found to be too small to carry
2enough goods. Norfolk complained several days later that 
not a loaf of bread had been made by the army's cooks, and 
that without help from their Flemish allies his men would 
have died at the rate of 2,000 a day. He himself was running 
short of cash for the army, as he had already spent £50,000 
of his ready money on coats, conduct money - an allowance 
paid for soldiers to get to the army from home - carriages 
and wages. He only had £9,000 left with him to pay the 
mercenaries when they arrived on the scheduled date of 8 July. 
If the king had not joined him by then he would have to be 
sent £40,000 more.
Norfolk's letters indicate that he was leading an
army that was on the point of disintegration through lack of
provisions only a few days after it had assembled. This
picture was supported by the account of Ellis Gruffydd, who
4was present in the van. He wrote that when the army began 
to march, bread sold for a common soldier's daily wage.
Gruffydd blamed this on the officers. He claimed that they 
would not buy bread from towns where there was ample, and that 
large supplies of food were being transported separately to 
the main body of the army, being kept some 20 miles' distant. 
This may have been merely a camp rumour, but it was consistent
5with other behaviour by the nobles later reported by Gruffydd.
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When Norfolk's army reach Montreuil, it had 
become almost completely undisciplined because of the lack 
of provisions. Food was being sent from St.Omer's, but 
not much was arriving because of transport difficulties, 
including theft by hauliers. In order to feed themselves, 
the soldiers were wandering around the countryside in small 
groups and unarmed, and were eating green fruit which did 
not assist their health. The risk of illness was also 
heightened by dead horses being left to rot where they fell 
in the camp.*
There were some other half-hearted and poorly
organised attempts to get food to the men, but all proved
failures. An attempt to victual the army via the port of
Etaples failed, for example, because of poor liason between
the court and hired Dutch ships. After this mishap, it was
left to the English officers at Montreuil to arrange for the
transport of food from Boulogne. This apparently resulted
in a monopoly situation in which the captains were able to
2sell the goods to their men at greatly inflated prices.
The poor provisioning of the army meant that by 
the time the English were about to depart, the horses were 
dying in large numbers, and the Burgundian mercenaries
3falling at the rate of 20 a day from hunger and disease.
Count de Burens complained on 19 September that he had lost
700 men, and Norfolk wrote that nearly all of his men had
been without bread for the last three days. Even the nobles
were feeling the effects of shortages and unhealthy conditions,
as John Lord Russell, joint commander of the force, and a
4number of other nobles fell ill.
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Disorder broke out during the withdrawal because 
heavy articles were left behind, such as barrels of wine.
Many soldiers siezed the opportunity for a carouse, and were 
left behind to be killed by the advancing French.
Once in Calais, the men suffered even worse outbreaks 
of disease, and provisions were as scarce as ever. Dozens 
were left to die in the streets from a combination of hunger 
and illness. Gruffydd later recalled the picture presented 
by the army as it straggled home.
...the soldiers coming from Calais and Boulogne 
were dying along the road from Dover to London, 
and along the roads from London to every quarter 
of the kingdom, while trying to go to their homes.
After they had come home those who were well fell 
sick and those who were sick got worse.1
A combination of neglect, inefficiency and corruption
had together done more than any enemy action to destroy
Norfolk's vanguard, a portion of the largest army yet sent
to invade France by England. His misfortune was shared by
Henry and his army during the siege of Boulogne, which was
continually troubled by shortages, especially of gunpowder, and
by the Emperor and his army during the Imperial advance on
2Paris, a march halted by shortages of provisions.
This was not only because of the inefficiency of 
the administration of provisions, but, as is shown in the 
next section, also because the attention and energy of the 
nobles was directed more towards maintaining their own comfort 
while on expedition.
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Armies of the early sixteenth century campaigned 
on the principle that it was necessary to provide the nobles 
with accommodation answering as closely as possible to the 
comfort of their homes, but that the comfort of the common 
soldier mattered hardly at all. The result was that the 
armies were burdened down with vast amounts of material for 
the ease of nobles. This meant that there was correspondingly 
less room for essential supplies for the men. Money that 
was spent on the infantryman was directed rather towards his 
appearance than to ensuring he had eaten well or had a dry 
bed.
Henry's army of 1513, for example, was loaded down 
with tons of tents for the nobles, and a small palace for the 
king. The treasurer, who was typical of the greater nobles, 
had a mobile home consisting of two large tents - the main one 
15 feet wide and 30 feet long - joined together by an 18 feet 
long passageway. The other nobles had larger or smaller 
encampments, depending on their wealth and rank, decorated 
with their coats of arms and badges of offices. The most 
magnificent of all was that of the king, its tents and 
prefabricated walls forming a vast, glittering maze. A visitor 
entered the palace through an entrance porch which led him into 
a pavilion 18 feet wide. A long passage then ushered him into 
the First Chamber, which was 40 feet long. Another passage 
went from this to the King's Great Chamber, which might be 
compared with the great hall of a castle. This was 15 feet 
wide and 50 feet long. The more private areas of the palace 
were joined to the Great Chamber by another lengthy passage, 
which led to the king's prefabricated wooden house, which had 
its own chimneys. A double set of passages each 40 feet long 
connected this to two more pavilions, both 30 feet in length, 
while on either side of the house, at right angles, were more 
pavilions. In addition, there were other quarters connected 




the Knight Harbingers, and the Master Cook. Even such lavish 
accommodation proved inadequate, as the king had extra tents 
made for his use during the course of the expedition. He also 
brought with him a tent used for special occasions, as is 
described in Chapter Six.*
These tents and houses once assembled in a camp made 
an impressive sight, as Hall showed in his description of the 
scene before Therouanne, where Henry
...planted his sege in most warlikewise, his camp 
was environed with artilerie, as Fawcones, serpentynes, 
caste hagbushes and trycle harowes, spien trestyls, 
and other warlike defence for the savegarde of the 
campe. The kyng for hym self had a howse of tymber 
with a chymney of yron, and for his other lodgynges 
he had great and goodly tentes of blewe water worke 
garnyshed with yelowe, and white, diverse romes 
within the same for all offices necessary, on the 
toppe of the pavilions stode the kynges bestes 
holdynge fanes, as the Lion, the Dragon, the Greyhounde, 
the Antelope, the Donne Kowe: within all the lodgynge 
was poyncted ful of the sunnes risynge, the lodgynge 
was C xxv. foot in length.^
Nothing could contrast more with this description than the 
usual conditions borne by the common men. They slept wherever 
they could find shelter - often under hedges - and the only 
allowance towards their comfort was the payment of conduct 
money. The nobles' attitude to the need for comfort for the 
common soldier is perhaps typified by the action of the Regent 
of the Netherlands. She noticed that men under the.command of 
Sir Edward Poynings had spoiled their coats through sleeping 
on the ground. She therefore provided each soldier with a 
new coat of yellow, red, white and green wool, for which she 
was greatly praised.3
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(b) THE RULES OF WAR.
Administrative efficiency does not appear to have 
been a primary concern of the warrior noble. But the weight 
of tradition, and the current style of waging war, meant that 
a great deal of time, money, manpower and effort was spent in 
making sure that war conformed to the accepted sets of rules 
shared by all sides in the conflict. These rules were an 
essential element of war at the time. They included formalised 
regulations governing behaviour in war, as well as the jumble 
of rules, written and unwritten, which had grown up around 
warfare over the centuries, including the paraphenalia of war 
such as heralds, the ceremonial of sieges, and the code of 
ransoms.
i . Regulations.
Regulations to govern the behaviour of troops had 
been introduced as early as the reign of Richard II, and 
continued to be issued at the start of each campaign during 
Henry's time. These rules governed aspects of war such as the 
morals of soldiers, including their behaviour during battles.
War had a moral dimension during the sixteenth century, and 
victory in battle was considered to be at least partially 
dependent on pious actions. Many of the 32 clauses of the 1513 
regulations, and the long preamble in particular, dwelt on 
these moral themes. Second only to the order to obey the king 
and his officers was the requirement that English soldiers 
should respect the sacrament, as well as the Church and its 
members.
Yet, at the same time, the regulations had a practical 
application, in terms of the current style of waging war. This 
practical application was evident in the same rules that 
governed the moral dimension of warfare. Children, for example,
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were to be protected from the ravages of war. But this 
pious outlook was tempered by the proviso that where there 
was the prospect of a substantial ransom, the rule might 
be overlooked: any child under the age of 14 could be held 
to ransom if he was the son of a lord, a gentleman, a rich 
man or a captain.
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Lengthy clauses were devoted to the system of 
ransoming in the 1513 regulations. This was because it 
was one of the more important aspects of war to soldiers 
of the early sixteenth century. The rights and conduct 
appropriate to the system were jealously guarded both by 
official regulations and by the nobles, and, to some extent, 
by the common soldiers, as ransoming was a system under which 
all could hope to benefit, and the nobles in particular.
Lord Herbert recalled that his family's fortune had been 
made at about this time by his grandfather, who had secured 
some substantial ransoms while fighting in the mid-century 
wars.* And as well as furthering the fortunes of rising 
families such as the Herberts, the ransoming system helped 
to ensure that war was relatively safe and pleasant for the 
warrior noble.
The regulations covered ransoming in great detail, 
outlining, for instance, the methods by which paroles could 
be obtained, and trying to settle in advance the kinds of 
disputes that arose over the question of the ownership of 
prisoners. Any noble who was captured was to be surrendered 
to the king, but if any other rank was captured in battle 
or deed of arms, the captor could take from him a weapon as 
token of his word, and did not need to guard him from then 
until the end of the "adventure". The prisoner was therefore 
safeguarded from being captured twice, unless it could be 
shown that he had a weapon with him, in which case the ransom 
was to be shared, and the last captor had to take responsibility 
for guarding the prisoner.
Not only were such details of the effecting of a 
ransom covered specifically, but the monetary aspects of ransoms
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were also carefully established by both sides before conflict 
began. When the Dauphin was advancing towards Boulogne in 
1544, he let it be known that the ransom for the commander of 
the king's forces would be 1,000 crowns, and between a month 
and a week's pay for specified officers. Gentlemen of the 
household of the Crown were to be ransomed for a quarter's pay, 
and other gentlemen for "honest" ransoms. No prisoners were 
to be kept for more than 8 days.*
The forms of ransoms were seriously observed.
Norfolk refused to pay the ransom of men who were captured
before the details of the system for the 1544 was were worked
2out. He also hanged soldiers who attacked Frenchmen who were
travelling under safe conduct following their release from
3captivity at Boulogne.
The ransoming system performed a number of important 
functions for the nobility and the army. For the army it 
meant that there was no need to concern itself with the guarding 
of large numbers of prisoners, which in any case its weak 
administrative system could not cope with. Whenever large 
numbers of prisoners were taken, it caused great problems, 
which usually resulted in the common soldiers being released, 
and the nobles being billeted in the homes of their English 
counterparts.^
The ransom system thus meant that nobles could 
usually hope to be returned to their army within days, or even 
hours, of their capture, or, if they were kept prisoner, the 
likelihood was that they would be treated as an honoured guest. 
Wallop negotiated the release of three men at arms the day 
after they were captured in skirmishes between his garrison r
at Guisnes and the Dauphin's army while it was passing to Boulogne'.
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The Chevalier Bayard, captured at the battle of Spurs, was 
sent on a tour through the Netherlands.
The comfort with which the nobles captured by the 
English were treated was also partially an outcome of Henry's 
desire to display to all his nobility and generosity. He 
appears to have always been extremely generous to his noble 
prisoners, even during the bitter wars of the 1540's. The 
Scottish nobles who happened to be brought to London after 
the battle of Solway Moss, for example, were lodged in comfort 
at Lambeth Palace at the king's expense, and were even given 
money for their journey home when they were released. Perhaps 
his most conspicuously honourable behaviour towards his prisoners 
was after Spurs, when he acted with expansive, and expensive, 
generosity. He was presented with the leading French nobles 
after the battle. Henry gave them a warm welcome, and clad 
their leader, the Due de Longueville, in a cloak of cloth of 
gold. He then invited the duke to dine with him, and 
personally made sure that the French deputy commander had 
water for washing. The Duke tried to refuse the honours 
extended to him - as was the polite thing to do - but Henry 
insisted, pointing out that the Frenchman was constrained to 
accept because he was a prisoner.
The Venetian ambassador who observed these proceedings 
took all of these courtesies as signs of great graciousness on 
Henry's part. Henry's generosity was not confined merely to 
dining his most exalted captive, however, as he also proclaimed 
that he would reduce the ransoms of nobles. If any noble was 
assessed at a ransom of 4,000 crowns, he would pay half the 
cost himself.*
The Duke continued in his honourable and comfortable 
captivity until released the following year.
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Prisoners were sometimes mistreated. Francis was 
not averse to selling some of his prisoners to the infidel.
But breaches of the rules usually brought loud protests from 
the nobles in particular, and for the common men it was 
unwise to mistreat the source of a potential fortune. Ransoms 
were shrewdly assessed, and sharp practice was indulged in by 
both captive and captor to make the mose of their opportunities. 
Within a short time of the battle of Spurs, for example,
Henry's ambassador in the Netherlands was shrewdly assessing 
the value of Frenchman brought there (illegally) by Burgundian 
horsemen who had been present at Guinegate.* The Burgundians 
had held aloof from the battle until the last moment, and had 
then rushed in to capture as many nobles as possible.
Another practical purpose of the ransoming system 
was that it allowed both sides to spy out camps when they sent 
their heraHs to negotiate for the release of prisoners.
Everyone involved in war was aware of this, and played upon it. 
One Italian mercenary captured by the English in 1544 was 
persuaded to turn his coat: he was sent back to the French 
camp ostensibly to fetch his ransom, but actually to spy for 
his captors.2
The ransoming system thus performed numerous functions 
in contemporary war. Its relatively efficient operation was 
largely an outcome of it serving the desires of many ranks of 
society, and in particular that of the nobles. F o r ’the 
nobility, ransoms were an insurance that war would be a less 
dangerous theatre of activity. In their expensive suits of 
armour and mounted on warhorses, they were clearly marked as
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potential ransoms whom it was unwise to kill, as Audley 
pointed out in his pamphlet. He recommended that if, when 
boarding a ship, an English captain caught sight of an 
enemy sail, he should commit every captive to the sea floor 
except for the captain and men of quality.*
Ransoming was a major aspect of contemporary war, 
as well as a constant reminder to all of the elite status 
of the warrior noble.
1. Audley, A Book of Orders.
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The use of such things as the system of ransoming 
indicates one of the major characteristics of early sixteenth 
century war. This was its formal, almost ceremonial appearance. 
At the same time, however, there was often a coldly practical 
application of the formal rules and styles of behaviour to the 
reality of war. These two aspects of war - its theatricality 
and its pragmatism - seem to have co-existed without causing 
much concern to contemporaries.
The pageant-like nature of war, and its coincident 
pragmatism, is also demonstrated by the use of heralds.
Heralds had a wide range of functions at this time, and obtain 
great prominence in the records of the 1513 and 1544 wars 
because of the many important tasks which they performed, apart 
from the colour and ceremonial quality which they added to war.
Henry took 8 heralds with him on the 1544 expedition:
Garter and Clarenceux kings of arms, Windsor and Somerset
heralds, and Portcullis, Bluemantle, Risbancke, Hammes and
Guisnes pursuivants.* These men were themselves drawn from the
ranks of the nobility whom they served, and whose attitudes
they shared. Charles Wriothesley, Windsor Herald, was the
brother of Thomas Lord Wriothesley and the son of William,
York Herald. Thomas's godfathers had been the Duke of
2Buckingham and the fifth Earl of Northumberland. Employing
heralds was yet another badge of the status of a noble, who
would take as many heralds with him on an expedition as his
rank, office and wealth allowed. The Earl of Northumberland
took several of his own heralds with him to France in 1513,
while the Earl of Shrewsbury was allowed the use of Lancaster
herald by Henry in that year, in addition to any heralds of his
3own who may have accompanied him.
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As with the other formalised aspects of war, the
use of heralds was taken very seriously by Henry. He had
Lancaster herald beheaded after the Pilgrimage of Grace
because the herald had kneeled to the rebel leader Aske while
wearing Henry's coat of arms. The herald had been carrying
out one of the normal wartime tasks of heralds, delivering a
proclamation to the rebels.* Henry's concern over the prestige
and safety of heralds was shared by other nobles, including
his Scottish enemies. Many Scots nobles protested when Somerset
herald was murdered by some Scots while on a mission to James V
in 1542, and wrote to James expressing the hope that his killers
2would be punished.
As mentioned, heralds had a wide variety of ceremonial 
and official duties, both in peace and wartime. Heralds were 
responsible during peacetime for establishing the pedigrees and 
right to a coat of arms of the many people anxious to acquire 
recognition of nobility, especially during the 1530's when there 
a scramble to achieve gentility. They also helped to conduct 
tournaments and royal events such as weddings and funerals. And 
they played crucial roles in the conduct of campaigns. They 
sometimes took the place of the posts, helping to give armies 
better liason than they could otherwise have hoped for. They 
took messages between field commanders and the court, and they 
conveyed most of the important messages that went between enemy 
forces. The Scottish threat to invade England unless Henry 
withdrew from France in 1513 was delivered to Henry outside 
the walls of Therouanne by Scotland's Lion Herald. Heralds 
also performed an important function as spies, as mentioned above. 
Surrey kept sending heralds into the Scottish camp at Flodden 
on the day before battle, both to convey challenges and to spy.
The challenges themselves were strategic as much as a matter 
of honour, as they were an incitement to James to keep his
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promise to fight the English, as Surrey was always faced with 
the danger that James would withdraw to temporary safety in 
Scotland. This would have forced the English to disband their 
army because they could not keep it provisioned for long in 
the Marches.*
Heralds gave a ceremonial appearance to war. But 
they also performed important functions in early sixteenth 
century war, with their colourful duties as much as their more 
mundane roles such as delivering letters and arranging ransoms.
1. Hall, Henry VIII , i, p.105.
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Early sixteenth century warfare thus had a 
colourful, pageant like appearance which was an outcome 
of the more or less formalised rules and systems of behaviour 
that permeated war. At the same time, the ceremonial and 
pageantry was very much a part of the reality of war, helping 
to shape the nature of war, as well as being shaped in turn 
by the practice of war.
This was shown by the formal behaviour which 
surrounded sieges. The pomp and ceremony which accompanied 
a siege was itself an indication of the prominence which 
sieges had in contemporary war. They were probably the most 
common theatre of war in which Henry and his men had 
experience, and were the central element in contemporary 
strategy, apart from the considerations of honour.
The progress of a siege was clearly marked by 
regulated conduct which it would have been unthinkable to 
ignore. A siege began with an official proclamation from 
the besieger that set out the terms of the attack, such as 
the claims to territory made by the invaders, the justification 
of their attack, and the conditions for surrender. Brandon 
wrote to the king from Boulogne in 1544 seeking instructions 
on the terms of such a proclamation before beginning the 
assault:
jr...besechyng (yo Highnes) to commaunde the wordes 
of the sommons to be brought to us, for (I the Duke)  ^
of Suff. never did s(ee sie)ge layed without summons.
Suffolk and Henry worked out carefully the details 
of the summons, concerned to see that it was appropriate and
iv. Sieges.
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precise. They quibbled, for example, over the extent of 
the territory which it was reasonable for Henry to claim 
in the summons.*
While the elaborate and complicated business of
the siege continued, both sides would be busily working out
the means of surrender, the besieged in order to preserve
their own lives in the event of defeat, the attackers to
cut short the lengthy business of a siege. Much attention
was paid to the details of evacuating the fortress and to
the problems of assuming control by the besiegers. This
was in order to augment the honour of the victor, as well
as preserving the prestige of the defeated, as much as to
safeguard the safety of everyone concerned. Typical of this
aspect of the siege were the terms of surrender for Therouanne
in 1513. The garrison was allowed to march out with bags and
baggage, colours flying, the men at arms helmeted and lances
2at their thighs. This contributed to the splendour of the 
occasion for Henry, as he reviewed the departing French 
garrison accompanied by the Emperor Maximilian. Henry always 
turned such surrenders into splendid processions when he was 
present. On this occasion he marched into the city at the 
head of his army dressed in gilded and engraved armour, 
followed by his henchmen (youths educated at court) carrying 
other pieces of his armour such as the helmet.
...thus with great glory this goodly prince entered 
and took possession of the towne of Tirwin and was 
received at the Cathedral church with procession, and^ 
they heard masse and dyned in the bishoppes palice...
The ceremonial associated with the surrender of
Tournai, at the conclusion of the campaign, was even more
4magnificent, with tournaments, masques and banquets.
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Henry's triumph at Boulogne was rather hurried 
because of the deteriorating military situation, but he 
still contrived to turn it into an occasion of splendour 
and gallantry. He again reviewed the French garrison as 
it marched out, the last to come being the commander,
M.de Vervins, who dismounted before the king.
And after he had talked with hym a space, the 
kyng toke him by the hand, and he reverently 
kneling upon his knees, kyssed hys hande...
Soon after this honourable interchange, Henry rode
into his new possession, his naked sword borne before him,
"...like a noble and valyaunt conqueror...", his trumpeters
2playing on the walls of the city.
Henry concluded the most important event of his 
last venture into war as he had marked the end of the first 
venture, with the pomp and ceremony which was an integral 
part of siege warfare.
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The administrative systems of early sixteenth 
century warfare were, by almost any standards, inefficient.
They prevented large armies from being held together long 
enought or from moving rapidly enough to achieve any major 
gains in an invasion of France.
But at the same time that little care or attention 
was paid to improving the administrative efficiency of 
armies, a great deal of attention was paid to what might be 
classified as the ceremonial aspects of war. This was because, 
to the nobles of the time, those ceremonial aspects were 
important elements of war in their own right, serving the 
particular needs which the nobles had in war, of the kind 
discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. It should be remembered, 
at the same time, that what might be considered as ceremonial 
aspects of war, such as heralds, and to some extent ransoms, 
also performed recognised functions in contemporary warfare.
No matter that from a modern point of view they may seem 
unnecessary appendages which tended to increase the inefficiency 
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ARMY: PART III. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.
It is perhaps not surprising, given the poor state 
of the administrative system of the early Tudor army, and the 
importance placed on ceremonial aspects of war, that strategy 
and tactics would appear to have been rather haphazard and 
crude. In fact, as with other areas of war, strategy and 
tactics were often conditioned by the concept of warfare held 
by the noble military elite. The prestige of a noble was a 
major determinant of the movement and deployment of an army, 
together with other factors including the already mentioned 
paucity of organisation and the crucial importance of fortresses.
i • The Influence of Fortification.
Siege warfare was probably the main military activity 
of the early sixteenth century, both in terms of the seasonal 
campaigns involving the capture of fortresses such as Boulogne, 
and in the cold wars which continued along the frontiers for 
decades. Fortifications helped to shape the main aspects of 
early sixteenth century war.
The architecture of the castle builder had reasserted 
itself over the skill of the artilleryman after the period during 
the fifteenth century when fortresses were often captured after 
a siege of days rather than months. The elaboration of already 
existing defences meant that the besieged were once again at 
an advantage over besiegers.
The importance of fortification for Henry and his 
nobles is indicated in several ways. Not only did Henry 
continue to build up his siege weapons and try to improve their 
firepower, but he also embarked on the largest campaign of 
castle building ever undertaken by an English king, using the
/141.
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latest techniques. This programme began in the 1530's in 
response to threats of attack from the Continent along the 
southern coast, but he also repaired and extended his castles 
and forts along the Marches and in the Calais Pale during the 
wars of the 1540's, as he had also done during the wars of 
the early years of his reign.* As with most other aspects 
of the military machine, castles were ignored when not actually 
in use, and were allowed to decay during periods of peace, to 
be hurriedly repaired when war threatened once more.
The effect of the importance of the fortress as far
as strategy was concerned was that it meant that Henry's major
wars consisted of either rapid incursions into enemy territory
or seasonal campaigns centred on a few sieges which would gain
only limited country for the English. There could be no long
term gains of foreign land, either in France or in Scotland.
And there was less likelihood of battles in the open field, and
little of the marching and countermarching typical of war in
other eras, such as the wars of Edward III. In the early
sixteenth century there were few large scale encounters fought
by the English. The strategy of war was in this sense very
similar to that which Oman has identified as typical of England
in the twelfth century, when siege war also predominated and
2there were only a handful of battles.
The main feature of sixteenth century strategy, the 
possession of fortresses, was therefore much the same as had 
applied for centuries with only brief periods of fluctuation.
In such warfare, Henry's large armies were a 
liability, because of the difficulty of provisioning so many 
men during the months of a siege, and because, as is shown
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below, the mixture of nationalities caused by the use of 
mercenaries brought problems of discipline. In any case, 
pike and English archers were suited for battle in the open 
field rather than in a siege.
The importance of siege warfare to strategy also had 
great importance for the nobles as a distinct group. As the 
elite cavalry, and as members of the cavalry in general, they 
had a crucial part to play in such war. The infantry was more 
use for the mundane details of a siege, such as digging mines, 
which were, incidentally, at least as important as cannon 
during a siege. But the cavalry, because of its mobility, was 
very useful in the skirmishes which accompanied a siege. They 
guarded supply routes and scoured for enemy bands infiltrating 
the district, or they penetrated deep into enemy territory to 
attack their supply routes. These were amongst the types of 
operations performed by the King's Spears in 1513, and which 
Surrey and other nobles performed during the 1544 war and its 
aftermath.
The prevalence of siege warfare therefore resulted 
in considerable prominence for the cavalry, and hence for the 
nobility, in early sixteenth century war.
At the same time as the fortress dominated the 
strategic thinking of the nobility, it was also a part of their 
group identity, a symbol of their place in society as a 
military elite. Castles were still held by many nobles at this 
time, both as residences and as sites of military importance. 
The Crown realized the power that this gave the nobles, and 
it continually tried to seize more privately held fortresses 
into its control, although rather than razing them, Henry 
usually handed them back to his courtier nobles. After the 
seizure of 12 castles from the Duke of Buckingham in the 1520's 
most were soon given to faithful servants and favourites such 
as Sir William Compton and Sir Richard Wingfield.*
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In the north, where threat of attack was always 
more imminent, nobles strengthened old castles and built new 
ones during the reign of Henry. Lord Dacre (1509-25), for 
example, built two new castles to repel Scots invasions and 
strengthened his castle at Naworth.*
The Earl of Northumberland, as Warden of the
Northern Marches in 1528, took the possession of his family
castles so seriously that he would not let visiting Scots
inside his castle at Warkworth lest its secrets should be
2betrayed.
The castle as a symbol of the power of the military 
elite had become ingrained into the minds of the nobility, 
who not only lived in these fortresses, but also spent long 
periods of their military service as the commanders and members 
of garrisons in the Pale and on the Marches.
The symbol of the castle was to be found in their
domestic architecture, such as Henry Howard Earl of Surrey's
mansion which was built while he was waiting to participate
in one of Henry's wars. It was the first classically
influenced palace built in England, but its banqueting halls
3were built in the shape and style of castles.
Castles were, therefore, both crucial in determining 
strategy, and also a major aspect of the concept that the 
nobles had of the nature of their group, as the body in society 
that drew its lifestyle and its power in part from the fortress.
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Mention was made at the beginning of this chapter 
of the influence of considerations of noble prestige on 
campaign strategies, a factor which appears to have been 
equally important as the predominance of siege warfare in 
determining the planning of military manoeuvres. This 
meant that when executing a campaign, it was necessary to 
carry out movements of the army with the greatest possible 
honour for the king in particular and his nobles in general. 
Indeed, the need to behave in an honourable manner frequently 
took precedence over even the planning of sieges. This 
contributed in its own way to making sixteenth century war, 
from a modern point of view, still more chaotic and inefficient. 
The army of 1513, for instance, has been criticised by 
Cruickshank as a force lacking any consistent co-ordination 
and without the characteristics of a modern army which single- 
mindedly seeks its objective with the least waste of time, 
materials and men. As he noted at some length, the army 
straggled across the Channel in a piecemeal fashion and once 
ashore wandered seemingly aimlessly across the countryside, 
pausing for the two main sieges.* The Earl of Shrewsbury landed 
with the first men of the vanguard on 6 June 1513, but it was 
not until the end of the month that the main section of the 
army arrived with the king. The time during which Shrewsbury 
waited for the king, who was making a royal progress from 
London, was spent in ineffectual activity. The vanguard made 
an initial thrust at Boulogne, a day's march south from Calais 
along the coast. This may have been a feint, or it was perhaps 
merely that Shrewsbury was looking for a suitable place to 
lay siege, as he eventually doubled back on his route, followed 
the river Lys 40 miles inland and sat down before Therouanne.
But the numbers of men he had with him were insufficient to 
win the city, as he could not completely surround its walls 
to cut off movements of troops and supplies. Apart from that, 
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While the siege laye thus before Tyrwyn as you 
have hard, the Frenchmen diverse times issued 
out on horseback and many a staffe was broken 
and manye a proper feat of armes done.^
The king eventually left Calais on 21 July, having
despatched Brandon several days before to prepare his way
with an army of 7,000 men. The effect of splitting his forces
was that the French continually harried the smaller groups
into which the King's Ward had now resolved itself, slowing
Henry's progress even more. There were constant delays as
Henry formed his army to meet a full scale French attack which
never eventuated. Henry does not appear to have been
particularly concerned at the slowness of his progress, however,
and even halted his march for an entire weekend. This may
have been because he wished to rest, or, as Hall suggests,
so that he could display himself to the local people who
2flocked to his camp or meet local dignitaries.
More time was taken up with ceremony at Therouanne, 
where he had a formal meeting with the emperor which was 
celebrated with the lavish display described in the following 
chapter. Once Therouanne had fallen, and its conquest marked 
with more formalities, Henry again moved across country at a 
leisurely pace. There had been considerable delay before the 
march began, for a number of reasons, including Henry's 
apparent lack of any strategy. The siege of Therouanne had 
something of the appearance of an accident, but the advance 
on Tournai seems to have definitely been the outcome of the 
persuasiveness of the Emperor. He apparently persuaded Henry 
over dinner that it would be best to continue east. According 
to the ambassador from Milan, who watched the persuasion of
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Henry, Maximilian wanted to capture Tournai because he 
thought the French were going to reinforce Tournai with 
500 men at arms, making it a threat to the land of his heir, 
Prince Charles.*
Henry began to march towards Tournai. But one day, 
when an attack was expected from the French at any moment, 
messengers arrived from the Regent of the Netherlands, who
...most hartely desired him for his pastime after 
hys long travayle to come and repose in his toune 
of Lisle and to see hys brother and prince and the 
ladies of the court of Burgoyne, saiynge that it 
became not ladies to visite him in his marciall 
campe whyche to them was terrible.^
"Gently" granting the request, Henry appointed his 
council - including men such as the Bishop of Winchester - 
to take over the army, and galloped off to Lille in his 
richest costume surrounded by most of the senior commanders 
of his army, including Brandon, Dorset, the Duke of 
Buckingham, and Essex, commander of the Spears. Henry was 
welcomed in splendid style, and spent three days carousing 
with Margaret, Maximilian and Charles. He participated in 
masques, watched plays, banqueted and danced.
War was a pastime for Henry an.d his nobles, a 
counterpart to their lavish lifestyle at court, and they 
disregarded its dangers and the need for efficiency. This 
is perhaps no more clearly shown than when it came time to 
depart. Henry and most of the high command of his army set 
off towards evening. But when they had gone a short way
...he asked wher his campe lay? and no man there 
could tel the way, and guyde had they none, the 
night was darcke and mistie: thus the king taried 
a long while and wist not whither to go...
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The senior officers of the English army were 
eventually rescued when they chanced to meet a carter who 
guided them to camp.
Henry enjoyed his visit to Lille so much that he 
made a second visit during the brief progress of the siege 
of Tournai.
The invasion of France in 1544 was scarcely more 
efficient in its planning or execution, although there were 
fewer opportunities for exchanging visits and holding 
elaborate ceremonies because on this occasion Henry was 
unable to meet the Emperor, and he was on poor terms with 
the new Regent. But, as in 1513, the planning and execution 
of strategy was weak. The commander of the vanguard, Norfolk, 
apparently had no idea of precisely what he was meant to do 
in France. He tried to resolve this dilemma by asking Count 
de Burens and Lord Cobham, the Deputy of Calais, and by 
writing to Henry begging instructions. Henry gave him two 
choices, either to attack Montreuil or to attack Ardres.*
Norfolk took another six days to make up his mind to attack
2Montreuil. But once he had decided this, he realised he 
would not have enought men to surround the city, so he decided 
instead to simply ravage the countryside while he waited for 
Henry to join him. Norfolk appears to have been labouring 
under the misapprehension that Henry intended to attack Paris. 
One of the three most senior commanders of the English army 3did not know that Henry really planned to besiege Boulogne.
Norfolk's co-commander and rival was John Lord 
Russell. It was never clearly established who should be 
regarded as the more senior, and the presence of two men 
claiming the leadership of the vanguard made the planning of
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strategy even more limited. Russell was very critical of 
Norfolk's leadership. He charged that Norfolk was wandering 
across with countryside without apparent aim, making "wild 
war". Russell offered instead to attack Boulogne, or else 
Ardres with only 8,000 men, a somewhat foolhardy boast 
considering the difficulty of sieges.*
What was actually happening was that Norfolk had 
become lost, and, at the same time, the army had split into 
fragments which were racing each other so that their 
commanders could take the front place, the post of greatest 
honour.
Norfolk was relying on Flemish guides. As he
wrote to the countil on 4 July, his allies were not to be
trusted. The guides were leading him, as he put it, through
hedges, woods and marshes and over hills in order to keep
him in French territory so that their friends' property would
2be spared from his army.
The difficulties faced by Norfolk were compounded 
by his race with Russell. Norfolk had arrived in France with 
Russell nominally as his subordinate. But from the beginning 
the enmity of the two divided the English. Russell camped 
on one side of Fiennes, a township outside Calais, Norfolk 
on the other, while rumours circulated amongst their troops 
about who was actually in command. Gruffydd wrote that he 
spent considerable time unsuccessfully questioning officials 
such as the Master of the Ordnance trying to find out if it 
was in fact true that Russell had been appointed over Norfolk.
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Norfolk was determined to keep his post. When 
he began his advance, he did so with great suddeness, 
striking his camp during the night to catch Russell by 
surprise. He stretched out a six mile lead over his 
adversary, who did his best to overtake Norfolk during the 
wandering progress that ensued. Meanwhile the Count de 
Burens arrived with about 3,500 men. He was apparently 
unable to decide which camp to join, so he held aloof. 
Three separate armies thus advanced towards Montreuil.
Eventually Russell managed to outmanoeuvre 
Norfolk, pitching his tents ahead of him on the line of 
march, and taking the place of honour. He also managed to 
ford a river before Norfolk, which meant that he continued 
to lead on the march to Montreuil. Not to be outdone, 
Norfolk determined to be the first to pitch his camp at 
Montreuil, or at least to prevent Russell from so doing.
He ordered Count de Burens to ride ahead and pre-empt 
Russell. But the mercenary leader was unable to do so 
because his baggage train had become out of control and so 
he was forced to turn back to a previous night's camp, 
against orders,
...which displeased the Duke very much. The Duke 
wanted to be the first to plant his artillery 
against the town and Lord Russell wanted the same. 
This made him decide to pitch his tents and his 
artillery in a great hollow to the east of the town, 
and on top of the hill to the north of the host men 
were set to work to make a place to plant three 
cannon to announce their arrival to the people of 
the city. The Duke heard this and ordered the 
Master of the Ordnance to send his heavy artillery 
to the camp of the Lord of Privy Seal and place 
them on the breast of the hill to shoot first, which 
was done. But the Lord would not allow one of the 
guns which came from the Duke's camp to shoot, on 
account of which there was some dissension between 
them, and the Duke's artillery and the gunners and 
the men who were guarding or pulling them, among 
whom I was one, lay there for three nights.1
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Gruffydd's account shows the importance of noble 
concepts of their own prestige as warriors in determining 
the strategy of early sixteenth century war, as well as the 
way in which noble rivalry over status could further help 
to make campaigns seem far from rational and efficient.
As is shown in the following section, such 
considerations of rank and honour could also help to determine 




There are two main areas to consider when examining 
early sixteenth century tactics. The first includes the kinds 
of tactical formations adopted by armies while on the march.
The second encompasses the ways in which armies were deployed 
during the actual business of fighting.
In both areas it is apparent that military tactics 
tended to be as haphazard and as traditional as other 
aspects of war. It also appears that considerations of noble 
prestige, and especially the honour and comfort of the king 
when he was with the army, were at least as important as 
achieving strategic objectives. There was actually considerable 
variation in the types of tactics used, but chance, tradition 
and prestige provided relatively strict limits to that 
variation.
Armies had been most usually divided into three 
tactical formations during the wars of the previous several 
hundred years, and Henry and his men did little to break with 
tradition. They continued to organize their armies, however 
large or small, generally into a vanguard, a mid ward, and a 
rearguard. The size of Henry's armies, up to four times as 
large as before, proved no great hindrance to this practice, 
even though each division of the army might be large enough 
to form an army by itself. The result of this was that the 
three main tactical formations were usually subdivided into 
three more units each. In both 1513 and 1544 the vanguards 
were large enough to operate as independent units of the army 
with their own internal tripartite divisions.
When the king was with his Ward, the division of 
that tactical formation was determined by two desires: 
anxiety to safeguard the king, and the wish to make his army 




march from Calais to Boulogne was perhaps even more splendid 
than the progress from Calais to Therouanne.*
In 1544 his Ward was led out of Calais by drums,
fifers and trumpeters conducted by heralds and many peers.
Garter herald bore the king's unfurled banner before the king
himself, who rode cap-a-pied on a charger, followed by a
servant bearing his headpiece and spear. Henry was also
surrounded by well armed and mounted henchmen. Outside the
gates he was joined by the Duke of Alberquerque with 100 men
at arms, some of them on horses barded in clock of gold, and
Essex and Sir Thomas Darcy with more men at arms. The
formation of the army was thus based around the splendour of
the king, his nobles and his musicians. The glittering court
at the centre of the formation was protected by the light horse
and demi-lances who headed the march, and the pikemen, gunners
and archers who flanked the king on either side, while at the
rear protection was offered by the men at arms and the yeomen
2of the guard interspersed with other horsemen. Such a sight
could be expected to impress ambassadors and locals with its
splendour, as was the case in 1513 when the Milanese ambassador
commented on the fine sight made by Henry and his men in their
3glittering armour as they traversed the countryside.
But although the formation of the army was worked out
in a way to impress the observer, the organisation of the units
within that formation was extremely casual. Infantry bodies
were often raised and employed in bodies of about 100 men with
a captain and a deputy captain. But, as in the case of the
900 pike brought by Brandon in 1513, they might also serve in
4an undifferentiated mass, depending on the circumstances. The 
horse was no better organized, and the size of units could be 
equally as nominal. The largest recognized unit was a standard.
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This might consist of anywhere between 100 and 1,000 horsemen. 
The smaller units, known either as cornets, pennons, or 
guidons, could be from 60 to 120 horsemen. And, as mentioned, 
the smallest of all, the lance or spear, might be only one 
man at arms, or five men at arms, or a variety of different 
kinds of cavalrymen in differing amounts.*
Honour, tradition, and the chance effect of 
circumstances, were therefore all major influences on the 
creation of tactical formations.
These same factors also applied in battle, because 
the organisation of armies prevented much scientific 
deployment and manipulation of troops during fighting. This 
situation was also contributed to by the presence of mercenary 
troops in Henry's armies, and the unreliability of many of his 
common soldiers. These two factors in themselves helped 
ensure the prominence of nobles in war.
Some infantry bodies were of high reputation.
Ferdinand told Henry to always have 2 or 3,000 lansknechts in
his service, because no "parfayte war" could be made where
they were absent, although it is curious that Ferdinand
considered that the German pikemen were most useful for
2guarding cannon during battle.
Swiss and Spanish infantry were also of high 
reputation, and played major roles in the Continental wars of 
the period. But European infantry in general had a bad 
reputation for unreliability and lack of discipline in battle, 
an infamy that occasionally extended to the Swiss and German 
pike as well. Henry claimed he would not employ the Swiss in
/155...
1. Audley, A Book of Orders.
2. L.P. I (360 7) ; Sp.P . II (86)  ; cf.Audley, A Book of Orders, 
who accounted the Germans as the flower of all footmen.
- 155 -
1544 because he thought them "...men of small service and 
little courage when it cometh to the brunt...", and suggested 
to Charles that they would be more valuable if the French 
employed them.*
Henry's own infantry enjoyed a somewhat variable
reputation. Ferdinand openly scorned them in his letters to
2Henry because of their lack of endurance and discipline. The
Italians thought they compared well to their own infantry,
however, because they were not barefoot, nor were they men
who went to rob, but rather to gain honour. One Italian
observer was surprised to find that they did not take wenches
3with them, nor were they profane swearers.
These opinions were not shared by the soldier 
Audley, who commented that men were chosen for infantry 
companies by their captains out of favouritism rather than 
worth. He said that men could go to war for up to five years 
and at the end have no more knowledge of how to fight than 
they had at first, because their captains were as ignorant
4as they were. Indeed, there was some evidence of poor 
discipline and something of a lack of willingness to fight 
amongst Henry's infantry, both mercenary and national, in 
both 1513 and 1544. The result was that the cavalry, and the
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nobles, often performed more valuable service in battle 
than did the common infantry, as was continually demonstrated 
during the war around Therouanne in 1513.*
As mentioned in the preceding section of strategy, 
Henry and his men were subjected to continual harassment 
from the French after the English forces were divided during 
the march to Therouanne. It was in these intermittent clashes 
that Henry's cavalry performed much of its service during 
1513. One such incident occurred on 27 July near the town of 
Dornham, when a large French army approached Henry's ward.
The French may have numbered around 4,000 horse and about
11,000 infantry. They were apparently unable to approach 
closer than two miles because the French foot refused to 
advance any further. The French cavalry was therefore forced 
to continue on alone after pausing for a time. Henry, adopting 
the usual English tactics, deployed his infantry and cannon 
to await the charge. The ensuing events are unclear, but the 
English sources suggest that the confrontation turned into a 
series of cavalry clashes akin to the melees of tournaments, 
with horsemen from either side engaging in jousts, to the 
apparent entertainment of Henry and the watching infantry.
"...a pleasant sight if a man's skin had not been 
in hazard..."2
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While these individual engagements continued, 
with lives being lost and prisoners taken by both sides,
Essex with the King's Spears and 200 mounted archers set 
up an ambush. The French failed to enter the trap, however, 
and when Sir Rhys ap Thomas joined Essex at noon with a 
force of demi-lances and Sir Thomas Guildford's following 
of more mounted archers, the English cavalry circled behind 
the French cavalry, causing the enemy horse to retreat onto 
their infantry and eventually depart. The threat of attack 
gone, Henry spread his cavalry out behind his army as a 
protective screen, and continued his interrupted march.'*'
The infantry had been unable to join in the 
engagement. In fact, many had died of thirst as they waited 
for hours in their armour in the July sun while the cavalry 
manoeuvred.
The events of the following day demonstrated once 
more the relative flexibility and discipline of the cavalry, 
as compared to the recalcitrance of the German mercanaries in 
particular.
The French seemed likely to capture one of the 
twelve apostles, which had fallen into a ditch. They also 
threatened the master carpenter and 100 labourers who had left 
the army without leave to attempt to right it. The king, in 
a rage, ordered the Germans to go to the aid of the workers.
But the lansknechts refused to do so, as a French force had 
assembled nearby.
Meanwhile Sir Rhys and his horse were scouting in 
the area and saw what was happening, so they sent to the Spears 
for help. The Spears happened to be nearby guarding another
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overturned gun. While Lord Berners completed the rescue of 
that weapon, Essex and his nobles joined with Thomas, at the 
same time sending for help to a Flemish cavalry commander,
Lord Walon, who had only just then joined Henry's army. But 
the Flemish mercenaries proved no more willing to risk 
themselves than did the lansknechts. Walon sent back word 
that he would not fight 10,000 French because he had 
contracted to serve the king for more than one day. Essex 
and his cavalry were "sore discontent" with this answer, as 
they were apparently anxious to join with the enemy whatever 
the odds. Once more the French and English horse skirmished 
as the French army moved forward in a solid block, cavalry 
in front, "...with standardes, penons and banners waverying, 
and sumptuous bardes, and riche harnys glyteryng...".
At this point the English cavalry seems to have 
realised that was vastly outnumbered. Hall says that Sir Rhys, 
a veteran of the Wars of the Roses, advised Essex that it was 
foolhardy for 700 men to charge so many, and that it would be 
best to follow orders and simply reclaim the gun. Essex was 
persuaded, so he ordered a withdrawal.
"...and so softely and not in flyeing maner retreted..." 
The French sensed victory, and their men at arms charged at the 
backs of the English. But suddenly, crying to St.George, the 
English faced about again and returned the charge, at which the 
French cavalry broke and their whole army retreated in disorder.
Willingness to come to grips with the enemy - unlike 
the mercenaries - and relative self-discipline had won the 
English cavalry its second minor victory in two days.
The same applied during the battle of Spurs, the only 
large scale engagement with the enemy in the open field during
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Henry's wars on the Continent. It was almost purely a 
cavalry battle, largely because the control of early sixteenth 
century armies during a battle was so poor, prohibiting the 
use of the full potential of the various forces under Henry's 
command.
Henry and his army were camped outside Therouanne.
The French planned to relieve the city by approaching it from 
two directions. One group of horsemen was to occupy Shrewsbury 
and the van on the west side of the city, while the rest were 
to break through to the walls on the opposite, unbesieged, side 
with provisions.
But Henry learned of the French approach from the 
south, partly because the northern horse under Sir John Neville 
found the French at Guinegate. The Spears subsequently ventured 
out of the English camp to joust with their rivals. These 
skirmishes continued until the French cavalry left their former 
hiding place, at which time they split into two groups. A 
group of light horsemen tried to reach Therouanne's walls, 
while the men at arms made a slower and more direct approach. 
Meanwhile, other forces attacked Shrewsbury to keep him 
occupied.
Henry assembled his army to meet the heavy cavalry, 
deploying it in order of battle, and causing some delay while 
he argued with his advisers over whether or not his tents should 
be left up, an argument which he won:
...the king sayde I will this day that my felde be 
made and sette in as royall wise as maye bee, and  ^
all my ryche tentes sette up, whyche was done...
The army eventually sorted itself into marching order,
2with about 1,100 cavalry in front of about 10,000 infantry.
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No record of the disposition survives, although from Hall's 
account it would appear that the lansknechts were supposed 
to have gone in front of Henry and his archers, but they 
refused to do so, and halted on his left. Henry had 
experienced difficulty with the Germans during the siege.
At one point they had seized his cannon during an altercation 
with his infantry and turned the weapons on the king and his 
camp.* Now, for some unknown reason, they refused to march 
any further, so the king was forced to halt his infantry while 
his elite cavalry continued on unsupported, to the chagrin of 
the king who had to be restrained from joining them. The French 
horse numbered perhaps 2,000 men, and the odds were further 
increased when 400 mercenary cavalry under Walon broke off from 
the English. They held aloof during most of the battle, only 
joining it when victory was certain for their allies. Despite 
this, the 700 English heavy cavalry, banners displayed, 
advanced up a hill to meet the French, joined at the last 
moment by Sir Joyn Guildford and 100 mounted archers, and 
Clarenceux king of arms, who rode up crying that victory 
belonged to the English and that he would fight with them in 
just his surcoat, without armour.
When the English reached the top of the hill, 
they found themselves on a plateau bordered by a field on one 
side and a forest on the other. Here the archers dismounted 
and fired at the French, who were then charged by the cavalry. 
The initial impact brought down the front rows and some French 
standards. Perhaps because the French had orders not to 
engage the English - although it is strange that they should 
have continued to advance under such circumstances - perhaps 
because they were feigning a retreat but failed to bring off
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the manoeuvre, perhaps because they were already returning 
when the charge came, or perhaps, as Hall suggests, because 
they were disordered by the sudden return of their light 
horse, who poured onto their unsecured flanks, the French 
were disordered and put to flight.*
The brief encounter had turned into a rout as the 
English, now joined by the Burgundians, pursued the French 
to Guinegate, capturing about 120 nobles and 9 standards.
As with so many other combats of the era, the
tactics of the battle were determined by the chance effect
of which section of the army could get to the enemy first,
and also by the recalcitrance of hired troops, especially
the infantry, rather than any carefully weighed employment
2of various combinations of troops.
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At home, the limited and largely traditional 
variation of tactics which was used was demonstrated at the 
battle of Flodden, which had most of the characteristics of 
the usual confrontation between English and Scots. The Scots 
were always weak in cavalry, relying on their massed spearmen, 
on this occasion armed and trained according to the precepts 
of Continental pike. And the English, as often was the case, 
dismounted their men at arms to disperse them amongst 
formations of bill, pike, and archers.
The 1544 expedition produced no large scale 
engagements, either in Britain or on the Continent. There 
were some considerable combats in the years immediately after 
1544, however, including the battle of St.Etienne. This 
encounter once more demonstrated the unreliability of the 
infantry, the importance of the nobles in battle, and their 
relative steadiness and discipline in combat, as well as the. 
continuing role of the cavalry.
Henry Howard Earl of Surrey was commander of 
Boulogne in January 1546. He learned that the French were 
to relieve the castle of Chatillon, some 10 miles away, with 
a wagon train guarded by horse and foot. Surrey sent out 
a scouting party composed of several hundred horsemen from 
Boulogne and Guisnes under Sir George Pollard. Once Pollard 
had located the enemy, Howard marched out with most of the 
garrison of Boulogne, some 2,000 footmen accompanied by a 
number of knights and gentlemen, including Sir Thomas Wyatt 
the younger. Surrey discovered that the French had nearly 
double the number of his men, about 50 0 horse and 4,00 0 foot, 
but decided to risk battle anyway, spurred on, he later claimed, 
by the hope of winning Chatillon during the confusion of 
battle. He deployed his forces with a mass of pike and bill 
in the centre, flanked by gunmen and bowmen, and with the 




The tactical importance of the nobles' sense of 
honour was demonstrated when they asked to be placed in the 
front row of the infantry, trusting to the strength of their 
armour.
The battle was begun by Surrey's horse charging 
and disordering the French gunmen and cavalry before moving 
on to destroy the baggage train. Meanwhile, in the centre 
the German lansknechts, who were the French infantry, grappled 
with the English pike, which broke and fled, leaving the 
nobles to be killed "...who were very hardy and could have had 
good success if they were followed...". Despite the efforts 
of the nobles to rally them the foot would not stop until they 
reached the safety of their trenches. Unlike the infantry, 
the cavalry retained its discipline, claiming a hollow victory 
for the English by occupying the field before marching back 
to safety by a circuitous route to avoid the remnants of enemy 
forces.
The cavalry, due to its relative cohesion, and 
perhaps to the extra training its members received in tourna­
ments, outweighed the value of the masses of infantry in this 
engagement. The only members of the infantry to show similar 
cohesion and courage were the gentlemen captains, as Surrey 
remarked to Henry.
...if any disorder ther were, we assure Your Majeste 
ther was no defaulte in the rulers, nor lacke of 
courage to be geven them,^but a humour that sometyme 
raigneth in Englisshemen.
The poor quality of the bulk of the troops used in 
early sixteenth century armies meant that tactics were often 
a matter of chance and the sense of honour shared by the nobles. 
This picture is qualified by the fact that the noble cavalrymen
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were often more steady than the infantry, and were able to 
manoeuvre more rapidly than infantry during the skirmishes 
and ambushes which were the main type of fighting in which 
Henry's armies engaged in the field. These were the usual 
areas of field combat because the main part of the army's 
activity was often devoted to the less dramatic business of 
siege warfare.
Early sixteenth century tactics present a contrast 
to those of later in the century, and particularly to the 
style of fighting which emerged during the Thirty Years War. 
Henry's field operations were not struggles between disciplined 
masses of scientifically deployed and closely co-ordinated 
pikemen and arquebusiers, supported by accurate and rapid firing 
artillery, and occasionally by light armed cavalry. The 
deployment of troops remained relatively simple and traditional, 
and the cavalry, in addition to its duties of scouting and 
raiding, often played a leading role in combat engagements, 
while the infantry, although it physically dominated the field, 
was often too poorly disciplined to be of any use in battle.
/165.
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The nature of early Tudor strategy and tactics is 
a reflection of the state of early sixteenth century warfare 
in general. As indicated in examinations of aspects of the 
army such as troop types, weapons, administration and other 
important areas of the military sphere, this era would not 
appear to have undergone that "...transformation in military 
matters..." claimed for sixteenth century warfare by Oman.
It remained a period which was, despite innovations such as 
gunpowder weapons and the use of huge bodies of prestigious 
infantry, inefficient in the extreme in military practice 
compared to modern standards, or even to the level of 
efficiency reached by the Swedes during the following century.
Several reasons for this have been suggested. These 
include the fact that warfare remained relatively crude and 
limited because its practitioners still largely relied on 
traditional means of waging war, and that the bureaucracy of 
royal government had not yet been organised to cope properly 
with the demands of warfare.
It has also been briefly suggested that the nobles 
helped give war an appearance of inefficiency because of their 
attitudes to war. These attitudes had a significant effect 
on the practice of war because the nobles were of major importance 
in almost all aspects of warfare.
The following two chapters will show how the nobles 
considered other aspects of war besides mere efficiency to be 
of crucial concern, and how these considerations governed their 
behaviour in war. War was not an activity that the nobles always 
distinguished clearly from their peacetime activities. It was, 




and, as a result, their behaviour in war tended to continue 
many qualities of their life in peace. War was, as far as 
they were concerned, like jousts or the banquet, the place 
where a noble could demonstrate to all his status as a noble, 
and where he could gain even more honour to himself, his 




A GAME FOR GENTLEMEN: PART I .
The lifestyle of the Tudor nobility is supposed to 
have undergone a great change which distinguished the typical 
behaviour of Henry VIII and his contemporaries from that of 
nobles of previous eras, particularly in the area of military 
behaviour. Rather than being typically "chivalric", noble 
attitudes and activities of the early sixteenth century could 
be described by terms such as "realistic", "rational" and 
"ruthless", and by other somewhat vague appellations which might 
be generally classified as "modern".
This change in the usual modes of noble behaviour 
is thought to have accompanied, and even to have helped bring 
about, a similar revolution in methods of waging war. Kilgour 
summed up the transformation in this way:
War was no longer a game for gentlemen but a terrible 
and bloody business, in which there was no place for 
clemency.
But, as has been indicated in the previous brief 
examination of early Tudor warfare, the nobility was still 
dominant in many of the key areas of war, despite the advent 
of reputable infantry and new weapons.
And, as will be shown in the following two chapters, 
warfare still often had the appearance of a game for the 
nobility.
Several reasons why warfare should have presented 
the sight of an exclusive sport can be suggested, including
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the influence of the way of life that was embodied in the 
tournament. This was one of the manifestations of the 
attitude shared by the nobles that the fact that they were 
part of an elite obligated them to behave in certain ways, 
both on and off the battlefield, to retain and improve their 
status within the noble group. And, as will be shown, because 
the military role of the nobles was so much a part of their 
code, there was often little distinction between their actions 
in civilian and military situations.
Other ways in which this attitude was embodied, 
apart from tournaments and pageants, included the style with 
which the noble displayed the heedless courage expected of 
his caste by undertaking individual feats of arms out of a 
sense of honour. And in addition to this, to some extent the 
behaviour of nobles during wartime was also governed by a 
shared understanding that, as an elite, certain religious and 
sexual types of behaviour were incumbent on them, even in the 
face of great danger. Each of these will be considered in 
more detail in the final chapter.
The cumulative effect of such attitudes was that 
the behaviour of nobles in war was often quite different to the 
rational behaviour that might be expected of men who saw war 
solely as a ruthless and bloody business. As a result, the 
question arises as to whether or not the presence of attitudes 
which, for want of a better term, might be called modern, 




i . Game or Business?
Historians have generally attributed the new noble 
lifestyle of the sixteenth century to what they have identified 
as the emergence of a more business-like, pragmatic approach 
to warfare. This "new" approach has usually been assumed by 
historians to have inevitably ended the more idealistic type 
of behaviour that they have associated with a chivalric nobility 
of the medieval period.
Such a claim would, however, appear to call for an 
arbitrary division in human motivations which rarely appears 
in the documents of any era. There is no reason why the more 
inefficient, less obviously rational forms of noble behaviour 
could not have existed in concert with pragmatic and ruthless 
activity. This would, in fact, appear to have been the case 
in the previous era, for medieval warfare was rarely less 
bloody than war at any other time, and medieval nobles could 
be just as ruthless as their sixteenth century descendants 
when the occasion was appropriate. Some historians have even 
attributed the same ruthlessness and practicality to medieval 
nobles as has often been claimed for Tudor captains. K.B. 
MacFarlane, for example, wrote of fourteenth century nobles 
that they "...made no pretence of fighting for love of king 
or lord, still less for glory, but for gain..."*
Johan Huizinga recognized that what might be called 
"realism" - ruthlessness, rationality, an interest in efficiency 
for its own sake - may well exist harmoniously in the minds and 
actions of people who are also impelled to act by motives which, 
from the viewpoint of another culture, might seem "unrealistic", 
that is, irrational, idealistic and inefficient. Huizinga 
classified most of the typical kinds of noble behaviour
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identified in this thesis - ceremonies, sports, titles of 
honour, rash or careless conduct in battle - as composing 
the "game" element in the behaviour of a group. This 
element he saw as accompanying a more serious type of 
behaviour, but not necessarily supplanting it.
...in every archaic civilization the sharp line 
between the serious and the posed eludes our view.
In chivalric life an element of grave and solemn 
play is constantly intermingled with reason and 
calculation. It will never be possible to understand 
all the aspects of medieval politics if one neglects 
this play element.^
Huizinga, who was one of the great proponents of a 
change in noble lifestyles during the sixteenth century, thus 
admits that what might be called realism or modernity could 
exist in mens' minds along with what he chooses to call the 
play element.
It would appear that this applies to the nobles 
of Tudor England as well as to those of earlier periods. It 
may be, in fact, that "realism" is a necessary and universal 
accompaniment to the "play" aspects of culture. A degree 
of pragmatism or realism was necessary for the Tudor noble 
in order that the play, or in other words, the acquiring of 
honour, might take place. The noble had to display some 
practicality in order to raise his army and to carry out his 
duties as an officer, however clumsily. Ideals of honour 
came into force once his use of practicality had put him into 
a position to acquire prestige through feat of arms, and when
/171...
1. J.Huizinga, "The Political and Military Significance of 
Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle Ages" (1921), in Men 
and Ideas. History, The Middle Ages, The Renaissance 
trans. J.S.Holmes and H. van Marie (London, 1960), pp.201-2.
- 171 -
honour conflicted with pragmatism, the former often took
prior claim on a noble's behaviour, as is shown in Chapter Seven.
Henry VIII himself recognised that this dualism 
existed in the behaviour of nobles, but he apparently saw no 
great contradiction in the co-existence of idealism and 
ruthlessness. One of the reasons why he did not go to the 
north immediately after the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1537 was 
that he feared his presence would incite the Scots to attack 
in the hope of gaining both riches and honour, for it was in 
the nature of men of war that they were "...desirous both of 
spoil and glory..."*.
Apart from the co-existence of seemingly contradictory 
attitudes to war being possible, it would also appear from 
anthropological evidence that it is possible for more than one 
kind of warfare to be practiced by society. That is, at one 
level, warfare may be ruthless, practical and bloody, while at 
another it may be invested with irrational and idealistic 
behaviour. The type of war that is waged depends on the needs 
of the society that wages that war. Two major types of war 
at least have been identified in Melanesia, for example. One 
is what the observer has called a "chivalrous" type characterised 
by formal challenges and pitched battles, in which the display 
of force (and perhaps of status) rather than the effective use 
of strength is aimed at. The other type is a treacherous, 
ambush warfare where there are few rules and more bloodshed.
Each type of warfare has its own function. The community both 
recognises and values the distinct functions of the two types.2
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Warfare, therefore, is not necessarily a universally 
consistent aspect of society, but may operate at many levels 
and perform many functions. This seems to shed a great deal 
of light on the conduct of warfare during the early sixteenth 
century. Warfare at that time often did appear to be a 
ruthless and bloody business. But it also displayed those 
qualities of ceremonial, sport and idealism which have been 
mentioned. It may be possible to argue, therefore, that 
sixteenth century war operated at a number of distinct but 
coincident levels, answering to the particular needs perceived 
for warfare by society. The particular need of the sixteenth 
century military elite was for a type of warfare that justified 
their status and which allowed them both to demonstrate and to 
acquire more of that status. At the same time, however, they 
were not so bound up with the need for honour that they were 
completely irrational and uninterested in pursuing victory by 
using their strength. They also practiced the kind of "foul 
war" for which Henry once apologised to France after a raid 
by Thomas Howard, when they saw the need.*
It is not always clear how the nobles distinguished 
between what they knew as "foul" and "honourable" war, 
although a French contemporary, Blaise de Monluc, who fought 
in the 1544 war, in explaining why no ransoms were taken during 
the Wars of Religion made a distinction between the kinds of 
motivations that applied to nobles in different kinds of wars.
It was not like a foreign war, when one fights for 
love or honor; in civil war one has to be either 
master or servant...^
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Amongst the English, the invasions of France in 
1513 and 1544 seem to have been of the former type, as compared 
to the ruthless, cruel war practiced against the Scots by 
Hertford in 1544, when he tricked Scottish women and children 
into staying in their cottages so he could burn them alive.
The Scots, because of their perfidy in breaking treaties, were 
considered to have forfeited the right to clemency.*
As will be shown in the following chapters, the 
honourable, ceremonial type of war took up much of the time 
of nobles during campaigns, and occupied their attention even 
during the heat of battle, sometimes with the loss of strategic 
and tactical advantages, and sometimes even at the cost of their 
own lives.
The question of whether the early sixteenth century 
was more ruthless in war than previous centuries, and hence 
more realistic and modern, is therefore not a crucial issue, 
because realism did not necessarily exclude what are, from the 
modern viewpoint, the idealistic and ceremonial aspects of war.
The more important feature of war was the way in which 
nobles regarded it as a place where they could obtain prestige 
by acting according to the more or less recognised standards 
of the military behaviour of their group, a consideration that 
was often of supreme importance to them.
1. L.P. XIX, i (533).
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Perhaps no other single institution did more to
give early Tudor warfare the appearance of a ceremonial or
thea sport than did/tournament, and the kinds of activities 
associated with the tournament.
Often there was no clear distinction made between 
the behaviour typical of a noble at peace or a noble at war, 
and some of the characteristics of warfare situations were 
recreated at court. At the same time, some of the typical 
aspects of court and domestic life were continued during a 
campaign, as a mark of the status of the noble warrior.
The result of this was that the inclusion of such 
things as tournaments in campaigns often prevented the 
efficient conduct of a campaign, and diverted a great deal of 
time, money and effort into maintaining the more showy aspects 
of the noble lifestyle during wartime.
But although the presence of these elements in war 
may seem from a twentieth century viewpoint to give military 
ventures the appearance of a game, an examination of the 
tournament from the perspective of the Tudor people themselves 
indicates that there were sound reasons, in their terms, for 
their presence.
For one thing, participation in tournaments was a 
way in which nobles could establish their status in the 
nobility in general and the military elite in particular. And 
in other ways, an examination of the many functions of the 
early Tudor tournament indicates that it was far from being 
merely a luxurious game to charm the leisure of a courtly 
society, divorced from war's reality. It was, rather, a crucial 
aspect of the reality of early sixteenth century warfare, 
serving a multiplicity of functions.^-
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ii. The Tournament: More Than a Game?
The tournament was a highly complex institution, 
which was capable of being adapted to a wide range of 
situations. This is shown at even the most basic level of 
its operation, as an arena for mock combat. The tournament 
was more than a clash between mounted riders armed with 
lances. It could actually reproduce most of the varying 
situations in which a noble could expect to find himself in 
wartime, as is shown by a challenge to a tournament issued 
early in Henry's reign. The challenge included in the list 
of events to be held during several days contests such as 
running 8 horseback courses with lances; archery competitions; 
striking 8 blows with blunted swords; wrestling; fighting 
on foot with spear or sword; and casting of the bar."* Other 
tournaments reproduced different situations, as is indicated 
below.
The terms tournament and joust themselves suggest 
the varying types of functions of tournaments. They are often 
applied with a great deal of latitude to almost any mock 
combat, but in the sixteenth century they had quite specific 
meanings of their own. The tournament was a battle between 
two or more parties of horsemen armed with lances and other 
weapons. A joust was an individual horseback course of lance 
against lance. Within these two general categories, various 
other more particularised kinds of combats were further defined. 
M£l£es - the combats that took place during tournaments - 
might be identified as a particular type, depending on whether 
they allowed a limited number of strokes, or unlimited strokes, 
or battles with particular weapons. Jousts could be with 
sharp or blunt lances, and combats could generally be a plaisance 
or a 1 1outrance, for pleasure or to the death.
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This brief outline of the numerous kinds of 
tournament combats - here tournament is used in the general 
sense - hints at the way that tournaments as an institution 
could also fill a number of functions for the participants, 
apart from simply being an armed contest. Some of these 
other functions were deliberately fostered, some appear to 
have arisen as an offshoot of the tournament. They were 
used, amongst other things, for the diplomatic, dynastic 
and personal activities of the monarch and the court.
The breadth of these functions was first recognised 
by S.Anglo, who depicted the tournament during the reign 
of Plenry VIII as a many faceted, functional institution, 
instead of as a mere formalised contest in arms. Rather than 
declining or rigidifying during the reign of Henry and his 
father, according to Anglo, the tournament had grafted onto 
it novel characteristics which made it more vital than ever 
before. He believed that tournaments had always been made 
up of a number of diverse elements: combat, politics, music, 
pageantry and feasting. The achievement of tournament holders 
at this time, and the Tudors in particular, was to synthesise 
enduring qualities that had previously been distinct.*
Fifteenth century tournaments at courts such as
those of Philip the Good were welded into a coherent amalgam
of fighting, feasting, music, dancing, graphic display, poetry 
2and speech. These largely theatrical tournaments were 
adapted by the Tudors as instruments of royal policy. They 
became propoganda.
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The tournaments of Henry VIII, for example, are 
explained by Anglo as marking through their increasing 
magnificence a change in his policy towards ambition and 
belligerency. Henry intended to impress Europe by court 
ostentation, while Wolsey, on the other hand, used display 
as a political instrument to proclaim every triumph of 
English diplomacy during his attempts to make England the 
arbiter of Europe. Changes in the tournament marked changes 
in political circumstances. After England's foreign policy 
became introverted during the Reformation, for example, 
tournaments became fewer and less spectacular. International 
spectacle gave way to religious controversy and pageants as 
doctrinal propoganda. The tournaments once more became 
spectacular as Henry returned to foreign ventures after the 
fall of Cromwell.*
Anglo's interpretation perhaps somewhat over 
emphasises the importance of dynastic policy in shaping 
the tournament. But he has opened the way to a consideration 
of the tournament as being more than merely a luxurious game, 
and allows, rather, the examination of the tournament as an 
important aspect of the lifestyle of the Tudor military elite.
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The tournament performed a number of functions 
for the royal family in particular, both in peace and in 
war. The major function, propaganda, as identified by Anglo, 
has already been mentioned.
More generally, however, it could be said that the 
tournament acted as a kind of stage for the significant 
events of the monarch's life, and as a reflection of his 
personality. Henry was the main inspiration of English 
involvement in warfare in both 1513 and 1544. Because Henry 
was a belligerent personality, because he seems to have been 
driven by a need to establish in wars his prestige as a 
monarch, and because he was the head of a military nobility, 
frequently eager for war themselves, the festivities and 
institutions which were part of the court life were often 
organised around the main arena of mock warfare, the tournament. 
Henry and the members of his court - nobles and officials in 
general - manipulated pageants and tournaments so that they 
emphasised a desire for riches and honour in war, specifically 
against France. Henry had made his own interest in such goals 
clear at the very moment of the beginning of his reign, when, 
as he journeyed in his coronation procession, coats of arms 
were borne before him signifying his claim to English 
territory in France lost by his ancestors. The early years 
of his reign appear to have been largely a whirl of tournaments 
and pageants repeating these claims, interrupted only by the 
occasional war.
But tournaments were more than simply military 
propaganda. They were also publicity for the royal family 
as a dynasty, the lately arrived rulers of a quarrelsome and 
sometimes rebellious nobility. As such, the money lavished 
on tournaments by the king, and his personal participation in 
them, helped develop a spirit of unity between Henry and his 
nobles, associations which often began in the early years of
iii. Pageantry and Propoganda.
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the reign and continued until the king's death. Apart from 
this, the tournaments continued to be combative events that 
hardened and trained the nobles for war, and instruments to 
establish diplomatic links, a refinement reached long before 
the Field of Cloth of Gold.
But no absolute distinction should be drawn between 
the various kinds of tournaments, or the ways in which they 
performed various functions. Elements of each of these kinds 
of tournaments might be found intermingled in any single 
event, and the functions largely associated with one kind of 
tournament might be found originating in the most unlikely 
place.
The intermingling of various elements and functions 
can be found in the tournaments of 1510 described to 
Ferdinand by his ambassador. The ambassador wrote that Henry 
was rejoicing in the news of Spanish success against the 
Moors, and was celebrating by running at the ring (a jousting 
exercise), as well as jousts and tournaments on foot. At the 
same time, in imitation of the ancient knights such as Amadis 
of Gaul and Lancelot, two days a week were permanently devoted 
to single combat. Ferdinand's representative described the 
English courtiers as using lances 14 feet long with blunted 
heads which they threw at each other, before joining in combat 
for 12 strokes each with two handed swords. This event took 
place behind waist high barriers erected to stop the knights, 
as the ambassador described the courtiers, from wrestling. He 
commented that there were many young men who excelled in this 
king of war, but the most conspicuous, assiduous and interested 
was the king, who was never absent.*
Several elements and functions were joined in the 
contests described by the ambassador. There was serious
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training for war with swords and lances, with barriers to 
prevent fighting getting out of hand, there was fantasy 
provided by the imitation of Arthurian knights, there was 
diplomacy evidenced by the presence of the ambassador and 
his reports, and there was the overwhelming presence of 
Henry's own enthusiasm for war and of the need for him to 
display his own worth as a warrior.
Henry sometimes went out of his way to impress 
ambassadors with the dazzling splendour of his feats in the 
lists, and hence, of his own status as a warrior noble. This 
status was established not only by his dexterous use of the 
lance, but also by the magnificence of his costumes and his 
ostentatious generosity. When the Spanish diplomats first 
arrived at Henry's court they expressed the desire to see him 
joust. They soon had an opportunity when the nobles made a 
wager - perhaps at the king's instigation - to see who excelled 
at running at the ring. The nobles formed into parties, with 
the king as a participant.
' v.
At the day appointed, the kyng was mounted on a 
goodly Courser, trapped in purpul velvet cutte, 
the inner syde whereof was wrought with flatte 
golde of Damaske in the stoole, and the velvet 
on the other syde cutte in letters: so that the 
gold appered as though it had bene embroudered 
with certayne reasons or poyses. And on the Velvet 
betwene the letters were fastened, castels and 
shefes of arrowes of doket gold, with a garment, 
the sieves compased over hys harneys, and his 
bases of the same worke, with a greate plume of 
fethers on his head pece, that came doune to the 
arson of his sadell, and a great company of 
fresh gentlemen came in with his grace rychely 
armed and decked, with many other right gorgeously 
appareiled, the trompettes before them, goodly to 
behold, wherof many strangers, but specially the 
Spaniardes much rejoysing, for they had never 
sene the king before that tyme armed.^
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This account is typical of the magnificence of 
tournaments, and of- the appearance of nobles, both in peace 
and war. It also contains the constant themes of Henry's 
tournaments, and his use of the institutions of the court.
The richness of the noble warriors in their armour was 
used constantly by Henry to overawe ambassadors, and to 
demonstrate his nobility. On this occasion he further 
contrived to impress the foreigners by allowing them to 
strip his gold badges and devices from him, once he had 
demonstrated his martial prowess by winning the prize at the 
ring running contest.* The combination in tournaments of 
diplomacy, and the delight of the king in displaying his 
skill, continued into war. In 1513, for example, splendid 
jousts were held in Tournai at the conclusion of the siege 
before ambassadors from many European courts, as well as 
Henry's newly conquered subjects and Imperial nobles whom 
he hoped would join in new ventures against France. Accounts 
of the tournament do not make it clear which element was 
predominant, whether Henry hoped to overawe his subjects, 
to cement his alliance with the Emperor, sound a warning to 
Louis, to spread rumours of his ability through the courts 
of Europe, or simply to participate in a sport in which he 
exulted.2
The tournaments so far described appear, however, 
to have inclined more towards being occasions of celebration 
and pleasure, rather than being serious training of.the 
knights for war. There were, coincident with the former 
general type of tournament, the contests which were more 
obviously training for combat, although these too combined 
more than one element.
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The "serious" combats - serious in the sense that 
the actual fighting tended to be given more emphasis - often 
gave an appearance of spontenaity, with the nobles fighting 
in rough and tumble manner on the nearest playing field. Such 
an event was the first public joust in which Henry participated, 
when, in January 1510, he heard that some of his nobles were 
going to joust in Richmond Park. Despite the earliness of the 
season, Henry ventured out of the warmth of court in disguise, 
accompanied by a favourite, VTilliam Compton. The tourney was 
a great success for Henry, because he and Compton broke many 
spears and won a great deal of acclaim for their ability. The 
day was unfortunately marred when Compton was wounded all but 
fatally by Sir Edward Neville, brother of Lord Bergavenny.^
These jousts were part of an almost continuous 
programme of training in which Henry and his nobles engaged 
at this time in preparation for a major war. They occurred 
at the same time as steps were being taken to improve the 
general military preparedness of the country. These steps 
included the re-issue of the Statute of Westminster, which 
required war training for all his male adults, and ordinances 
to organise the strengthening and refurbishing of fortresses.
Henry's northern rival, James, was also encouraging the fitness
. . 2 of his nobles by fostering similar tournaments.
The jousting programme for 1510 indicates the 
continuity of such training, as it also shows the way in which 
martial pursuits were combined with the generality of court 
life, almost without distinction. Jousting began at the feast 
of Pentecost at Greenwich, the traditional date for the 
beginning of chivalric enterprises in Arthurian romances.
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Henry and other nobles challenged all comers to fight at the 
barriers with targets and casting spears 8 feet long, as well 
as 12 strokes of the sword. After these contests were over, 
the court moved to Windsor, which became the starting point 
of a royal progress during which time Henry and his men amused 
themselves at shooting, singing, dancing, wrestling, casting 
the bar, and music. There were jousts and tourneys, and 
generally much hunting, hawking and shooting. When the progress 
was completed, Henry returned once more to Greenwich, where, 
says Hall, he was still desirous to see his nobles expert 
in the martial arts. He therefore set up a place in Greenwich 
park where the queen and her ladies could watch the men battle 
with two handed axes. These weapons were probably more deadly 
in tournaments than swords because they were more clumsy, and 
hence less easy to control. The king himself fought in the 
combats, exchanging blows with a German noble named Guyot, 
whom Henry later knighted, and who continued as a prominent 
soldier in the king's wars. Hall notes that Edward Howard 
managed to knock this noble over during the fighting. Such 
incidents could, and often did, make tournaments a deadly 
affair, and Henry often saw the need to take steps to preserve 
the safety of his nobles by cooling their malice. After this 
particular fight he sought to pacify his courtiers by giving 
them 200 marks in gold so that they could banquet together 
in the city, after which they went in procession by torchlight 
to show themselves in amity to the king, "...who toke pleasure 
to behold them..."*
Henry travelled to Richmond when the Greenwich 
tournaments had concluded, where he once more took part in 
two day contests with the support of Charles Brandon and Will 
Compton. After these were over, it was time to go to
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Westminster, where the birth of his first child was 
celebrated at the magnificent "solemn" jousts of Westminster.*
These "solemn" jousts were another, distinct kind 
of tournament, differing from the diplomatic and the training 
contests, although, as is shown in the following section, 
combining elements of both, and perhaps setting the standards 
of magnificence for noble behaviour in general and military 
lifestyles in particular.
According to Anglo, such tournaments represented 
a Tudor innovation in the staging of tournaments. They 
enlarged and embellished the acting out of legends that had 
long been an accompaniment to tournaments, and created out 
of those legends coherent symbolic representations of 
contemporary occurrences.2
The early court or pageant tournaments were devoted 
largely to felicitous matters, such as the coronation tournament 
in Westminster. The splendour of this event is rendered in 
great detail by chronicle sources such as Hall. The tournament 
arena was decorated with gilded devices in which the Spanish 
pomegranate and the English rose were entwined, and where the 
royal patron of humanists was confronted with a woman bearing 
a crystal shield, a symbol of learning, leading a band of 
jousters disguised as scholars. The tournament to celebrate 
the royal birth in 1511 was also concerned with elaborate 
disguises, processions, imitation forests, and castles as 
scenery for jousting. The fights were themselves often part 
of a story, usually based on an Arthurian legend, but referring
/185...
1. Hall, Henry VIII, p.22.
2. Anglo, The Great Tournament Roll of Westminster, I, p.44; 
Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy, p .4.
- 185 -
to the occasion of the joust. In 1511, the story of the 
tournament was a reflection of the joyousness of the royal 
family, and Henry entered in the appropriate disguise of 
Loyal Heart.*
As mentioned, the splendour and the symbolism of 
court tournaments was continued in other events, including 
those apparently concerned with the more "serious" aspects 
of the kingdom's affairs. Pageantry and symbolism was used 
by Henry as part of his encouragement of the nobles in their 
enthusiasm for war. This occurred, for example, during the 
long court festival of Maying in 1511. Henry went out Maying 
in the woods around Greenwich with a coterie of his future 
war leaders. These included men such as Admiral Edward Howard; 
the commander of the Spears, Essex; the Earl of Devon, whose 
son commanded a ship in the Channel fighting of 1513; the 
Marquis of Dorset; and another Lord Howard, probably the 
Admiral's brother Thomas. All of these men were prominent in 
the events of 1513, except Devon who died just before the 
expedition began.
On their return journey from the woods, the nobles 
met a ship (actually a pageant wagon), whose master hailed 
Henry with the news that he was a mariner who had visited many 
ports and who had now come hither "...to se if any dedes of 
armes were to be done in the countrey, of the which he might 
make report in other countreis...".
A herald with the party asked the mariner what was 
the name of his ship, and was told that it was Fame, a vessel 
laden with Renown. The herald then informed the captain that 
in order to bring his ship into the bay of Hardiness, he must
/186...
1. Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.10 and 22.
- 186 -
double the point of Gentleness, and there he would see a 
company that would meddle with his merchandise. This was the 
kind of allegorical story which characterised the major court 
tournaments. But there was an undercurrent to the play acting 
which was revealed in a comment said to have been uttered by 
Henry at this point:
Then sayed the kyng, syth Renowne is their 
marchaundyse, let us bye it and we can.
Henry already had an army fighting in southern France, 
and the next few years saw even more strenuous efforts to buy 
his renown on the Continent.
With a peal of guns, the ship, displaying its flags 
and banners, sailed before the company to the tilt yards, 
where the training for war continued for three days.*
The flavour of fantasy and Arthurian romance with 
which such events were invested continued even into the 
immediate preparations for war. When Henry mustered his army 
on Blackheath in preparation for the 1512 naval war, he had 
to break off from his jousting in order to do so. From the 
muster he went to Portsmouth accompanied by his nobles. There 
he appointed captains for the royal ship the Regent. These 
were, as usual, his courtiers and favourites, such as the 
commander of the Royal Horse, Sir Thomas Knyvet, Sir John 
Carew, of the prominent Devonshire family, as well as Brandon 
and Sir Henry Guildord. The departure of the fleet was the 
occasion of a great banquet given by the captains, during 
which:
...every one sware to another ever to defend, aide 
and comfort one an other without failying, and this 
they promised before the Kyng, which committed theim 
to God, and so with great noyse of minstrelsie thei 
toke their shippes...^
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The behaviour and the scenes which accompanied the 
departure of the fleet could have come directly from the pages 
of Malory. The noble life in general was largely embellished 
with the language and symbols of Arthurian romance, because 
the romances of chivalry were as popular as ever amongst the 
English, despite the efforts of humanists such as Vergil to 
debunk them because of their questionable authenticity. Lord 
Berners spent his time as deputy governor of Calais translating 
French romances into English, and Arthurian legend was used by 
Henry during the Reformation to establish that he came of a 
line of independent rules, dating from Arthur's reign as 
Emperor.*
7\nd in addition to being a characteristic of the
preparation of the noble for war by Henry, and one of the
ways in which the solemn tournaments were given form,
Arthurian type motifs were used by Henry as part of his
diplomatic propaganda. At the New Year celebration in the
same year as the beginning of the Channel war, a feast was
held during which a castle named The Dangerous Fortress - a
common occurrence in romances - was drawn in. The pageant was
"...garnished with artilerie and weapon after the most warlike
fashion...", but the attack on it was purely symbolic. Inside
the castle were six women in red and gold costumes, who were
besieged by the king and five nobles dressed in identical
colours. The symbolism was plain: Henry intended to reclaim
2his rightful property.
These then were some of the many elements and 
functions of the tournament, insofar as they directly affected 
the king himself and were manipulated by him to suit his 
needs. The king in 1513 was a gallant knight, eager to lead
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his nobles to war sword in hand. The tournament was the 
instrument that he used to channel the desires of those 
nobles and to incite them, lighting their enthusiasm with 
the glitter of pageants, and toughening them in the lists 
for the coming encounter. From this point of view, the 
tournaments were a necessary appendage to war, and were very 
much a part of the reality of the military life, as perceived 
by Henry and his court. This was not only Henry's point of 
view, however, but was something shared by senior advisers. 
The cost of tournaments was enormous, and they could not 
have been mounted without the co-operation of his council 
members, who were not above discouraging the king in some 
os his ventures. And it is notable that a man such as 
Wolsey should have used the tournaments during the 152 0's 
as part of his policy as arbiter of Europe.
But the tournaments were not merely the instrument 
of the king. They involved a large number of courtiers who 
helped to stage and arrange them, and who apparently enjoyed 
and benefited them, as shown in the following section.
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The tournament was an important aspect of noble 
life because, as with the king, it performed many necessary 
functions for the nobles. These functions often arose from 
the position that the nobles occupied in society, and 
especially the fact that for the greater nobles in particular, 
a public career meant attendance at court.
The court was a minute, faction ridden and 
dangerous world, where rivalries and irritations between 
groups, families and individuals naturally arose. But physical 
measures against an enemy within the precincts of the court 
were strictly discouraged by harsh sanctions. Thomas Duke of 
Norfolk was banished for a time for drawing a knife on a rival, 
and his son Henry was imprisoned under threat of the loss of 
his hand after one of his numerous altercations.
The tournament provided a defined area where the 
nobles could settle their grievances with violence, working 
off their aggressiveness in the heat of a melee.
At the same time, because the court was a world of 
ambition and rivalry, the tournament was also an opportunity 
to increase the status of oneself or one's family. Nobility 
could be flaunted by elaborate displays of wealth and prowess.
The heat engendered at tournaments by such 
considerations helped to ensure that the nobles had plenty of 
practice in relatively realistic combat situations before they 
went on campaign.
The elements of aggression and of status seeking 
through display were both present at the great midsummer 
tournament of 1540, an event held nominally to celebrate the
iv. The Tournament and Nobles.
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wedding of Henry and Anne of Cleves. It was possibly the 
largest tournament of Henry's last years, attracting over 
40 noble participants after its challenges were proclaimed 
throughout Europe. Henry marked the success of the 
tournament by seizing the land of the Knights of St.John.
This he distributed amongst the tourneyers, giving each of 
them land worth over 100 marks per annum for life, as well 
as a house each.
But although the tournament was ostensibly called 
to mark the wedding, it was probably also staged to celebrate 
the immediate good fortune of the Cromwell family, and possibly, 
at the same time, to reinforce their position at court, which 
had been shaken by the unfortunate marriage. Apart from that, 
it was in keeping with Cromwell's practice of demonstrating 
his newly acquired status through military activities, as in 
his parade of his large private army in his livery at the 
London musters three years before. The occasion of celebration 
for Cromwell was that only a fortnight before he had assumed 
the office of Chamberlain, the traditional prerogative of the 
Earls of Oxford, and had been created Earl of Essex, thus 
apparently entrenching himself amongst the peerage.
Cromwell was too old to fight in the lists, but his 
son Gregory substituted for him, demonstrating by tourneying 
that he had the qualities of a great noble, as did a nephew 
who was one of the most successful fighters during the contest. 
This man, whose name was Richard Williams, changed his name to 
Cromwell in order to align himself more closely with the 
rising branch of the family. His outstanding deeds in the
/191. . .
1. Wriothesley's Chronicle, I, p.118.
- 191 -
tournament furthered his advancement, as he was knighted 
immediately afterwards. He survived the fall of his uncle 
to become a prominent figure in the 1544 invasion.
Cromwell and his faction called the tournament, 
jousts and barrier combats which made up the programme of 
events, and kept open house at Durham House, where they 
feasted the newlyweds, the lords, the House of Commons, and 
the aldermen with great ceremony. The guests were served
...everie meale with their owne servantes after 
the manner of warr, their drume warning all the 
officers of household against everie meale which 
was donne, to the great honor of this realme.
Cornwell's circle contained an anti-Howard group 
composed of John Dudley, Viscount Lisle; Sir Thomas Seymour; 
Sir George Carew; Sir Thomas Poynings; and Anthony Kingston. 
All were prominent soldiers in the 1544 expedition, and all 
were bitterly opposed to the Howards. The challenge was 
answered by a team led by Henry Howard, who seized the 
opportunity to seek revenge on his enemies. So intense was 
the fighting that he and his particularly bitter enemy, Lisle, 
had their armour partially shattered by sword blows, not 
easily accomplished considering the sophistication of 
contemporary tournament armour.*
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The bitterness and violence which underlay court 
ceremonial had also appeared thirty years before, at the 
coronation tournament of 1509, ostensibly a pacific and 
joyous occasion. During the second day of tourneying, the 
jousters asked that the combat should be to the utterance. 
This may not actually have meant a fight to the death, but 
rather that it was to be a contest with no limits to the 
tactics employed. Henry, however, was unwilling to let the 
contest go ahead uncontrolled:
...his grace conceyving, that there was some grudge 
and displeasure between theim, thynkying if suche 
request wer to theim graunted, some inconvenience 
might ensue, would not there unto agree.^
But even limiting the number of strokes allowed in 
the melee could not prevent uncontrolled violence from 
flaring:
...then was pesis of harneys hewyn In to the ffyeld 
& swordys brokyn & bowyd that wondyrffull It was & 
fferefull to behold The which contynuyd wyth such 
egyrnes that theyr numbyr of strokis passid, and 
that the powar of the marshallys Sufficid not to 
depart theym tyll the kyng Cryed to hys Gard to 
help to dyssevir theym, which was not doon wtouth 
grete payn, And how well that everych of them quyt 
theym ffull manfully yit Charles Brandon that daye 
was gretly avauncid & ffortherid by his hors the 
which that day ffawgth wyth his teth and fete lyke 
a serpent and therunto was soo pleasaunt & lygth of 
hede that he hadd his aduersary evyr at grete 
avauntage.2
The violent outcome of this tournament which had 
begun as an elaborate celebration pageant, and in which the 
participating nobles dressed in rich costumes, demonstrates 
the numerous levels of activity which were covered by the
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general form of the tournament, and also indicates how 
closely the tournament still answered to the needs of a 
military nobility by providing them v/ith combat training.
In fact, it was probably the only adequate and relatively 
organised military college for the English high command, 
in which the nobles were confronted with virtually all the 
conditions that they were liable to meet in war. Not only 
could they test their skills with all the noble weapons - 
the lance, sword, mace and axe - but Henry's tournaments 
also adopted relatively new weapons such as the cannon and 
handguns. Several people were wounded by gunpowder weapons 
during Henry's tournaments. In addition, there were waterborne 
tournaments on the Thames, and tournaments in which the nobles 
had to attack realistic fortresses enthusiastically defended 
by the besieged, during one of which Sir Francis Bryan had 
an eye knocked out.*
The behaviour of the noble during wartime was 
duplicated in such events, a duplication that went beyond 
merely reproducing the conditions of combat, as is shown in 
the next section.
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
there was often no clear distinction between the behaviour 
of a noble at court and that of a noble on campaign. This 
was partially because peacetime institutions such as the 
tournament were continued on into the campaigns themselves, 
as were the styles of behaviour appropriate to the tournament. 
This had the effect of diverting much of the energy and 
efficiency of the military into maintaining such institutions 
during wartime. One of the reasons why this took so much 
of the resources of the army was that lavish expenditure was 
an essential part of the tournament, just as it was of the 
noble lifestyle in general, both during peace and war. 
Ostentatious generosity was one of the marks of the noble, 
and as such marked noble participation in tournaments and in 
war.
Henry was one of the main instigators of such 
display by the nobles. He provided the physical arena for 
conspicuous consumption by the nobles, both in terms of 
creating court pageants and leading his men to war, and he 
also personally set an example for their display. Henry's 
father had been generous in staging tournaments and pageants, 
but he had not been keen to participate in them himself. But 
Henry not only opened his coffers to provide for tournaments, 
pageants and wars, he was seen to revel in the expenditure, 
joyously distributing his inherited treasures amongst his 
subjects. When the nobles strove to imitate him in 
increasingly lavish costumes, Henry responded by providing 
them with suitable backgrounds against which to disport 
themselves. At the coronation tournament, for example, he 
erected costly items such as a tapestry covered house, and 




crown to serve as the stage for jousting. The castle was 
elaborately decorated with gilded vines, contestants' shields, 
and gargoyles that spouted wine.
The nobles did their best to live up to the 
expectations created by such scenery by wearing splendid 
costumes and armour. Brandon, for instance, wore armour that 
was completely gilded. The jousters were accompanied by bands 
of horsemen in cloth of gold and silver, and hundreds of 
sumptuously dressed footmen.*
The cost of such events was enormous, and together
with the cost of war must have dominated Crown expenditure for
two decades. The 1511 tournament in celebration of the birth
of Henry's child, for example, was estimated to have cost
2£20,000, or about six months income to the exchequer. Although
this was a particularly magnificent tournament, it was not
unparalleled. And the tendency was for the cost of these events
to increase as the nobles strove to be even more outstanding
in their costumes, seeking new ways to spend their money on
their appearance. A new style of cloth was adopted by them
for the 1511 tournament. Made out of gold, it cost £10 a yard
as compared to £5 a yard for the material previously used.
All the nobles who participated in the event wore the cloth,
but two were singled out for special notice by the chronicler
as being especially magnificent, and hence praiseworthy.
These were the lords Bergavenny and Fitzwater, who,, besides
their rich trappings of cloth of gold, wore collars of gold
3chain estimated to be worth 1,000 marks each.
/196...
1. Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.10-11.
2. The Great Chronicle of London, p.374.
3. This was probably not an exaggerated estimate: see the 
portrait of a Gentleman Pensioner of 1560, A.L.Poole (ed.) 
Medieval England new ed. (2 vols, Oxford, 1958), I, Plate 61 
(a) which shows a gold chain with at least four layers 
around his neck.
- 196 -
This elaborate display was highly valued by the 
nobles and their contemporaries. Richard Grafton commented 
that this tournament was
...holden a more excellent iustes, not for the 
more valiaunt actes yt daye done of armis, but 
for ye inestimable richesse and costely apparell 
whiche that daye was worne.,.1
The common people valued tournaments for their
richness as did the nobles, but perhaps for a different
reason. The commons were allowed to participate in the
tournaments not only as onlookers and assistants, but also
frequently they received benefits from the events as the
result of generous gift giving by the nobles. At the end
of the 1511 tournament, for instance, the common people
were allowed to enter the banquet and strip the ornaments
and cloth of gold from the nobles. One of the ornaments
that was given away "...but for honoure, and larges..." was
2later valued by a goldsmith at £3/14/8.
The profligacy of this court life, its ceremony, 
the bands of retainers, and the richness of the nobles, was 
merely an amplification and intensification of their domestic 
lifestyle, rather than an aberration. In their homes the 
nobles also kept large numbers of servants and retainers, 
according to their wealth and rank, and carried on the 
magnificence of court life in miniature.
And, because elaboration and lavish expenditure was 
such a basic part of the noble lifestyle, and because it was 
an essential element of the institutions of court life,
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including quasi-military events such as tournaments, it was 
perhaps inevitable that pageantry and display was continued 
into war, so that the noble in war was almost indistinguishable 
from the noble at court or at home.
When war broke out in 1513, the elaborate costumes 
and profligate expenditure of pageants and tournaments were 
transferred to the theatre of war. The splendour and 
pomposity of Henry's arrival at Calais has already been 
mentioned in general terms, but a specific instance of his 
royal progress illuminates the parallels between court life 
and campaigns even more clearly. The meeting between Henry 
and Maximilian outside the walls of Therouanne, with its 
extravagant costumery, could as easily have occurred within 
the walls of Westminster palace. The very tent in which they 
sheltered from the rain, made of purple and gold cloth, had 
been part of the scenery in the court tournaments at home.
Now it saw service on the battlefield. The nobles were 
themselves paraded in brilliant costumes, their chargers 
barded with cloth of gold, damasc and embroidery, the latter 
more expensive than cloth of gold. The Duke of Buckingham 
was especially resplendent in purple satin, a cloth confined 
by statute to royalty. His horse's bard was covered with 
golden bells and embroidered antelopes, swans and spangles, 
decorations that were designed to drop off as the horse 
moved so they could be distributed as largesse.
The king was naturally most splendid of all, his 
armour covered with a costume embroidered with pearls and 
gems. He was accompanied by the Master of the Horse, who 
led his spare charger, and by henchmen who bore more pieces 
of the royal armour.
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It was greatly to the satisfaction of some of the 
English that the emperor and his nobles were overshadowed by 
Henry and his court, as they wore dull black. The emperor 
was in mourning for his wife, and was also impoverished by 
a lifetime of warfare.*
Every opportunity was taken during the 1513 expedition 
to display the nobles in their richest clothes. They paraded 
not only at the meeting with the emperor, but also at the 
surrenders of Therouanne and Tournai, and at the entry into 
Lille. Banquets and tournaments at the end of the campaign 
in Tournai consumed money in such a rapid manner that it drew 
an unheeded warning from the Clerk of Parliament, John Taylor.
At the great banquet of Tournai, for example, specially made 
costumes of damasc and satin in the Tudor colours were
distributed indiscriminately to local people at the end of the
* , 2 feast.
Such profligacy gave rise to wild rumours about
Henry's wealth, one Italian merchant in London writing that
the king had taken two million pounds in gold and four wagons
3loaded with silver on campaign.
Although such rumours may have been wild 
exaggerations, Henry was in fact extremely lavish with gifts 
during this campaign, as Paolo de Laude noted. The Milanese 
ambassador described how Henry, during the dinner to discuss 
strategy, began to discuss rings and jewellery with the 
emperor, showing his treasures to Maximilian, and eventually 
giving him a large eagle holding a ruby in its claws, a 
cluster of diamonds in its beak, and a large pearl at its
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throat. The jewel was estimated to be worth about 30,000 
florins. The exchange would appear to have been a largely 
formalised event to show both monarchs to their advantage.
Henry was either being particularly extravagant with a 
fortuitously handy gift - the eagle had belonged to Maximilian's 
predecessor Charles the Bold - or it was a gift that was 
suitable as a bonus payment .for Maximilian, a well publicised 
honourable gesture on Henry's part, and an augmentation of 
Henry's pride. Paolo noted that the emperor played his part, 
acting like a good physician who will not take money from a 
sick friend, but who eventually allows himself to be persuaded 
in order not to be surpassed in courtesy or nobility.*
Such display was continued during the 1544 war,
although on a more limited scale, perhaps because there was
a suspicious spirit prevailing both at court and in Henry's
alliances with Continental nobles. Despite this mood, Henry
had not completely dispensed with ostentation as part of his
military ventures. The court was just as magnificent on its
journey to overawe the north in 15 41 as it had been in France
in 1513, and when he sailed to France in 1544, Henry travelled
2on a ship with sails of cloth of gold.
Gruffydd, half impressed, half disdainful, commented 
that the royal host at Boulogne was
...a fine array of gallant people, in rainment of 
silk and velvet and gold cloth, and the harness 
also very gallant, some carved and gilded, some 
painted with splendid figures, by gilt enamelling 
of the bridles, the body harness and the headpieces...
There were also new-fangled weapons made in Italy 
called pardisans which were gallantly carved and 
engraved, with gilded halberds so brittle that not 
one of them^could stand up to a blow from the hand 
of a woman.
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The nobles surrounded themselves with glittering 
entourages and bankrupted themselves in order to present an 
honourable appearance in wartime. But whereas for the king, 
display was perhaps mostly an aspect of foreign policy, for 
the nobles it was an attribute encumbent on them as members 
of the elite. The style with which a noble went to war 
matched his habits at home. Domestic households made the 
great nobles virtually minor monarchs, and their retinues 
gave them miniature armies. The Duke of Buckingham, for 
example, was accustomed to have 6 3 followers in his household 
throughout the year, and on special occasions such as a 
Christmas feast as many as 97 gentlemen, 107 yeomen and 97 
servants.
Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, was known as
the Magnificent because of the splendour in which he lived,
even when away from court. His simplest domestic meals saw
him served by a chaplain, a carver, a server, a cupbearer
each for himself and his lady, a gentleman waiter, a yeoman
usher, a yeoman of the chamber for each of the four courses
of supper, an officer as butler and cellarer, and a groom of
2the chamber to keep the door.
This lifestyle did not change when the noble was 
on campaign. Percy in 1513 was served during the expedition 
to France by a treasurer, a herald, a pursuivant, a 
chamberlain, kitcheners, yeomen of the tent and yeomen of the 
wardrobe, apart from the 300 tenants and about 200 volunteers 
who served under his banner. Besides the entourage of 
servants and retainers, he also took along 23 thoroughbred
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horses for his own use as well as others to give to the Dukes 
of Burgundy and Brittany, plus 20 sumpter horses to bear his 
luggage. This luggage included the usual extravagant wardrobe 
of a campaigning noble, such as several suits of the latest 
style armour, different sets of harness for his horses for each 
day of the week, and a special set of harness for meetings with 
the king's allies. His coat of arms were displayed around his 
tents, and inside the tents were heavy items of furniture, 
such as a cupboard that doubled as an altar on which his priests 
could say mass.*
Percy's appearance in 1513 might be compared with
that of Hertford during his journey north in 1544, when he
appears to have used his huge entourage and splendid appearance
to impress on the northerners both his own status and the might
of the king whom he served. Hertford made an official entry
into Newcastle. He was led through the gates by 3,000 horsemen,
160 gentlemen in black velvet coats covered with gold chains,
and Hertford himself was accompanied by three trumpeters, three
clarions, three heralds in their coats of arms, and a gentleman
bearing a naked sword. The servants who immediately surrounded
the richly dressed earl were three sumptuously costumed pages of
honour. Hertford also had with his 160 retainers in his livery,
2and, bringing up the rear, 5,000 footmen.
The nobles surrounded themselves with entourages 
appropriate to their rank and office, each striving to be more 
magnificent than the other. But there was one noble who 
excelled in taking with him the paraphenalia of a noble on 
campaign. This was, of course, the king, who not only took with 
him a palace of canvas and prefabricated walls, but also his 
household bureaucracy and most of the court.
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Besides the chief officers such as the commander of his 
Ward, the Masters of Ordnance and the marshals, he had as 
part of his retinue the Spears or Pensioners, with their 
own furniture and retinues, his bodyguard, the yeomen 
gunners, the 115 members of his chapel, his five Latin 
secretaries, the clerk of his council, the members of his 
wardrobe, the grooms and pages of the Privy Chamber, the 
wardrobe of the king's beds, the clerks of the signet with 
their retinues, the master of the posts with his 13 messengers, 
the clerk of the Privy Seal, with his retinue, the auditor 
and his servants, the sergeants of arms with their servants, 
the Chamber, with the Knights and Squires of the Body, 
gentlemen ushers, grooms and pages, the king's luter, his 
henchmen, his trumpeter, his minstrel and nine players, his 
hunters, his armourers, his household, his stable, the petty 
captains, the king of arms, herald and pursuivants, his 
bowyer and fletcher with their retinues, his medical attendants, 
and his artillery adviser.*
The swarming mass of servants both of the monarch 
and his nobles formed a movable court which made a campaign 
as comfortable as possible and a counterpart to the glamour 
of life in England. Because they were so much a part of the 
lifestyle of the nobles, the vast bodies of followers were 
an essential adjunct to campaigns, helping to recreate in 
wartime the glitter of the tournament and the pageant.
Their presence also indicates the kind of war which 
was valued by the noble. With such a huge body of followers, 
many of them non-combatants, and trains of horses and wagons 
laden with clothes and furniture, the royal army could not be 
mobile or flexible in the field, even if weak administration
/203...
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and crude planning had allowed it to be. War was, for Kenry 
and his nobles, an activity in which their appearance and 
behaviour was no less important than winning new territory 
from the French.
This noble attitude was one of the major ways in 
which the military elite helped shape the characteristics 
of sixteenth century warfare, by making it an arena in which 
they could display their nobility, rather than the theatre 
of efficiently conducted operations that gained specified 




A GAME FOR GENTLEMEN; PART II.
The preceding examination of the way in which 
the tournament and its associated activities were very 
much a part of the reality of warfare indicates that there 
is an alternative way to understand the feats and deeds of 
honour which are analysed in this final chapter. As 
mentioned, the usual practice of historians has been to 
label those deeds as eccentric anachronisms, the last 
dance of withering medieval leaves before the blast of 
modernity. Cruickshank, speaking of the feats performed by 
Henry and his nobles during their wars, wrote:
There were isolated examples of this sort of 
thing during the whole of the century, but they 
were of no great importance. Victory by fair 
means or foul was becoming the order of the day.
Science and cunning were taking the place of 
nobility and the lance.^
But it is also possible to understand the apparently 
irrational deeds of the nobles as being part of a generally 
recognised and understood set of social expectations that 
was possessed by the nobility, and to see these expectations 
as conditioning the behaviour of nobles in war.
The usual historical practice, of attempting to 
classify such aspects of noble behaviour as mere aberrations, 
with no connection with reality, is to dismiss the motivations 
that sent men to their death, and to ignore the implications 
of individual actions that were of national and international 
significance in both their immediate and long term ramifications 
It is, rather, perhaps more conducive to an understanding of 
the history of the early Tudor period to attempt a comprehension
/ 2 0 5 . . .
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of noble behaviour as being the outcome of contemporary 
society's structure and institutions.
One of the areas in which this applied has already 
been examined in the previous chapter. It now remains to 
consider several other aspects of noble behaviour which have 
been identified as being significant elements of warfare. 
These are the ideas that the noble had particular religious 
and sexual conduct in warfare incumbent on him, and, finally, 




i. Religious Obligations of the Warrior Noble.
The nobles were not only an elect group because 
they were so important in the temporal aspects of warfare.
As they were an elite body, it was assumed that their 
military activities were of special concern to the deity.
This in turn placed obligations on the nobles to act in 
a certain way in war, not that they always lived up to those 
expectations of course. Ellis Gruffydd considered that the 
continual setbacks of the English army during the 1540's was 
due in large part to the failure of its noble leaders to be 
suitably pious in their actions.*
Even so, the belief that the warrior noble had
obligations to his God still helped to condition the details
of war. During the 1513 naval war one of the King's Spears
in command of a ship of the fleet was Arthur Plantagenet.
The illegitimate son of Edward IV, he was later made Viscount
Lisle and Governor of Calais. Arthur left his post as
commander of the ship in the midst of the war because, during
the heat of battle, he made a vow to Our Lady of Walsingham
that he would not eat fish or flesh until he saw her. As a
result, at the height of the naval war, he was sent home by
the admiral to carry out his oath. Edward Howard, the
admiral, wrote to Henry explaining the circumstances of
Arthur's departure. There is no surviving evidence that either
the monarch or the admiral thought the behaviour odd or
reprehensible, and Plantagenet received a knighthood at the
2conclusion of the expedition.
Plantagenet's case was not an isolated incident. 
Howard had made his own elaborate vow during the course of
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the naval war, as the outcome of the death of Sir Thomas 
Knyvet. This oath also indicates the way in which war was 
still seen in terms of personal conflict between individual 
nobles or family groups, apart from its demonstration of 
the religious elements of noble behaviour. Wolsey - again 
without any expression of surprise or displeasure - wrote 
to the Bishop of Worcester to announce that as a result of 
the death of Sir Thomas Knyvet in the sinking of the Regent 
(the other 700 men who burned with him are not mentioned):
Sir Edward (Howard) hath made hys vowe to God that 
he wyl never se the Kyng in the face tyl he hath 
revenged the deth of the nobyll and valyant knygth 
sir Th. Knyvet.1
Mystique surrounded their persons and their actions, a
quality that was illuminated when Howard drowned at Brest.
The English and French ceased their fighting so that his
body could be recovered, and the French admiral, Pregent
de Bidoux - a prior of the Order of St.John recently returned
from fighting the Turks - could arrange for the funeral.
Before the funeral arrangements were completed, however, he
wrote to his King and Queen asking that he be allowed to
keep Howard's heart for himself. The body of the dead admiral
2had been invested with the aura of a holy relic.
War was thus made into a religious duty, and those 
who were most prominent in it - the nobles - shared in the 
mystique. It was no coincidence that the conclusion to the 
1513 war was a large scale religious ceremony in which all 
the nobles participated, because the invasion of France was 
officially a Crusade, to protect the Pope and to punish France 
for making use of heretic cardinals. The concluding ceremony 
was centred around the arrival in England of Henry's reward
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from the Pope, the Sword and Cap of Maintenance. Its 
arrival was celebrated with the same glittering display 
that was a necessary accompaniment to other great court 
occasions, and military campaigns. This included the 
usual demonstration of the dominance of the nobles, such 
as the over 40 0 peers and gentlemen who formed an escort 
for the gifts during their journey from the coast to 
London. Thousands of people thronged the streets of the 
capital to watch the presents arrive. The emblems were 
carried by the Florentine ambassador through the crowded 
laneways to St.Paul's, where Henry waited before the altar 
with members of his court and ambassadors. After an exchange 
of orations by English and Italian representatives, the king 
was girded with the sword and crowned with the hat before 
the high altar. Then the procession paraded around the 
inside of the church, the nobles costumed in rich clothes 
topped with gold chains, before celebrating high mass. At 
the conclusion of the ceremony, the nobles moved outside to 
show themselves to the waiting throngs. The whole ceremony 
was brought to a close by a banquet, from which the Spanish 
ambassador was absent, it was rumoured, because of his shame 
that his country had withdrawn from the Crusade.*
As in other areas of warfare, the nobles spent 
much of their time and resources in elaborate recognition 
of the special relationship that the warrior nobility 
enjoyed with the deity.
It may be argued, of course, that they were cynical 
and that the ceremonies were an elaborate farce. But, on the 
other hand, the nobles went to considerable trouble to mount
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these ceremonies, and occasionally, as in the case of 
Arthur Plantagenet, religious duties were of overriding 
concern to the noble even in times of great stress and 
danger. In later years, after the Reformation, English 
nobles were often forced to sacrifice family ties, careers, 
wealth and safety in order to carry out what they regarded 
as the special religious duty of their caste, fighting in 
God's service against the infidel. There were 87 English 
nobles who became knights of the Order of St.John during 
the sixteenth century, most of them before 15 50, 25 of whom 
fought in the siege of Malta.* Sometimes several members 
of the one family persisted as members of the religious 
military orders. Such a family was the Shelleys, who also 
managed to retain a prominent place at court. One of the 
family, Sir Richard (1513-89) was the last Turcopolier or 
cavalry commander of the Order, while his brother, Sir 
Edward, who is mentioned below, became Master of the 
Household, captain of Berwick, treasurer of the Council of
2the North, and was killed fighting at the battle of Pinkie.
Sir John Wallop was another prominent noble who 
seems to have been compelled by his sense of religious duty 
to risk himself in battle, not only at considerable danger, 
but also at financial cost. After distinguished service in 
1511 and 1513 - for which presumably he could have expected 
a sinecure - he offered his services to Emmanuel of Portugal. 
He fought at his own expense under the Portugese flag against 
the Moors of North Africa, his only reward being membership 
of the Portugese Order of Christ. Wallop was not regarded 
as an anachronistic eccentric. After his return he was
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offered the post of ambassador to France, although he turned 
this offer down so that he could take up the office of 
captain of Guisnes, where there was the greatest opportunity 
to fight.*
In the same year as Wallop went to Africa, three
gentlemen - one of them the son of the king's shipbuilder -
led a retinue of 100 men aboard a pilgrimage vessel to seek
2adventure in the East.
The warfare in which men such as the Shelleys,
Wallop, and the three venturesome gentlemen participated was 
conducted in an atmosphere of religious fervour. The arrival 
of the papal gifts in 1514 was not the only large scale 
religious ceremony associated with the 1513 war. When news 
of victory at Flodden arrived in the king's camp before 
Tournai, the tent of cloth of gold was set up and a Te Deum 
sung by the nobles. When Henry entered captured cities, he 
immediately marched to the main church of his new possession 
and celebrated mass, and throughout his realm special religious 
observances were held. When news of victory in France arrived 
in Rome in September, Henry's ambassador, Cardinal Bainbridge,
3and four other cardinals celebrated the news with a high mass.
Henry's first queen, Catherine, was certain that her husband
was personally sincere in his actions as a soldier of the
4Church in 1513, as she assured Cardinal Bainbridge. And in
official documents there were constant references to God's
interest in the affairs of the nobles. Vergil, for example,
claimed that Janes of Scotland was killed by God because he
5had attacked England while Henry was on Crusade.
/211...
1. D .N .B . entry for Wallop, XX, pp.610-11.
2. Lodge, Illustrations of British History, I (v).
3. V.P. II (315) .
4. Ibid., (203) , 2 November 1512.
5. Vergil, Anglica Historia, pp.215-22; cf.Hall, Henry VIII,I, 
p.109; M.P. I (655), Henry VIII to Sforza.
- 211 -
Even in 1544, when Henry was an outcast from the 
rest of Christendom, he continued to colour his wars with a 
sense of special religious obligation. The Privy Council 
ordered prayers and processions throughout the kingdom for 
the safety of the king and his nobles in France, and for 
victory over the Turks by the Christians. Henry often 
promised aid for the Emperor in his wars against the infidel, 
although the promises of his later years were rarely fulfilled.*
Virtually every army before and since the sixteenth 
century has claimed divine approval for its actions. But for 
the sixteenth century noble, there was a special feeling that 
he was obligated to perform duties for God in wartime, because 
he was one of the military elite. This placed unique privileges 
and duties upon his shoulders, such as Plantagenet1s freedom 
to go on pilgrimage in the middle of a campaign, and Howard's 
obligation to revenge the death of a fellow noble according 
to an oath sworn to God.
1. A.P.C., I, 27 June 1544; L.P. XIX, i (66); 
ii (421).
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Perhaps even more obvious in the wars of Henry VIII 
than the characteristic religious practices of the nobles were 
examples of their highly formalised sexual behaviour. As 
well as being a place where the noble could acquire honour 
through deeds of arms, war was also a place where the sexual 
display which formed such a large part of court life could 
be continued. In fact, the wars of Henry VIII and his nobles 
often appear to be an elaborate sexual game.
This was because the sexual behaviour permitted to 
nobles tended to be tightly restricted by social conventions 
and dynastic needs. Marriage depended on property and dynastic 
questions, rather than on emotion or sexual preference. One 
example of this amongst the peers was the unfortunate career 
of Henry Percy. As a young man at court, he fell in love with 
Anne Boleyn. But he was forced to marry elsewhere, due to a 
combination of court intrigue and family pressure. The unlucky 
future Earl of Northumberland was required to marry a daughter 
of the Earl of Shrewsbury, even though he detested her. The 
marriage was a misery for both, and ended with her insanity, 
but it was politically expedient for Percy's father, it was 
advantageous for the Shrewsburies to ally themselves with the 
more powerful Northumberlands, and Wolsey saw that there was 
a royal interest in the object of Percy's devotion.*
As a result of such constrictions on their sexual 
preferences, the nobles, and perhaps especially those at court, 
had to find other avenues through which to form liasons. These 
frequently took the form of elaborate, public and highly 
ritualised courtships. These were included in the great 
occasions of court life, such as tournaments and pageants, which, 
as has been shown, were also very much a part of the military 
life of the nobility.
/213...
ii. Sexual Behaviour of the Warrior Noble.
1. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.200; Brenan and Lindsay, A History 
of the House of Percy, I, chs vi and vii, passim.
- 213 -
Henry himself provided the lead in many such 
formalised games, particularly in the early years of his 
reign. The relative absence of such games in the records 
of 1544 may have been due to his advanced age, apart from 
the general absence of women from the events of 1544. One 
such formalised sexual ritual of the early years at court 
was the occasion in 1510, when Henry and other nobles such 
as the Earls of Essex and Wiltshire disguised themselves as 
Robin Hood and his band. They burst into the Queen's 
apartments, to the surprise and delight of the ladies, whom 
they joined in dances and other pastimes.*
Such games made women part of those aspects of 
court life which were continuations of military ventures.
Ladies were often the focus around which the activity of an 
event such as a tournament revolved, and sometimes they 
actually participated in the tournaments. One of the 
protagonists in the drama of the coronation tournament was 
a woman disguised as Dame Pallas, and it was also on this 
occasion that the ladies of the court came to beg the king 
to let the combats be to the utterance. The ladies often 
attended tournaments which were largely devoted to serious 
training for war, and occasionally they might have tournaments 
devoted purely to themselves, as in 1511 when the queen was 
the centre of thematic development of the solemn tournament 
to celebrate the birth of her child. The disguises of the 
nobles all paid tribute to her as the object of their devotion. 
Henry was costumed as Loyal Heart, William Earl of Devonshire 
was Good Wishes, Sir Thomas Knyvet was Good Hope, and Sir 
Edward Neville was Valiant Desire. Brandon entered disguised
as a recluse, and sought the queen's intercession to permit
. . . 2 him to join in the combats.
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In these ways women were an integral part of the 
larger pattern of the noble military life, creating a style 
of behaviour which perhaps reached the summit of its 
ostentation at the Field of Cloth of Gold, but which had 
clear precedents in 1513, and also continued on into the 
last years of the reign. At the Field of Cloth of Gold the 
women were key participants in the cementing of peace. The 
celebrations involved an elaborate formal exchange of visits 
between the monarchs and their spouses. And similarly, in 
1513 the women also played a major part in the course of the 
war.
The sexual games played by the nobles and their 
ladies began in the long series of tournaments, pageants and 
banquets that preceded the war, and continued in similar 
pastimes during the course of the war itself. Relations between 
the English nobles and the court of the Regent of the 
Netherlands, Margaret of Savoy, were most cordial. Henry and 
his nobles took advantage of this to enjoy the hospitality of 
the Regent and her ladies on at least two occasions during the 
campaign. As with life at the English court, the visits to 
Margaret at Lille were accompanied by glittering pageantry and 
courtly recreations, and also the emblems of the noble warrior. 
Henry arrived before Lille's gates as a triumphant warrior, 
surrounded by his nobles and 200 of his elite cavalry, as well 
as his personal bodyguard. His sword and mace were borne into 
the city before him, and the beauty of his gold encrusted armour 
was emphasised by the simple white tunic that he wore over it.* 
The horses which were an essential part of this display were 
also elaborately costumed in cloth of gold, solid silver 
ornaments, black velvet and designs of the fleur de lys.
Margaret responded by welcoming him appropriately 
with rich displays of wealth and pageants which lined the road 
into the city.
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The days spent with the ladies of the Netherlands 
gave Henry in particular and the nobles in general the 
opportunity to demonstrate to the women their nobility, 
through their athletic prowess, their courtly graces, and 
their generosity. Henry played cards with the ladies and 
danced until dawn "...leaping like a stag...". He demonstrated 
his skill as an archer before the ladies when he made a 
second visit to the court a few days later, during the time 
his army was besieging Tournai. Once more he danced, and 
gambled, and at his departure showed off his horsemanship, 
of which he was extremely proud, by performing acrobatic 
feats while his steed was at full gallop.*
Henry and his nobles were also lavishly generous
in their gifts of jewels and money to the ladies. This was,
additionally, perhaps an attempt to further enhance the
diplomatic ties between the two countries at a time when
Henry was negotiating with the Empire to join him in a new
invasion of France in the coming year. Henry gave each of
Margaret's ladies a valuable diamond during his entry into
the city, and other jewels at his departure, as did his
nobles. The king also distributed 3,000 crowns amongst the
2officials of Margaret's household.
But these visits were not merely for archery 
practice and gambling. The nobles also used them to form 
sexual liasons with the ladies of the court, the most famous 
of which became a scandal. That it did become a scandal 
indicates that even such highly formalised public wooings 
as the one about to be recounted had great significance for 
the nobles. This liason was the attachement formed between
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Margaret herself and Brandon, who had just gone through a 
rather questionable form of marriage before the expedition 
in order to acquire his title of Viscount Lisle. Margaret 
was beautiful and rich, one of Europe's most eligible widows, 
and Brandon appears to have pursued her enthusiastically.
In fact, Brandon was so intent in his purpose that the king 
intervened and spent a considerable amount of his time at 
Lille trying to persuade Margaret to accept. Although 
Margaret refused, the king's persistence wrung a promise 
from her not to marry until the following year, when Henry 
was to bring the court back to the Netherlands. The alliance 
was to have been a secret, but rumours of it were spread, 
perhaps by Brandon to force Margaret to declare herself.
One of the sources of these rumours was a ring taken from 
Margaret by Brandon. The account of how the ring came to 
be taken gives an unusually intimate description of the style 
of public flirtation in which the nobles engaged during the 
expedition, as Margaret wrote down her memories of how Brandon 
had wooed her:
...one night at Tournay, being at the banquet, after 
the banquet he put himself upon his knees before me, 
and in speaking and him playing, he drew from my 
finger the ring, and put it upon his, and since shewed 
it me; and I took to laugh, and to him said that he 
was a thief, and that I thought not that the King had 
with him led thieves out of his country. This word 
laron he could not understand; wherefore I was 
constrained to ask how one said in Flemish laron.
And afterwards I said to him in Flemish dieffe, and I 
prayed him many times to give it me again, for- that it 
was too much known. But he understood me not well, 
and kept it on unto the next day that I spake to the 
King, him requiring to make him to give it me, because 
it was too much known - I promising him one of my 
bracelets which I wore, the which I gave him. And 
then he gave me the said ring; the which one other 
tyme at Lylle, being set nigh my Lady of Hornes, and 
he before upon his knees, it took again from my finger.
I spake to the King to have it again; but it was not 
possible , for he said unto me that he would give me 
others better, and that I should leave him that. I
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said unto him, that it was not for the value but 
for that it was too much known. He would not 
understand it, and departed from me. The morrow 
after he brought me one fair point of diamond, 
and one table of ruby, and shewed me that it was 
for the other ring; wherefore I durst no more 
speak of it, if not to beseech him that it should 
not be shewed to any person; the which hath not 
all been to me done.
Margaret's account of her wooing emphasises the 
formalised and public nature of such exploits, as well as 
the somewhat laboured emphasis that was placed on the 
appropriate exchange of gifts. The second occasion on which 
Brandon took the ring, at the feast of Tournai, was the time 
when Margaret returned the compliments of Henry's visits to 
Lille. She and her ladies were the focal point for the 
pageantry and jousting which marked the conclusion to the 
war. They entered the city in processions, escorted by 
richly dressed nobles, and were entertained by the tournament 
held in their honour, as well as the banquet which was
2accompanied by a masque and the distribution of gifts.
Noble sexual practice both at court and on campaign 
was thus both well publicised and highly formalised, with 
great importance being placed on the display of martial 
qualities by the men, and the generous giving of gifts. These 
prescribed styles of sexual conduct continued to impinge on 
the behaviour of the noble in wartime, leaving proportionately 
less time and money for the actual business of fighting and 
for the welfare of the men. As Gruffydd grumbled about the 
captains and their women friends at Boulogne in the 1540's, 
they preferred
...cards and dice and mistresses and ungodly whores 
to giving a penny or a groat out of charity for a 
man enfeebled by sickness. Indeed the captains 
spent on vain banquets of food and drink more in °ne^ 
week than would have kept many a strong man alive.
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Aspects of the noble lifestyle such as the 
tournament, display, and their religious and sexual codes, 
were all important elements in shaping noble behaviour in 
battle. But perhaps most important of all was the noble 
sense of honour, the feeling that, as members of a group, 
they were required to demonstrate their courage and 
individual prowess. The nobles of early Tudor England had 
inherited the concept that such courage and skill could be 
associated with the supposed qualities of a particular 
social group, the knights, and they continued to express 
those desired characteristics in the language of chivalry.
They spoke of valour, prowess, and the other features that 
were supposed to be shared by the knights. And when a noble 
combined all the recognised characteristics of the military 
elite, he was accorded the honour of being recognised as a 
knight. Thomas Howard, when assessing the qualities of 
Lord Dacre during a campaign to burn Jedworth in 15 23, wrote 
of his fellow noble that
"...there is noo herdyer ner bettir knyght...".*
The motivation to improve prestige, or in other 
words to win honour, through the deeds associated by the Tudor 
nobles with knightliness thus continued to be a profound 
influence on the noble at war.
As a result of the importance of this influence, 
it remained irrelevant to the nobles that they formed only a 
tiny proportion of the army, and it was also irrelevant to 
them that other groups than their own might possess the power 
to dominate battlefields. In any case, both of these
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situations had applied to European warfare since about the 
thirteenth century.
What remained more relevant to them was that war - 
its armies, its technology, and its various forms - comprised 
an admirable background against which to act out their roles 
as nobles, and to acquire prestige as a result. The nobles, 
from their point of view, were the centre of this world, and 
everything else, no matter how potentially dangerous, could 
be a prop. New forms of war were simply adapted by the nobles 
to serve their needs in an arena where they could show off the 
attributes of their group. The most potent weapons that the 
world had yet seen were turned into demonstrations of the 
wealth and power of the military elite. Cannon barrels and 
gunstocks, armour and swords, ships and pikes, were embellished 
and decorated with the same lavish detail that applied to the 
noble lifestyle in general. Even newly revived classical 
images were adapted to show the status of the owners of these 
weapons, as arms were inlaid with gilt and ivory representations 
of classical heroes, side by side with images of knightly 
romances. New weapons, rather than immediately transforming 
the behaviour of nobles, were therefore accommodated into 
existing conceptions of the proper methods of waging war. They 
became yet another way in which the noble could acquire honour.
A most striking example of this was reported by the Venetian 
ambassador while on his way to Henry's court. He paused during 
his voyage to visit a Genoese noble who had been wounded by 
gunfire during a battle:
...condoling him on his indisposition, and congratulating 
him on the advantage he really derived from it; for, 
although detrimental and mischievous, yet on the other 
hand, had it procured extreme glory for him, both through 
the valour he had displayed, and the honourable position 
of his wounds, and I said that the shield which was shot 
through at the same time with his hand, bore testimony 
to his prowess, so that he was renowned all over Italy.
He appeared extremely pleased at this, mentioning how he 
had been wounded, and that the result of the affair had
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done him honour, affording him greater comfort 
than the annoyance caused him by the said hurt, 
and that he should therefore soon recover, 
vowing that he was anxious, if the opportunity 
should be afforded him, to effect greater things 
for your Highness with the wounded member, and
The behaviour of the Genoese captain indicates 
how the noble managed to accommodate new weapons into his 
view of the purpose and meaning of noble participation in 
war, as gunshot wounds became attributes of honour.
At the same time, his speech also shows the same 
characteristics as did the behaviour of nobles generally 
when they were engaged in the business of acquiring honour. 
This was, primarily, that acquiring honour was an activity 
that required a great deal of publicity. In order to be of 
value, honour had to be seen to be acquired. The honour of 
the individual noble only had meaning when it was recognised 
by the public in general and his group in particular, hence 
the emphasis on display of honour in tournaments, in 
religious and sexual areas of behaviour, and, as will be 
shown below, in deeds on the battlefield.
...both words and actions are significant within 
the code of honour because they are expressions of 
attitudes which claim, accord or deny honour.
Honour...is only irrevocably committed by attitudes 
expressed in the presence of witnesses, the 
representatives of public o p i n i o n . ^
The speech of the wounded Genoese also emphasises 
that early sixteenth century nobles understood war through a 
different framework of language and concepts than that of 
the modern world, and that this shaped their actions. The
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military language and concepts of the nobles were drawn from 
the past practice of their society, and were all but entirely 
lacking modern terminology. Henry's invasions of France 
would be in modern terms, a campaign. But to the king's 
followers, it was a "journey", an "adventure", or an 
"enterprise", expressions that could also be used to describe 
any of the subordinate activities of a campaign, such as a 
battle, an ambush, a raid, or individual combat. There was 
no distinction between the categories of warfare that might 
be employed by a modem soldier, and there was no discrimination 
in the language between actions of thousands of men or the 
deeds of a single noble. It was through such language, for 
example, that the English ambassador to Charles, Nicholas 
Wotton, sought to justify a continued English siege of 
Montreuil in 1544. Wotton was determined that the attack 
should go on, even though it would mean extreme hardship for 
those involved, because if
...the French menne shuld be compelled to retourne, 
having neither succourid the towne, nor done enye 
other notable acte, it wer a deede of excellent 
prayse and glorye; no less then the siege of Calais 
was to King Edward the Thirde. And, yn cace we 
break up the siege from Monstreul, I feare leaste 
thEmperours menne will saye that the unprofitable 
siege of Monstreul hathe ben cawse, that neither 
they, nor we, have done that exploict against ^
thennemy that elis right wel mighte have ben done.
This was the kind of language employed by the 
nobles in contemplating their activities in war, indicating 
not only the limited perspectives that they shared, but also 
the way in which war was an area where they could perform 
"notable acts" and "deeds of excellent praise and glory".
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Henry's conduct in both 1513 and 1544 appears to have 
been largely governed by considerations of his own honour as 
a noble warrior and a conquering monarch. If need be, he was 
prepared to enhance his status by achieving notable acts with 
his own hand. The mere fact that Henry participated in the 
1513 war in person was in itself a deed worthy of honour, as 
it was undertaken in the face of disapproval from his senior 
councillors, who tended to be cautious in advising the king 
on his personal conduct. The 1513 venture seems to have been 
the inevitable outcome of a growing belief by Henry that the 
only way to maintain his honour intact was to invade France 
in person, especially after the series of disappointments 
during the first few military ventures undertaken in his 
reign. The war against France had opened with a reverse when 
Dorset's army mutinied in 1512, and returned home against the 
king's express orders. Henry was outraged, and the unfortunate 
leaders of the army had to kneel before him beg his forgiveness. 
An inquiry by the council publicly condemned the nobles for 
compromising both their honour and the honour of their country 
by their failure to control their men.*
Such mishaps apparently convinced the king that he 
had to take the leadership of the army into his own hands, 
as he thought that the English fought most willingly and 
successfully only under the direct command of their king. As 
a result, he announced his intention to lead the coming 
invasion of France in his own person. The council was 
naturally enough opposed to risking the king's life at the 
beginning of a new reign and at a time when there was no heir. 
But Henry overruled them, arguing that
...it behoved him to enter upon his first military 
experience in so important and difficult a war in 
order that he might, by a signal start to his 
martial knowledge, create such a fine opinion about
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his valour among all men that they would clearly 
understand that his ambition was not merely to 
equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of 
his ancestors.^
Henry was highly conscious, as were his nobles, 
of the military heritage they had from noble warrior kings 
such as Edward III and Henry V. As the king reminded his 
council, there were many instances in the past where great 
victories were won by armies led in person by his ancestors, 
but many losses where they were absent.
This consciousness of the examples set by previous 
military rulers, together with Henry's desire to establish 
his own prestige as a warrior king, can be seen in his 
management of the war, his interference in all the minor 
details of a campaign, and his behaviour when the prospect 
of battle loomed. And this was not solely his conception 
of his situation, for other citizens also saw the need for 
him to establish his status by an emulation of his ancestors. 
The person (or persons) who translated the history of Henry V 
in time for its publication to coincide with the 1513 war 
announced that they had done so in order that Henry would 
both model himself on the behaviour and wisdom of his 
ancestor, and also
that our Soveraigne Lord by the knowledge and 
sight of this pamphile should partlie be prouoked 
in his saide warr to ensue the noble and chiualrous 
actes of this so noble, so uertuous, and so 
excellent a Prince, wch so followed, he might the  ^
rather attaine to like honnour, fame and uictorie.
Eager to show to all that he was skilled in warfare, 
Henry involved himself at every level of organising the 
campaign, personally selecting men for the Channel war, and
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supervising their embarkation "...so that everyone marvelled...".
He received first hand reports in minute detail from Admiral
Howard about the handling of the fleet, as "...ye commanded me
2to send Your Gras word how every shipp dyd sail...". And m
his enthusiasm for war, Henry even took a hand in the mundane
details of war, as shown, for example, in the letters he wrote
to the Earl of Shrewsbury, the leader of the vanguard. Henry
complained that the earl had taken munitions that had been
appointed for the rearguard, and had then tried to disguise
his misappropriation by blaming the discrepancy on the Master
of Ordnance, Sir Sampson Norton. Henry ordered Shrewsbury
3to hand back the supplies.
Despite his apparent interest in making sure that
his army was well organised, at least before departure, once
on campaign, Henry never allowed the considerations of
military efficiency or the safety of his men to interfere
with his gaining of honour. Each significant event of the
campaign was made into an occasion of pageantry, celebration
and gallant gestures, as Henry thrust himself into the forefront
of events in order to exact the maximum of self display from
the war. Even though he was accompanied by men who were
veterans of many campaigns, he took the running of the
campaigning army into his own hands, for example supervising4the pitching of camp and the deployment of his forces. One 
night during the march to Therouanne when the rain was 
exceptionally heavy, Henry refused to disarm, but rode around 
the camp until three in the morning comforting his soldiers 
with promises of future deeds.^ He also felt it was incumbent
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on him to guard the morals of his troops personally, hanging 
three Germans for not respecting churches and disobeying 
orders. *
And when some of his nobles showed signs of 
reluctance to ford a river, Henry was the first to dismount 
and wade across.2
Just as Henry was irrepressible in such matters,
he was also the most eager when danger threatened. Whenever
the French seemed likely to attack, he flew to arms, supervised
the siting of his troops, advanced his personal standard, and
waited for the fight, his thirst for prestige and his concept
of the proper conduct of war interfering in the battle itself.
It was Henry, for instance, who deployed the cannons at the
battle of Spurs, and, as mentioned, it was because of his
stubborness that an argument ensued over whether or not his
magnificent tents should be struck or left up during the
3battle, a point of honour in which he prevailed.
Rejoicing in the victory over the French nobles,
Henry rode up to the walls of Therouanne to offer mercy if 
the garrison surrendered. And once the details of occupation 
were concluded with the usual splendid ceremonials, Henry 
disported himself in his camp for a lengthy period before 
moving on to another achievement. As mentioned, some people 
considered that the delay was caused because Henry had no 
definite plans, but others apparently believed that the pause 
was actually because the king wished to act with the dignity 
befitting the role of conquering knight:
...and as the xxvi day of the same moneth the Kings 
Highnes remoeved his feld again unto Gyngate, wher 
he contynueth as yit, according to lawe of armes,
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for in caas any man wold bid bataill for the 
beseging and getting of any Citie or Towne, than 
the wynner to give bataill & to abide for the 
same certain dayes . . .
Having delayed the course of the campaign by this 
feat, as well as his visit to Lille, Henry marked his re-entry 
into the war by yet another feat while he was personally 
deploying the army and pitching the ordnance before the walls 
of Tournai.
Then the king him selfe with a few persones rode 
betwene hys ordynaunce and the towne, and rode in 
great adventure so nere the walles that he might 
vewe the walles and the toures very wel: they 
shote out of their toures peces of ordinaunce 
and hurt such as came within their l e v e l . 2
Those who were discomforted during Henry's 
exhibition of coolness included John Grey, the brother of the 
Marquis of Dorset, who had his horse shot from beneath him.
Henry, having managed to involve himself in war, 
appears to have been determined to exploit the situation to 
the utmost in order to increase his prestige as leader of 
the nation and also as a warrior, even if it meant hampering 
the efficient management of his army, and endangering the 
lives of his nobles. Despite a number of changes in his 
condition, the same motivations still seem to have been of 
profound influence on the king's actions in 1544.
The young king of 1513 had been a dashing warrior, 
whereas the old king of 1544 was a feared and ruthless 
politician. But despite the years of intrigue and brutality, 
Henry was still a warrior king, ready to lead his army 
personally, even with his physical handicaps, in order to 
maintain his honour. As in 1513, considerations of the 
conduct befitting a member of the military elite could override 
all other factors.
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Henry's person had a symbolic quality for his
fellow countrymen. Gruffydd credited his presence with
inspiring the English to victory at Boulogne, and Morison
saw him as the figurehead of the nation in war.* But, as
in 1513, there was considerable opposition to him venturing
his person in war, largely because of his apparent ill
health. Henry brushed this aside in his eagerness to once
again involve himself in conflict with France. He even
had to contend with quite intense efforts by the Empire to
get him to stay home. He had been ill throughout the
opening months of preparation for war, and, because of his
insistence that he be closely involved in the details of
war, he seriously hampered the progress of readying the
army. Charles tried a number of diplomatic ploys to
persuade Henry to stay home, even promising that he would
remain out of the war if Henry would. But, as Chapuys told
Charles, despite his age and weight and bad legs, nobody
dared to tell the king to stay home because of his zeal to 
2go m  person.
Henry eventually surprised everybody by making
a rapid recovery, and continued to supervise the war effort
in intimate detail: amongst other things he experimented
3with a new kind of pontoon bridge. Nothing was going to 
prevent the king making what was probably his last invasion 
of France, for his sense of honour continued to impell him, 
as is shown in two major incidents of the wars of the 1540's. 
The first, which will be mentioned briefly, involved the 
incident which brought about the beginning of the 1544 war 
with Scotland. This was the ambush and defeat of Sir Robert
/228...
1. Gruffydd, ii, pp.77-8; R.Morison, An Exhortation to 
Styre All Englyshemen to the Defence of Theyr Countreye 
(1539) (unpaginated, New York, 1972) .
2. L.P. XIX, i (529), 18 May 1544.
3. Ibid., (20 6), 16 March 1544; ii (21), 3 August 1544.
- 228 -
Bowes and an English raiding party at Halidon Ridge, an
event which culminated in Hertford's terrible raid of
1544. Bowes' defeat, in late 1542, came at a time when
Scotland and England already enjoyed uneasy relations,
and when both monarchs were slowly preparing for war.
Henry was spurred on by the disgrace of Bowes - as
contemporaries saw it - to immediately plunge into war in
order to revenge his honour. He ordered his northern
deputy, Brandon, not to desist from war with the Scots until
some notable exploit had been achieved to purge the dishonour
which the Scots were voicing about England, namely that Bowes
and his men had not dared to abide an encounter with a
smaller number of Scots. He was adamant that there would be
no further negotiations with the Scots until such a notable
exploit was accomplished.* As Leslie wrote later, Henry was
so touched by the defeat at Halidon Ridge that "...he wist
2nocht quhat to do for angre...".
Henry's anxiety to revenge his lost honour in
1542 was consistent with his behaviour during the 1544 
expedition. At the end of the invasion of France, Pollard's 
Machievallian prince was prepared to sacrifice an entire 
army in order to maintain his honour.
As the campaigning season drew to an end in 1544, 
the Dauphin threatened Norfolk and his men at Montreuil with 
a huge, freshly recruited French army. With the successful 
end to the siege of Boulogne, the end of the campaigning 
season, and no chance of winning Montreuil, Norfolk quite 
reasonably planned to withdraw to Calais. But withdrawal 
was not so simple for a sixteenth century noble as simply 
moving by the shortest, safest route available. The withdrawal
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had to be performed in as honourable as possible a way, even 
if it meant some danger and inefficiency. Norfolk and his 
council drew up a suitable itinerary, writing to advise 
Henry that the most honourable and practicable means would 
be to go inland through St.Omer's, as the enemy would not 
then be able to say that the English were afraid to meet them 
and had taken the safer route through Boulogne.*
Henry appears to have been satisfied with this 
proposal, although he made some recommendations qualifying it. 
He ordered Norfolk to take his guns with him - an impediment 
to rapid movement - rather than sending them to safety at 
Boulogne, because it would be more honourable to have the 
guns with the army. And,in addition, when Norfolk was ready 
to depart, he was to send a herald to the commander of the 
French garrison in Montreuil, Marshal du Biez, to inform him 
of the circumstances of the withdrawal. Norfolk was to tell 
him that the Emperor had made peace with Francis: in this 
way Henry could claim a different reason for withdrawing his 
army than the danger posed by the Dauphin. The duke was also 
to offer a safe conduct to the French commander so that he
could visit Norfolk in his camp for the sake of old
• 2 acquaintance.
According to Imperial ambassadors at Boulogne,
Henry felt he could not honourably withdraw his army without 
first offering battle, but, apparently because of his weakened 
army, he was disappointed that the emperor had not obtained 
a truce for him. This would have meant that he could have 
honourably avoided the burden of having to give battle if the 
French wished it. The ambassadors reported that they found
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the king silent and pensive, with none of his usual boastful 
manner. They believed this was due to his fear that shame 
or harm might come to his army during the retreat.*
But Henry was apparently determined to give battle
if he had to, even against the advice of his councillors,
and he delayed his departure for a short time while he
awaited the outcome of events. Paget tried to get the
ambassadors to persuade Henry that he might withdraw with
honour, as he had achieved the enterprise of Boulogne and
2because Francis had not come to face him m  person.
The retreat from Montreuil proved to be a frenzy of 
tragic disorganisation and panic as the English army straggled 
to safety. As a result, Henry was not satisfied that his 
honour had been preserved as he wished, especially because 
Norfolk eventually chose the safer route through Boulogne, 
taking with him Brandon and the army with Brandon which was to 
have fought the French. There were sound reasons for Norfolk 
to take these measures. He had only 13,000 able men and 
thousands more who were disabled by illness, he lacked horses 
to draw his guns quickly, or even any food for the draught 
animals, and he believed that the Dauphin had with him about 
10,000 cavalrymen and 40,000 foot.3
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have had a significant effect on strategy. Henry advised 
Charles in 1521 not to besiege Tournai as planned, but rather 
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allowing the besieged town to be victualled.
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Henry had returned to England while the retreat 
took place. When he found out the circumstances, he fell 
into a raging temper which can still be sensed in the letters 
he wrote to his officers, telling Norfolk that there was no 
excuse for his conduct, as he had been ordered to remain in 
a position to give battle if need be, and commands had been 
given to supply more victuals and finance for his army. Henry 
singled out individual leaders for odium. Suffolk and the 
Privy Seal, Lord Russell, were told that they should have gone 
to Guisnes if it had appeared that the Dauphin was marching 
towards it, and there to have forced a battle or caused him to 
retreat so that he would lose his guns.
The commanders were then ordered to leave the 
safety of Calais for Boulogne, there to keep their camp and 
to refurbish the fortress in the face of enemy raids. A 
further letter added that the king thought his honour would be 
touched if his army should now retire at his enemy coming into 
the field, so that unless the commanders had certain knowledge 
of the Dauphin going to Guisnes, they were to go back to 
Boulogne, and there, by their diligence, "partly redub" what 
was past, not leaving there until they knew the king's pleasure. 
This was effective exile.*
Henry's somewhat contradictory orders proved
impossible to fulfil because the ground between Boulogne and
Calais was by this time occupied by the French, and'because
2the mercenary horse had left for home. This did not excuse 
the nobles in Henry's eyes, however, and he continued to 
abuse them for leaving Boulogne on the grounds of an uncertain 
report about the enemy's strength, and he wondered in his 
letters why they could not keep the field without victuals
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when the French did so under similar difficulties? And if 
the Germans had left, why was the wages bill for the army 
unchanged? Henry ordered them to seek
...no more indirect excuses to cloak your ill-favoured 
retreat but rather study and be as vigilant to see our 
honour, herein somewhat touched, redubbed.
Meanwhile, they could consider how little it 
reflected on their honour to be left out of the peace 
negotiations until they returned to Boulogne.*
The Dauphin was eventually weakened when he
divided his forces and the English won some minor skirmishes.
But the small successes only drew another stinging letter for
the nobles because they had not launched a large scale attack
2on the French. Henry began to regain his temper as the 
French forces were dissolved by the effects of winter. The 
king contrived to interpret English raids against the 
scattering French as reassertions of his honour,
...which enterprise we thinke shall not only be 
moche to our honour (thennemies being put to worst 
in all places, and We last in the feld), but also 
a great quiet for our subjectes there this winter, 
a continuance of our^possession Bullonoyes, and no 
small honour to you.
Throughout the affair of the retreat from Montreuil, 
Henry's mien had been that of a man dominated by a desire to 
preserve what he perceived as his honour as a military leader 
and a king - virtually the same thing - even if this meant 
risking a battle, which he did not wish to fight, with an 
outnumbered and diseased army.
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This was a particularly clear and detailed instance 
of a case where Henry's concept of the proper behaviour of a 
noble warrior was the dominant factor in his military strategy, 
rather than considerations of efficiency and expediency. But, 
in more general perspecive, the 1544 was as a whole may also 
be interpreted in the same terms. Henry's invasion of France 
in 1544 has much of the appearance of the quest for personal 
honour and for the reputation of his kingdom as a military 
force as was apparently the situation in 1513. Scarisbrick'.c
recognition of this has already been remarked upon. This differs 
from Pollard's suggestion that Henry's involvement with France 
in 1544 was part of a politically pragmatic plan to prevent 
the French from assisting Scotland, where his main interest 
actually lay and where he was engaged in a long term plan to 
establish his direct control.*
Several aspects of Henry's behaviour, and the 
circumstances of 1544, would seem to discount Pollard's 
interpretation. The costs of the 1544 expedition in terms of 
men, money, and time were scarcely indicative of a practical 
plan to divert French aid from Scotland. A fraction of the 
same amount of energy expended in France should have been 
enough to subdue all the lowlands of Scotland. And rather than 
being characterized by a single rapid thrusting attack on 
French territory, Henry's last venture in France was, by the 
standards of the time, relatively long term in strategy. He 
persisted in seizing, holding and enlarging his French 
possessions, which would not seem to be the actions of a 
monarch trying merely to divert attention from a main intention 
to unify Scotland and England. Henry's French venture was of 
prime importance throughout 1544, as he diverted most of his 
resources to France, taking unprecedented measures such as 
sending shire levies to protect his new possessions.
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In any case, the punitive raid into Scotland was 
a reprimand for the lack of honour of their nobles, who had 
broken their oaths to secure the marriage of Prince Edward 
and Princess Mary, rather than something which was planned 
as another step towards unification, at least from Henry's 
point of view. Hertford and other nobles advised the king 
that a fierce attack would further alienate the Scots, but 
Henry was adamant. The raid was to be a perpetual memory 
to the renown of its leader, Hertford, and forever a 
reproach to the perfidy of the Scots. Not one stone was 
to be left standing on another. It was in this spirit that 
Hertford carried out the cruelties which occurred during the 
expedition.*
Henry's venture into France in 1544, and the Scottish 
raid which was a prelude to it, would appear, therefore, to 
have had little of the practical planning attributed to the 
king by Pollard. It was, rather, an enterprise in keeping 
with Henry's notions about the need to maintain or increase 
his prestige as a warrior monarch.
There were continuities between 1513 and 1544 in the 
behaviour of the king, and his perception of his twin roles of 
monarch and noble warrior affected the conduct of both wars. 
Similarities in his behaviour tended to outweigh the differences 
brought about by radically changed circumstances. Henry had 
been an active young man in 1513, eager to involve himself in 
war in imitation of his ancestors, which he managed to do by 
persuading his advisors to let him lead the army not merely as
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a figurehead, but also as a soldier and administrator. Henry 
was thus in a position to impose his ideas on the conduct of 
the campaign. The result was that he severely limited its 
effectiveness by acting in a manner befitting his status, 
using the army to form a background to the magnificent display 
that was simultaneously an encouragement to and an essential 
component of war. In 1544, however, Henry was an old, sick 
man. But he nevertheless continued to personally administer 
the army and lead it into enemy territory, even though his 
age and illness might hinder operations. Henry, in 1544, was 
no longer the creator of glittering tournaments in war and 
peace, perhaps because he could no longer personally participate 
in them. The last tournament in which he fought, in the 1530's, 
had nearly resulted in his death. But he was still governed in 
old age by his perception of what was fitting behaviour for ■ 
himself and his nobles. As in 1513, this concept hindered 
rational, efficient planning during the expedition, making the 
1544 campaign an exercise in arms akin to the first war.*
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would have stopped the English advance to a position that 
was tactically disadvantageous to the Scots. Perhaps many 
of these accounts of his behaviour are apocryphal, but they 
accord with reports of his actions from other sources, and 
are similar to the actions of fellow kings such as Francis
I and Charles V.
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The king had a major effect on the course of a 
war not only because he was a symbol and an inspiration 
to his subjects, but also because he was England's supreme 
strategist and commander. As mentioned, the nobles also 
had a far reaching influence on war, because, as well as 
being courtiers and figures of display, army commanders, 
administrators and diplomats, they were also fighting 
soldiers who took their places in the front ranks of battle 
formations. As a result, their attitudes usually had a 
more immediate impact on the course of war than ‘did those 
of the king. Unlike his contemporaries, Charles and Francis, 
Henry never participated personally in a battle at close 
quarters, and so his sword never helped determine a fight.
He was perhaps the only monarch of his era who was restrained 
from striking a blow in anger, although it is thought that 
he did on occasion fire his cannon personally against the 
French. His nobles made up for this omission by the king, 
and there would have been few amongst them, especially in 
the early years of the reign, who had not exchanged blows 
with the enemy. This was, indeed, expected of them by their 
contemporaries. It was assumed that a noble would not only 
have the ability and training to command an army as an 
officer. He was also expected to have the skill and courage - 
the prowess and valour as it was known - to lead his retinue 
into battle. If such duties, or military posts with inherent 
danger, were avoided, it brought contempt from all levels 
of society. Scorn was heaped on the impoverished fifth 
Earl of Northumberland when he was unable to bear the burden 
of his family post as Warden of the Marches, an office that 
meant frequent encounters with the Scots. He was spurned 
both by his tenants and his family for this lapse, "...and 
al men estemed hym without hart or love of honour and chivalry".
b). The Nobles.
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Gruffydd similarly decried the cowardice of English 
nobles during the occupation of Boulogne when they 
regused to lead their underlings, against a French fleet 
that had anchored near the fortress.*
On the other hand, the common soldiers rejoiced in
a keen fighter like Hertford, who was every ready for battle,
the men joyfully receiving him when he came to Calais in
21545, and the nobles feasting him in welcome.
Nobles customarily fought at the head of their
retinues, and often bore the brunt of fighting because their
relative invulnerability made them a focus of action in a
melee. There were some slight signs of change in this by
1544, and even in 1513 the English commander Thomas Howard
the elder placed himself behind the front lines. But the
signs of change were almost imperceptible, and there had
been good reason for Howard not to be too prominent in
fighting, as he was 70 years old when he went to Flodden.
And in any case, he was not so far from the fighting that
James IV was not able to get to him. The Scots king cut
his way to within a spear's length of Surrey during the
m£lee before being killed. It was during this battle that
almost the entire Scots peerage died in the front ranks of
the army. Some 4 spiritual peers, 12 earls and 18 barons
were lost by the Scottish. And many English nobles were
in danger during the fighting, such as Edmund Howard, third
son of the English commander, who was knocked to his knees
three times and had to be rescued by cavalry when his men
3deserted him to leave him fighting on alone.
Edmund's nephew, Henry Howard, fell into disfavour 
in 1545 because he allowed a score of nobles to be killed 
in the battle of St.Etienne, indicating that there may have 
been a more cautious attitude in later years to the
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employment of noble soldiers. But even at this time nobles 
still figured prominently in hand to hand fighting, and 
Henry's disgrace may simply have been an outcome of the fact 
that although it was expected that nobles should fight in 
battles, it was not expected that many of them would be killed. 
Howard himself on several occasions placed himself in dangerous 
positions during the siege of Montreuil, until on one venture 
he was cut off from his allies and had to be rescued by his 
squire, Thomas Clere, at the cost of Clere's life. Henry 
commemorated this deed in his poem "A Tribute to Thomas Clere".
At the assault on Edinburgh in 1544, it was the 
nobles who assaulted the Cannongate in order to encourage their 
soldiers, attacking the obstacle so fervently that they beat 
back the Scots from the embrasures and manhandled the Scottish 
guns out through a loophole.*
And even the commander of the main English army in 
1544, the elderly Duke of Suffolk, advanced further into the 
trenches than any of his men, shaming them to braver deeds and 
earning the admiration of Viscount Lisle.
He passeth so little upon shot of artillery that he  ^
enforceth others to be hardy whether they will or not.
The nobles were thus placed at the very centre of 
war by the demands of their rank and the practice of military 
leadership. Here, their actions were of deep and immediate 
importance to the course which war took. At the same time, 
the ideal of the noble military elite which was fostered by 
the ceremonies, the pageantry and brave displays that 
accompanied war did not cease to influence the nobles when 
they were in such situations. It continued to shape the
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behaviour of nobles even while blows were being struck. As 
a result, the deeds of arms and honourable actions which they 
performed were not isolated incidents nor events distinct from 
reality, but were essential and influential aspects of 
contemporary war.
There was both a display of the continuity between 
the behaviour of nobles in both war and peace, and, coincidentally, 
demonstrations of the far reaching impact of their ideas about 
honour in two incidents from the 1513 war in particular. Both 
events happen to have involved members of the Howard family.
The first deed saw Edward Howard lose an almost 
certain naval victory because of rashness when he abrogated 
his responsibilities as admiral in order to win honour. It 
should perhaps be emphasised that in this his behaviour was 
entirely in keeping with his previous actions over a considerable 
period. As mentioned before, he was one of the keenest 
participants in the great court occasions that led up to the 
war, taking a major part in jousts and pageants. He continued 
to act in a similar spirit on the battlefield. During his first 
voyage to Brittany, in June 1512, Howard landed a small army 
near Brest, at a place named Crozon Bay. Here he was met with 
a formal challenge to battle. He suitably rewarded the 
messenger who brought the challenge and announced that he would 
await the French army all day at a certain place. While 
waiting for the French, in order to encourage his nobles, he 
knighted several of them, and exhorted his 1,500 Englishmen to 
stand against about 10,000 French he could see approaching,
...bidding them remembre the honor and renoune that 
should come to them, if thei gained the jorney, and 
yet if thei were slain, their valiauntnes was to be 
praised, and their true diligence to do their master 
service much to be allowed.1
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But, unlike Howard, the French were apparently 
not spoiling for a fight, and they allowed the English to 
retire to their ships without offering battle. They then 
sent an embassy to Edward asking him to desist from his cruel 
war - he was burning villages - or at least to allow a six 
day truce. Howard's reply was what might be expected from 
a bellicose noble. He answered that he had been sent to 
make war, not peace, and that he considered gentlemen ought 
to defend their country by force rather than sue for peace.
He was so bent on war that he even refused a Breton offer to 
surrender Brest castle to him in return for a truce. Having 
banqueted his enemies in an honourable fashion, he sent the 
embassy home and continued with his war.*
It was during the subsequent engagements at sea 
that Howard made the oath to revenge the death of Sir Thomas 
Knyvet, an oath that may have helped spur him to his own death.
The following year saw the French driven into 
blockade in Brest harbour, the English fleet hovering outside 
the heavily defended sanctuary. Howard seems momentarily to 
have been reluctant to press home the attack. The reasons 
for his hesitation are not clear. Perhaps he expected the 
French to come out to meet him, or perhaps he thought their 
position impregnable. He may also have wished to avoid the 
responsibility of leading his fleet into great danger, as the 
French fleet was guarded by shore batteries, although he does 
not appear to have been so considerate in other cases. He 
also wrote to Henry, requesting that he come to join the 
venture, promising that the victory would be an easy one, and 
advising the king to take the opportunity to share in the 
glory. A report sent to Milan from England claimed that the 
king v;as eager to go to Brest, but was opposed by the council 
which feared for his safety. Hall has a similar account,
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saying that because of his advisers' displeasure with the
delay, Henry wrote to the admiral ordering him to carry out
his duty. It was this, according to Hall, that prompted
Howard to launch his final rash attack.* And Howard's brother
Thomas was of the opinion shortly afterwards that the late
admiral had felt himself exposed to rumour and lies, many men
putting his inaction down to fear, which he proved untrue 
2by his death.
Such rumours may have been the spur to Howard, 
leading him to act upon the advice of a Spanish knight serving 
in the fleet that he should risk a personal adventure rather than 
waiting for a planned large scale assault by land and sea in
which the whole navy would participate. He was to venture all
. . 3in the interest of gaining personal honour.
Hall's interpretation agrees with a report sent from 
the fleet by one of Wolsey's spies, William Sabin, who had been 
sent to offer certain secret advice to Howard. Sabin reported 
shortly after the fatal engagement that he had warned against 
the assault but had been ignored by the admiral, who was acting 
on the advice of a Spanish knight. Sabin wrote that it had 
been agreed to assault the galleys in Brest simultaneously by 
land and sea. Lord Ferrers was to attack the bulwarks that 
guarded the harbour, while Howard was to enter with the rest of 
the army by barge. But, on the prompting of the Spaniard,
Howard called together his best friends, including William 
Fitzwilliam, William Cook, John Colley and Sir Wistan Browne, 
all courtiers, to join him in a surprise sea assault by only a 
few boats. The admiral incited his colleagues by advising them 
that
...the matter was little, and the honor greate, if 
they only tooke on them that enterprice, and let 
none other know of it. Thei like men of haute courage 
and desirying honour gladly assented...4
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The admiral was rowed into the harbour with 9 5 men 
in four boats. Not surprisingly, there was heavy loss of life 
when the assault began. All but 56 of the men were casualties, 
according to Thomas Howard, including 25 killed and 20 hurt in 
the boat commanded by Lord Ferrers alone. Howard himself was 
killed when he led an attack on a galley and was left stranded 
as his boat was swept away by the tide. According to Sir 
Edward Echingham, when Howard saw that there was no chance of 
rescue, he took his admiral's whistle, the symbol of his rank, 
from his neck and threw it into the sea. The French then 
pushed him overboard, his armour carrying him to his death.
The admiral of the English fleet had thus perished 
in his quest for personal prestige, a venture in which he was 
assisted by a number of nobles. His death became the occasion 
of mourning for the loss of a brave knight rather than for 
regret at the loss of a strategic advantage. A halt was called 
to the fighting in order to arrange for his recovery and 
funeral, and expressions of regret came to England from friends 
and enemies. Sabin's pithy comment seem to have voiced a 
common attitude to the significance of his death:
"More pyty yt was, howbeit he dyed lyke a vallyent 
(knyght)." 2
The venture, albeit unsuccessful as a military 
exercise, conferred great honour on the dead admiral and his 
confederates. Thomas Howard wrote to Wolsey praising the 
feats of the nobles who had been present in the fighting, 
including prominent courtiers such as Wallop, Cheyney and Sir 
William Sydney.
As far as the writer can understand by report, it 
was the most dangerful enterprise he ever heard of, 
and the most manly handled.3
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James IV voiced similar sentiments in a letter to 
Henry, in which he used the instance of Howard's death to 
persuade Henry against invading France. James had a personal 
interest in Edward's death, as he mentioned in the letter, 
for it was Edward's father Thomas who had escorted James' bride 
to Scotland. The Scottish king wrote to Henry that Howard had 
died in a way that had brought him great honour and praise, 
but that his death was a greater loss than the winning of the 
French galleys would have been a victory. He reminded Henry 
that not only this valiant knight would die if the war continued, 
but that other noble men would be lost who would be better set 
to fighting Christ's enemies.*
The sentiments expressed by the nobles generally 
overlooked the fact that Admiral Edward Howard had risked not 
only his own life but also the safety of the fleet on the 
counsel of a foreign knight to undertake a dangerous adventure.
In so doing he ignored the advice of his government, and won 
over to his side, without apparent difficulty, at least 8 other 
nobles who likewise risked their lives to gain honour.
The result of his actions was not only his own death 
and loss of many of his men, but also the demoralisation and 
disbandment of the English fleet at a time when it had recently 
established mastery of the Channel after months of fighting, 
and when victory seemed in its grasp. The venture was not the 
escapade of one man acting in an isolated and unimportant situation, 
but,rather, a major event stemming from the actions of one man, 
whose deeds were given such influence by his rank and status.
It was an event in which hundreds of other men participated 
either through direct or indirect intervention and approval or
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disapproval, as well as through the effects of Howard's 
death on the course of the war, or else through the effects 
on people far from the immediate scene whose lives were 
marked by the death of Howard and the breaking up of the 
English navy as a result. The implications of Howard's 
death during the course of a deed of honour thus made the 
feat more than an isolated incident, even though it was 
originally a noble's personal reaction to a particular war 
situation.
The personal nature of Howard's feat, at the same 
time, indicates how the nobles did not see themselves simply 
as mere cogs in a huge impersonal war machine. Instead, they 
tended to regard their place in war in more intimate terms, 
at a level of individual or family involvement, or the 
obligation of a noble and his family to the Crown. This 
perception is also indicated by the second instance of the 
ways in which noble concepts of their roles influenced their 
behaviour on the battlefield. The situation in which these 
actions arose was in itself partly an outcome of Edward's 
death, for after his death his brother Thomas was appointed 
as admiral in order to avenge him. As mentioned, Thomas 
was very concerned to uphold the reputation of his brother 
when he took over the post, and, as a result, prosecuted the 
war against England's enemies with great fervour.*
This sense of the personal and family responsibility 
of the noble in war was shared by the head of the family,
Thomas Howard the elder, Earl of Surrey. He was forestalled 
from participating in the war with France in 1513, possibly 
because he was outmanouevered politically by his rival, the 
Earl of Derby, or perhaps because it was felt necessary for
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him to remain to defend England against Scotland. In the 
light of Surrey's later actions, the latter case would seem 
the more likely. His anger at being left behind made him 
all but speechless as he watched Henry departing with the 
court:
...beyinge redy in suche an honorable jorney. And 
when he was somewhat settelled in hys mode, he sayde 
to some that were about hym: Sory may I se hym or
I dye, that is cause of my abydinge behynde, and yf 
ever he and I mete, I shal do^that in me lyeth to 
make hym as sory yf I can...
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Surrey's reported speech indicates the way in
which war, as the place of acquiring honour, was seen in
personal terms by the nobles. His behaviour, and the behaviour
of his fellow nobles, throughout the rest of the Flodden
campaign, was entirely consistent with this attitude. King
James himself, as mentioned, had felt that he was unable to
invade England with honour while Henry was absent without
making formal moves to clear himself of criticism. As a
result he sent his herald to France with a public declaration
2that he would cross the border unless Henry returned home.
Surrey was equally formal in his attitude. He 
despatched a herald to James when both armies were in the field 
offering the king the opportunity to try the justice of their 
dispute on a set date
...yf he of hys noble courage wyll geve hym tarienge, 
and abode, within this the Kynges Realme so long tyme:
And the same the sayde Earle promiseth, as he is true 
knyghte to God and the Kynge of England hys Master.3
The challenge from the commander of an army was 
couched in the personal terms that one noble, or one knight, 
might have used to another.
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Surrey's son Thomas behaved in a similar manner. 
Before Surrey's herald departed to James, Admiral Howard gave 
him a token to show James to prove that Thomas and his men 
had come ashore from the fleet, after being unable to catch 
the Scots for battle, in order to offer his own personal 
challenge to James to settle their long standing dispute.
...and in as muche as the sayde Kynge hadde diverse 
and many tymes caused the sayde Lorde too be called 
at dayes of true, to make redresse for Andrew Barton, 
a Pirate of the sea, long before that vanquyshed by 
the same Lorde Admirall, he was now come in hys awne 
proper persone too be in the Vantgaurde of the felde 
to Justifye the deathe of the sayde Andrewe, agaynste 
hym and all hys people, and woulde se what could be 
layed to hys charge the sayde daye, and that he nor 
none of hys campaignye should take no Scottish noble 
man prysoner, nor any other, but they shoulde dye yf 
they came in hys daunger, oneles it were the kynges 
awne persone, for he sayde he trusted to none other 
curtesye at the handes of the Scottes.
And in thys maner he should fynde hym in the 
Vauntgarde of the felde by the grace of GOD and 
Sayncte George as he was a trew knyghte.-J-
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1. Hall,
Henry VIII I,p.102. Hall's account is generally supported by a 
contemporary account by a clerk, Brian Tuke, except that 
Tuke believed that Howard joined his father to answer 
claims by James that Thomas was afraid to meet him.
V .P . II (316) . Grace, "The Life and Career of Thomas 
Howard", p.48, suggests that Thomas was spurred on by 
accusations of cowardice by James and a lack of success 
at sea. Kightly, Flodden, pp.10-11, speculates that the 
challenges were a planned and successful appeal to the 
king's sense of honour to make him fight rather than 
withdrawing over the border and waiting for the English 
army to disband. Possibly all these motivations played 
a part in determining the Scots and English on battle.
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Thomas Howard, Admiral of England, had therefore 
left the fleet, taking with him 1,200 hardened soldiers in 
his retinue, in order to answer a charge of murder and 
cowardice by placing himself and his men in the most 
dangerous position of the army, and foreswearing his right 
to safety in the case of defeat.*
The Howards did not monopolise the exchange of 
challenges with the Scots, however, as another formal 
document of challenge from Surrey to James, arranging for 
the place and time of battle, had appended to it the names 
of some 18 nobles altogether. The exchanges of challenges 
and oratory between the nobles continued until moments before 
the battle itself. Surrey vowed that he would fight, or if 
he did not he would hold himself openly perjured. He 
addressed his troops and told them that if they did not do 
their best he would fight James in person to die honourably
2at the king's hand, rather than live in shame and reproach.
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1. As with other aspects of these events, the motivations are 
complex. Howard's desire to clear his name may not have been 
the sole reason for his choice as leader of the vanguard, for 
there were rumours of family rivalry amongst the English. An 
apparent partisan of the Stanley family wrote a poem 
published as An Exact and Circumstantial History of the Battle 
of Flodden in Verse. Written About the Time of Elizabeth
ed. R.Lambe (London, 1774). The author claimed that Surrey 
would not appoint Sir Edward Stanley, who had with him a 
retinue of over 6,000 men, to command of the van because of 
hatred between Surrey and Stanley's father, the Earl of Derby. 
Stanley revenged himself by a brilliant tactical manoeuvre 
during the battle, and may have killed James with his own hand 
See especially Stanza CCLXXIX. Details of the poem usually 
correspond with other accounts, so it may be an accurate 
account based on family knowledge. An earlier stanza is 
interesting because it too indicates the influence of noble 
perceptions of honour. The poet claimed that Thomas became 
angry when other lords counselled Surrey to avoid battle 
because the Scots outnumbered the English, and he reminded his 
father of the feats of the ancestors. If the English withdrew, 
said Howard according to the poem,
Your father's fame would soon be lost,
And all his worthy acts no more,
Your honour, flitting like a ghost,
Nor yet your sons could ever restore.
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And, if Tuke is correct in his version, the 
considerations of personal reputation which had brought 
Thomas Howard to the field of Flodden also governed tactical 
considerations on the day. Except for Dacre's 1,500 border 
horsemen, everyone dismounted to fight. This may have been 
due to the slipperiness of the field, and it was not uncommon 
practice for the English to fight the Scots on foot. But, 
according to Tuke, Thomas Howard dismounted to lead the van 
lest it be supposed that he was a coward and a runaway. If 
this was the case, then it was in keeping with other reported 
aspects of his behaviour and that of his fellows. Having 
incited his nobles with speeches encouraging them to glory,
James also dismounted when he saw his men winning some 
initial successes. He rushed on foot to join in the victory, 
forcing his court to follow him, and leaving his army without 
a general or further orders.*
The initial charge by the division led by the Scottish
Chamberlain, Lord Hume, drove back the wing commanded by Edmund
Howard. Squire Brian Tunstall, an experienced border fighter,
who was with Howard, tried to encourage his faltering men with
his own courage. He scooped up a handful of earth which he
ate as a sign of Communion, and then charged alone into the
2ranks of the enemy, where he was surrounded and killed. At 
this, his wavering followers fled, leaving Edmund to face the 
enemy alone, except for his standard bearer and a few personal 
servants. All except Edmund were killed, and he was himself 
beaten to the ground repeatedly, probably being saved only by 
his armour. At this, the Bastard John Heron - another doughty 
border fighter - and 10 horsemen from Dacre's troop spurred to
/250...
1. Rightly, Flodden, p.42; cf. Holinshed's Chronicles, III, 
p. 596 .
2. An Exact History of Flodden, DI-DXVI; Rightly, Flodden,p.42.
- 250 -
his rescue. Heron had already been wounded, but proclaimed 
that
...there was never noble mans sone so lyke to be 
loste as you be thys daye, for all my hurtes I 
shall here lyve and dye wyth you...
Heron joined Howard and together they cut their way through 
the Scottish ranks to safety, Edmund killing Sir David Hume, 
son of the Chamberlain, on the way.*
And, finally, when the tide of battle had clearly
gone against the Scots, James chose to die like a noble.
Encouraging his men not to shame their ancestors, he gathered
the remnants of his household about him, and pressed into the
thickest part of the fighting, attempting a last vain effort
2to fight his way through to Surrey.
At Flodden, as at Brest, the attitudes of the 
nobles to their proper conduct in war affected the lives of 
many people in situations of extreme personal danger and of 
grave national significance. Thomas Howard, for example, was 
prepared to risk not only his own life but the lives of his 
retainers in order to preserve his reputation as a noble 
warrior, and James of Scotland sacrificed everything to his 
own sense of honour, and the thirst for renown.
Perhaps the most striking example of the influence 
of such considerations in the 1544 war has already been 
outlined in the discussion of Henry's actions during the 
withdrawal from Montreuil. Other details of individual deeds 
of honour from the 1544 war are relatively scarce, partly
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because there were few actual encounters with the enemy, 
and also because the most prolific source of details of 
such deeds, Hall, is very sketchy on the later years, a 
matter also regretted by Holinshed.* Hall conscientiously 
recorded noble feats, as he regarded it as the duty of the 
chronicler to do so. He was highly critical of clerics 
who devoted their time to hunting and hawking rather than 
preserving in writing
...the noble triumphes, chivalrous feates, valiant 
actes, victorious battai.les, and other noble jestes 
of this realme, and in especiall, of our tyme and 
knowlege, of this most valiant and goodly prince.
These tales, he considered, "...should appere muche more
2honorable, then any other stories...". Perhaps due to 
advancing age or illness, Hall did not record the later years 
of Henry's reign in the detail accorded to the earlier decades, 
and, as a result, fewer deeds by nobles survive in the records.
There may be other reasons for a scarcity of accounts 
of deeds, as Ellis Gruffydd suggests. He complained that the 
nobles in 1544 were unwilling to risk their lives in sieges as 
their fathers had.
... (no) ... diligence was shown during this siege, 
during which if the truth be told, there was no 
effort to perform one praise-worthy deed.^
It is possible, however, that this was merely the
jaundiced view of an old soldier who was comparing the soldiers
of the present with the heroes of the past when men were
"...ready early and late to serve and achieve honour and glory
4for the king and his realm as the captains of old...".
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In fact, there were nobles, like Henry Howard, 
ready to risk their lives for fame. A young baron, Lord 
Mountjoy, placed his life in jeopardy during the siege of 
Montreuil to lead 14 of his men in the storming of a French 
countertrench. This was despite Norfolk's protests that the 
venture was too dangerous.* And during the campaign that 
followed the withdrawal of the main army, Henry Howard and 
his men took the opportunity to perform feats of arms, such 
as the secret despatch of gentlemen to the Dauphin's camp 
for jousting. At least one of the English nobles, Edward 
Shelley, is believed to have killed an opponent in such a 
contest.^
Henry Howard appears to have seen such skirmishes 
between French and English nobles in terms of acquiring 
honour. His letter recounting the clash between English and 
French during an attempt to victual the fortress of Chatillon, 
for example, placed great emphasis on the prowess of nobles 
in individual clashes with enemy horse. He told how Mr.Marshall 
broke his mace "handily" on a Frenchman, how Edward Shelley 
broke his lance and captured a French gentleman, and, indeed, 
how all the gentlemen broke their lances. Surrey asked Henry 
to write letters of thanks to the gentlemen for these deeds, 
especially mentioning for praise "...Francis Aslebye, that
3hurt Mons.Doumaylie, brake his staff very honestly".
It may well have been the desire to win honour which 
prompted Howard to fight the battle of St.Etienne. According 
to Gruffydd, Howard went against the advice of some of his 
officers, who told him that battle was undesirable because
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of the poor state of the infantry. But his head and heart 
"...were swollen with pride, arrogance and empty confidence 
in his own unreasoning bravery...". And so he persuaded his 
captains to lead the infantry into battle, with the result 
that 22 gentlemen were killed in the first round of fire, 
more than in either of the two major battles of 1513.* 
According to Gruffydd, therefore, Surrey's pride and eagerness 
for glory appears to have resulted in a disaster that cost 
the lives of an unprecedented number of nobles, threw his 
army into chaos, nearly sacrificed Boulogne, and failed to 
prevent the enemy from reaching the castle that they had been 
sent to reinforce. Perhaps Howard's greatest mistake was 
that, unlike his uncle, he did not die at the head of his 
troops.
A noble who was more fortunate with his feats of 
arms during the wars of the 1540's was Sir John Wallop, who 
was given the Order of the Garter for his leadership of the 
English contingent in the invasion of France by Charles in
1543 .
This expedition had the usual appearance of a 
venture conducted largely for the benefit of the nobles, 
according to the report by Ralph Eure, who was a warden of 
the Marches during the following year. Eure wrote home that, 
while under constant and immediate threat from the French, 
the English and their allies amused themselves by running at 
the ring, a jousting exercise. Eure was able to report that 
the English gained the prize. The day after this feat, a 
Burgundian captain set out to win his spurs. He led a force 
of 400 Burgundian horse, 50 horse led by Sir Ralph Bulmer, 
and 600 foot against a village in which was quartered 100 
noble Italians. The English were eager to get the Italians'
/254 . . .
1. Gruffydd, ii, pp.39-41.
- 254 -
horoughbred horses, and made off with them during the 
attack, only to be chased back to the village by a force 
of 60 French cavalry. The Imperial horse fled, disordering 
their own footmen. But, as Eure proudly wrote, Bulmer and 
his men remained to fight it out, and although all but 4 
were hurt, none were lost dishonourably, and all deserved 
great praise.*
This was the atmosphere which seems to have 
prevailed during this expedition. When Wallop led a force 
of horsemen, archers, and arquebusiers to scour around 
Therouanne there were skirmishes but no decisive battle 
outside the walls of the refortified town.
The same night, after our camp was lodged, for 
tholde acquaynetance I had with the Captaine of 
Therwaine, I sent him a letter of visitacion, 
the copie wherof, and likewise his answerre 
therunto, I send your Lordshippes herewith. And 
theffect of my said letter was, that seyng he 
wold send owt no greter nombre to skymoche with 
us, if he had any gentlemen under his charge that 
wold breke any stave for theire ladis sake, I 
wold the next morning apoint 6 gentlemen to mete 
with them. Wherunto ereley in the morning he 
sent me a letter, that he had appointed 6 gentlemen 
to mete me by the waye, at 9 of the clocke, with 
certen condicions, as doth appere by hys said 
letter; which hower I kept, and observed the 
condicions accordingly. And those, I sent to 
runne against them by theire own requestes (saving
2 of myn own men), was Mr. Howard, Peter Carowe, 
Markeham, Chelley of Callais, with my 2 men 
Cawverley and Hall. And, by the reaport of those 
that did behold them, aswell strangers as others, 
they dyd runne well, and made very fayre courses.
As for Mr.Howard, at his furst course, brake hys 
staff in the myddes of the Frenchemans curayse, 
gallierdly; Markeham strake an other upon the 
hedpece, like to have overthowen him; Peter Carow 
also brake his staff very well, and had another 
broken on hym. Cawverley, my man, was preased to 
make the fairest courses of them all; yet by the
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yvill running out of a Frenchemans horse, that 
flede owt, strake hym under the arme pitt 
throughe the body, and persed his harnes in 
the backe, so as he is sooer hurte and in grete 
danger, not hable to be brought backe to our 
camp, but carryed to Thurwanne, where is he is 
well entreated; this morning haveing hard from 
thens, have some hope of his life; and the 
thing shall put hym most in danger is the gusset 
that is stryken into his body. I wold wische to 
God the next kynesman I have (not being my brother) 
had excused hym.l
This is a remarkable document in a number of ways, not least 
in that it is perhaps the earliest account written in English 
of the setting up of a feat of arms by the man who was 
responsible for the deed. And within it are contained the 
intimate records of the state of mind and the motivations 
of a man who was not only one of the most experienced 
soldiers and diplomats of the era, but also at this time the 
leader of an army. From his own account, he was concerned 
with the appearance of the actions of his men, anxious to be 
able to recount their deeds as being worthy of admiration.
His letter also shows the closeness of the caste of ruling 
warriors on either side during these wars, who were able to 
deal with each other in terms of their "...old acquaintance...". 
This particular aspect of Wallop's conduct might be compared 
with Henry's orders to Norfolk in the following year, ordering 
him to deal honourably with the commander of Montreuil 
because of their old acquaintance in arms.
And, above all, it indicates the way in which what 
might be classed as the realistic considerations of war could 
be suddenly laid aside to pursue the more theatrical aspects 
of war. Wallop was able to break off in the middle of a 
campaign - or perhaps, it might be said, began to act
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according to a different set of precepts - in order that he 
and his men could enjoy the kind of hazardous sport in which 
they engaged at court, and in which they could demonstrate 
their prowess. The day before the joust had seen the 
participants trying to kill each other outside the gates of 
Therouanne. On the day of the joust, the French were willing 
to extend their medical facilities to aid the wounded 
Englishman.
Wallop also apparently believed that the joust had 
considerable interest for his superiors at home, as it was 
reported in unusually lengthy detail, and his promotion to the 
Garter would indicate that his standing had not been damaged 
at court by his conduct.
The courtesy that surrounded the setting up of the 
jousts, the creation of an agreed set of rules that were 
carefully observed, the hospitality accorded to Calverley, 
is not the behaviour of men wanting victory by fair means or 
fould, but is, rather, the conduct of men who were governed 
by the consideration that certain types of behaviour in war 
were appropriate for the noble.
This instance, together with the death of Edward 
Howard, the challenge to James IV by Thomas Howard, and 
Surrey's rashness on the walls of Montreuil, can be comprehended 
if they are regarded as the results of a pattern of-belief 
that was shared by the military elite. They are consistent 
and make sense within the code of the elite. But if they are 
seen merely as isolated incidents that were the hangover of 
decadent and outdated chivalry, then they appear as the actions 
of a group of eccentrics and romantics who were holding on to 
an outmoded tradition that had no contact with reality.
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But, as has been indicated, such actions did 
have a significant effect on the contemporary world, even 
though the deeds were performed by only small groups of 
nobles. Because the noble was so important in warfare, and 
because he held the idea that his prestige as a warrior 
noble could be enhanced by certain behaviour, the lives of 
countless men and women were effected by the particular 




The concepts of the types of behaviour appropriate 
to their group which were held by the nobles had a profound 
significance for the way war was waged by the English during 
the early sixteenth century. The nobles were a military 
elite, and were recognised as such. As a military elite, 
certain types of behaviour became associated with the nobles. 
These were considered to be characteristic of members of 
their group. As well as such practices as elaborate displays 
of wealth and office while on expedition, these included 
traits such as extreme bravery in battle, a consciousness 
that as members of the elite, the nobles had special religious 
obligations during wartime, and particular rituals of sexual 
behaviour unique to the elite.
The kind of war in which all this took place was, by 
the standards of a later age, relatively crude, unscientific 
and traditionally minded. The typical kinds of noble behaviour 
contributed to this situation because nobles had other 
interests in war than simply in ensuring that campaigns were 
conducted efficiently. War was, from their point of view, 
the proper place to display their status and to improve or 
defend that status through honourable deeds in what was a 
fiercely competitive society where power and position was 
continually under challenge. It was of relatively minor 
concern that the forms that their displays took might often 
interfere with military efficiency.
The behaviour of nobles in war had widespread 
ramifications for military affairs in particular and for 
the condition of society as a whole. This was despite the 
nobles forming only a relatively insignificant proportion of 
the population, or, indeed, of the army. Their position as 
the main suppliers of troops, the key posts in royal 
administration and in the armed forces shared amongst noble
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families, their roles as heavy cavalry and as front line 
troops, and continual training for war in tournaments, 
meant that their importance in the army belied their small 
numbers. As a result of this dominance, their deeds of 
arms and their attitudes could affect the outcome of 
battles and even of entire campaigns, while their expenditure 
of large amounts of time, money and energy on the more 
elaborate forms of noble participation in war had a major 
influence on war because it diverted many of the resources 
of the armed forces to other than ends that the modern age 
might regard as practical.
At the same time, parts of the typical behaviour 
of members of the elite were concerned with those categories 
of activity that many writers, both contemporary and modern, 
have identified as chivalry. Most historians have claimed 
that what they have seen as chivalry was in a state of 
decadence at this time, without influence on reality, and 
hence, on the behaviour of nobles. They have arrived at 
this conclusion partly because they have been able to 
identify changes in noble behaviour over a lengthy period, 
and have categorised those changes as being signs of decline. 
But change is not necessarily the same as decay, and in any 
case, changes in institutions such as the tournament were 
continual from their inception. And, as has been indicated 
in considerations of aspects of the noble life such as the 
tournament and orders of knighthood, continually altering 
but traditionally derived institutions continued to perform 
important functions in Tudor society. This was because they 
helped to make up the forms of the typical behaviour of the 
military elite. And as essential aspects of noble behaviour 
they also helped to determine the nature of early Tudor 
warfare.
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But it was membership of the military elite, and 
conformity to the many facets of its lifestyle, rather than 
a rigid adherence to a code of chivalry, which was of most 
importance in shaping the usual behaviour of nobles. Those 
attributes and attitudes which might be called chivalric were 
merely a part - and not a particularly well defined part - of 
the noble lifestyle. If those kinds of behaviour that have 
often been labelled as chivalry are considered in this way, 
it is possible to avoid the rather limiting practice of 
having to understand noble attitudes and actions in terms of 
the decadence or continuity of chivalry as the main influence 
on noble life.
A NOTE ON THE APPENDICES
Appendices B-F have been constructed for three main
purposes:
a) To demonstrate that there was a social hierarchy in 
the methods of raising troops from the retinues of the nobility, 
with the peers tending to raise the largest bodies of soldiers, 
followed by the knights and then the squires-gentlemen. Usually 
there have been insufficient details to distinguish between the 
ranks of the latter category except in Appendix E . One aspect 
of the social structuring of troop recruitment which does emerge 
is the relative importance of the knights as a military group. 
Appendix C, for example, shows the knights - comprising only 
10.56% of all suppliers - providing 42.7% of the horsemen for 
the King's Ward in 1544.
b) To establish that the peers were a military aristrocracy 
by showing that an overwhelming majority took part in army 
activities in both 1513 and 1544.
c) To show that there appears to have been a link between 
court office, military service, and reward: see Appendix B . 
Section (a), for example, shows that a gentleman was more likely 
to be knighted during the 1513 expedition if he was also an 
office holder: section (b) shows that it was generally the 
gentlemen of the court who supplied the largest bodies of troops 
who were knighted in 1544. Unfortunately, I have been unable to 
establish any correlation between such rewards and actual deeds 
performed during the war, except in the case of the knights in 
section (a), who were rewarded for their fighting at the battle 
of Spurs.
KNIGHTED SUBSIDY COLLECTORS, 1512, 1514.
APPENDIX A
















Lincoln (includes Holland and 
Kesteven, listed separately in
1512) 4 5















Villa Salop. n.a. 1
Warwickshire 6 8
County or town 1512 1514
Worcestershire n.a. 1
Wiltshire 8 8
Yorkshire East Riding 8 7
West Riding 8 8
North Riding 5 5
209 208
n.a. = not available.
The overall decrease from 1512 to 1514 results from absence 
of figures from three areas, and the lack of any tendency to 
an increase over a period when mass knightings took place is 
probably due to the use of some kind of formula to decide how 
many knights should officiate in each shire.
There are some inaccuracies in the lists because of 
the omission of titles for some knights, such as Arthur 
Plantagenet, who was listed merely as a gentleman: my practice 
has been to count only those listed as knights, and to exclude 
peers, who are sometimes listed as knights. Both returns omit 
a number of regions such as Westmoreland, Cumberland, 
Northumberland and Cheshire, which had 16 knights in 1544.
The degree of accuracy of the returns is indicated, 
however, by Cornwall's study of several counties during the next 
decade. He shows that in 1524-5 Suffolk had 12 knights,
Sussex 8 and Buckinghamshire 3 in residence: the subsidy lists 
show 11, 9 and 2 in 1512 and 15, 8 and 3 in 1514 in the respecti 
counties. Although a knight did not necessarily have to be a 
resident to collect subsidies, common sense would probably mean 
that there was frequent appointment of local knights to collect 
money.
Sources :
Statutes of the Realm III 4 H.VIII c.19: 5 H.VIII c.17:
6 H.VIII c.26.
Cornwall, "Early Tudor Gentry", p.462; L.P. XIX ii(Appendix 8).
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17 peers 6,153 men





















































25 knights 3,314 men
Smallest retinue 54 men, largest retinue 500. 
b = created knight banneret after Spurs (52%) .
All these knights held some office from the Crown in 1513. 
Henry Guilford, for example, was bailiff of Sutton Coldfield, 
Henry Willoughby was Master of the Hunt at Sutton Park, Henry 
Wyatt was a privy councillor, and John Rainsford was a Knight 
of the Body.
1. Sir Adrian's son John accompanied him on the expedition 
with his own retinue of 50 men. L.P.I (3890).
OTHERS
number supplied
Edward Ferrers .. .. .. .. lOOxk
John Vere (later Earl of Oxford) .. 100k
G. Goghe and T. ap Glinn .. .. 120
T. Wolsey .. .. .. .. 200x
Will Compton .. .. .. .. 400xk
John (son of Lord Zouche) .. .. 102k
John (son of Lord Dudley) .. .. 200k 
Thomas West (son of
51Lord de la Warre)
W.Morgan .. .. .. .. 103xk
E.Bray .. .. .. .. 102
A.Hopton .. .. .. .. 103k
G. St.Leger .. .. .. .. 100k
T.Philips .. .. .. .. lOOxk
R.Egerton . . . . .. .. lOOxk
E.Belknap .. .. .. .. 200xk
E.Hungerford .. .. .. .. lOOxk
J.Mainwaring .. .. .. .. 100k
W.Ascue and . . . .  .. lOOxk(both) 
W.Hansard
J.Neville .. .. .. .. 30k
G.Fuljambe .. .. .. .. lOOx
John Fortescue .. .. .. .. 50x
W.Smythe .. .. .. .. 50xk
N.Barington .. .. .. .. 12k
Leynham . . . . . . . . 7
Walleden .. .. .. .. 13
27 gentlemen 2,649 men
Smallest retinue 7 men, largest retinue 400.
x = known office holder. Philips and Fuljambe for example were 
Squires of the Body. 69% of these were knighted.
K = knighted 1513 (66.6%).
John Marney is listed as having led a retinue of 800 men in the 
King's Ward. But his father, Sir Henry, was also appointed to 
the ward with 500 men. Presumable he was the actual leader of 
the retinue with John as his deputy, but because the records do 
not make this explicit they have both been omitted. John was 
a Squire of the Body and was knighted during the expedition.
Sources:
L.P.I (3886), (3890), (4306), (4307).
APPENDIX B
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Smallest retinue 40 men, largest 550.
KNIGHTS
number supplied
Richard Riche •• •• •• •• ^uu
Anthony Browne . • . . . . . . 400
John Gage •• .. .. .. 531
Anthony Wingfield .. . . . . 61
Thomas Henege •• .. . . . . 200
William Paget •• .. .. .. 55
Richard Long *• .. . . . . 180
Francis Bryan .. .. .. . . 200
Henry Knevitt •• . . .. .. 201
William Herbert . . .. .. . . 151
Richard Cromwell .. .. .. .. 160
Thomas Speke •• . . . . . . 2 31
Thomas Darcy .. .. .. .. 71
Richard Manners •• .. .. .. 201
Percival Hart . • .. .. .. 31
William Willoughby .. .. .. 71
William Musgrave .. .. .. .. 101
Anthony Kingston .. .. .. .. 400
William West .. .. .. .. 6
Thomas Jones .. .. .. .. 31
John Williams . . .. .. .. 40
Edmund Peckham .. .. .. .. Ill
William Penyson .. .. .. .. 101
Robert Acton .. .. .. .. 60
Richard Page .. .. .. .. 21
George Carew .. .. . . .. 220
Humphrey Ratcliffe . . . . . . 7
Gervase Clifton .. .. .. . . 50
Hugh Paulet .. . . . . . . 6
Edward Baynton .. .. .. .. 2 4
Clement Harleston . . . . . . 6
John Bridges .. .. .. .. 21
William Paston .. .. .. . . 10 
Richard Southwell..
John Bird
Anthony Hop ton . . • • . . • . 12 
John St Clo(?)
37 knights 4,171 men
Smallest retinue 6 men, largest retinue 531.
All except nine are listed in the returns as holding office at 




Philip Hoby .. .. .. .. 221k
Anthony Denny .. . . . . . . 121k
Maurice Berkeley .. . . . . .. 41k
Thomas Cawarden .. .. .. .. 251k
Thomas Paston .. .. .. .. 21k
William Sherington .. .. .. .. 21
John Gates .. .. .. .. 60
Dr. Buttes .. .. .. .. 36
Brian Brereton .. .. .. .. 101
Foster .. .. .. .. 20
Rogers .. . . .. .. 20
Edw.Hopton .. .. .. .. 20
Eustace Sulyerd .. .. .. .. 30
Thomas Gifford .. .. .. .. 21
Thomas Weldon .. . . . . .. 25
Ralph Vane .. . . . . .. 37k
Thomas Morgan .. .. .. .. 9 3k
George Harper .. .. .. .. 41
Thomas Johns .. .. . . .. 120
19 gentlemen 1,300 men
In addition to this there were another 23 3 gentlemen 
of the court who brought with them retinues of less than 20 men, 
usually about 10, a total of about 3,500 men.
k = knighted 1544. Other gentlemen of the main battle who were 
knighted at the same time, but who are not recorded to have 
brought 20 or more men were: William Blount (5), Edward Grey (3? 
and Robert Stafford (15?).
Largest retinue 251 men, smallest 1 man.
Sources:
L.P. XIX, i (273), (275); DNB.
APPENDIX C
HORSEMEN PROVIDED FOR KING'S WARD, 1544
Arranged according to
a) rank, i.e. peer, knight, gentleman,
b) whether supplier considered as a member of the court 




















Knights 107 ( 3.9%) 5 (1.8%) 6-121
Others 16 ( 0.6%) 2 (0.7%) 6 and 10
2,7142 274
1. Includes two sons of a peer, Lords Thomas and Edward Grey. 
Five members of the Privy Chamber and three Gentleman Pensioners, 
including Edward Grey, who have been counted amongst the other 
rank were amongst the 29 gentlemen knighted in France. Of these, 
several were amongst the largest suppliers of horsemen, 
including Philip Hoby (20), Denny (41), Barkeley (21),
Cawarden (51), Vane (31) and Paston (11), who in fact provided 
the six largest contingents of horsemen sent to the King's Ward 
by gentlemen.
2. A total of 3,159 horsemen were to be supplied for the Ward, 
leaving a discrepancy of 445 men. Some 323 court grooms and 
yeomen were to serve as horsemen: the 122 remaining cavalrymen 
possibly represents the retinue of Lord Herbert, who is recorded 
to have sent men, the number of which is unspecified.
Source:
L.P. XIX i (275).
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1544: MEN RAISED OUTSIDE THE COURT CIRCLE
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46 6-110 (average 29.5) 
1-31 (average 6.9)
These figures are made up from the returns of men available 
from gentry in the shires rather than at court. The rest of 
the Vanguard was made up of men supplied by the King, clerics 
and courtiers, such as 200 men supplied by Sir Richard Riche.
See Appendix B. Retinues available from knights were larger 
than those available from squires and other gentlemen in 60 per 
cent of the shires.
Figures for Lincolnshire and Leicestershire have been 
omitted because of lack of details. Additionally, returns from 
three towns, one bishop and one peer have been excluded, as they 
totalled only 170 men altogether.
Source:
L.P. XIX i (274).
APPENDIX E
RETINUES FOR SCOTTISH WAR, 1544.
(Returns of Musters from northern counties March 1544)
Supplier of Number Number of Ranae in size
Men supplied suppliers of retinues
YORKSHIRE
Peers 1,240 8 40-400
Towns 70 2 20 & 50
Knights 1, 390 20 20-300
Ladies 30 2 10 & 20
Squires 540 15 10-100
Clerics 10 1
Others 1, 140 55 10-200
BISHOPRIC OF DURHAM
Peers 450 4 50-200
Knights 320 5 20-150
Others 30 3 10
STAFFORDSHIRE
Knights 200 2 100
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE
Knights 250 5 20-100




Knights 1/080 9 50-200
Others 300 16 10-70
TOTALS
Peers 1, 790 13 40-400 (average
Towns 70 1
Knights 3,040 41 20-300 (74)
Ladies 30 2
Squires 540 15 10-100 (36)
Cleri cs 10 1
Others 1, 520 77 10-200 (20)
Yorkshire gentlemen knighted 1544: John and Robert Constable 
(? men supplied); Richard Chomley (100 men); Thomas Waterton 
(50 men); Thomas Malveray (40 men); Ralf Bulmer (100 with 





PEERS IN FRENCH AND SCOTTISH EXPEDITIONS,1513 




Edward of Buckingham 
Marquis
Thomas of Dorset 
Earls
Henry of Northumberland 
Thomas of Arundel 
Richard of Kent 
Henry of Essex 
Thomas of Derby 
George of Shrewsbury 
Henry of Wiltshire
Viscount
Charles Lord Lisle 
Barons
William Lord Willoughby 
George Lord Bergavenny 
Henry Lord Daubeney 
Thomas Lord Ros 
Charles Lord Herbert 
John Lord Berners 
Thomas Lord Darcy 
Thomas Fines Lord Dacre 
John Lord Curzon 
John Lord Cobham 
Edward Lord Dudley 
Thomas Lord Burford 
Edmund Lord Carew 
John Lord Audeley 
John Lord Zouche 























George Lord Hastings 
William Lord Mountjoy 
Robert Lord Broke 
Thomas Lord Dowcra 






Thomas of Surrey 
Barons
Thomas Lord Dacre of Nth 
Richard Lord Latimer 
Henry Lord Scrope 
Randulph Lord Ogle 






40 peers 9,12 4^
1. Includes Henry Earl of Devon who served only as a naval 
officer. Excludes John Earl of Oxford who had apparently not 
been created when the expedition began.
2. Excludes 1,500 men sent to Flodden by Northumberland and 
6,000 sent by Derby, as well as doubtful figures for Essex and 
Dacre.
Sources :
L.P. I ( 4070). (4237), (4306), (4307), (4360),- Chronicle of 
Calais y Hall, Henry VIII, I, pp.61 and 100; R. Reid, The King1s 
Council in the North (Longmans, London, 1921), p.20; Stone, 
Crisis of the Aristocracy, p.203; Rightly, Flodden, p.34.
APPENDIX F
(b)




Thomas of Norfolk . . . . . . . . . . . . 650*
Charles of Suffolk .. .. .. .. . . .. 550
Marquis
Henry of Dorset .. .. .. .. .. .. 350 
Earls
John of Oxford .. .. .. .. .. .. 500 (?)
Henry of Sussex .. .. . . .. .. .. 100
Henry of Arundel .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,300 (?)
William of Essex .. .. . . . . .. .. 751
Henry of Rutland .. .. .. .. .. .. 121(+)
Henry of Worcester .. .. . . .. . . .. 500
George of Huntingdon .. . . .. .. .. .. 200
John of Bath .. .. .. .. .. .. 106





Walter Lord Ferrers .. .. .. .. ' ..1,100
Charles Lord Mountjoy .. .. .. .. .. .. 140
Thomas Lord Wentworth .. .. .. .. .. .. 140
John Lord Latimer .. .. .. .. .. .. 100
John Lord Russell .. .. .. .. .. ..1,100
Thomas Lord Burghe .. . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 
Henry Lord Neville
Edward Lord Grey of Powys .. .. .. .. .. 120
William Lord Grey of Wilton .. .. .. .. .. 162
William Lord Windsor .. .. .. .. .. .. 120 
George Lord Cobham 












' 3Randulph of Westmoreland






2Edward Lord Clinton 
Thomas Lord Wharton 
William Lord Eure 
William Lord Stourton 
John Lord Scrope 
Thomas Lord Mounteagle 




441 peers 8,255 men
1. Men supplied in concert with his son Henry Earl of Surrey.
2. Served in both Scotland and France.
3. Supervised border defences during invasion of Scotland.
4. Excludes doubtful figures such as Hertford's retinue.
Retinues were also sent by the Earl of Essex (100) and John 
Lord Latimer (50) for the Scottish invasion.
There would appear to have been a slight proportional decline 
in the numbers of peers engaged in war. In 1513, there were 
about 47 peers and in 1544 there were about 54. But this may be 









to serve in 1544 due to age or infirmity; and gaps in the 
records. Thomas Lord de la Warr was once a keen soldier but 
was 78 in 1544. Other aged peers in 1544 were Richard Lord 
Lumley, John Lord Mordaunt and Henry Lord Morley, who was 
one of the few peers who did not engage in a military career. 
Thomas Lord Wriostheley, who was another non-military noble, 
remained in England to advise the Regent. Henry Lord Berkeley 
was aged ten in 1544, and Thomas Lord Sandys was also young. 
Records for the other peers are scanty. Some may have been 
in the field but unrecorded, such as Edward Earl of Derby, 
who had fought in Scotland in 1542 and who was asked for a 
loan for the 1544 war. Robert Lord Ogle, who was killed at 
the battle of Ancrum Moor in February 1545, is not recorded 
to have gone to Scotland, but he did lead raids against the 
Scots in mid-1544, so he has been included amongst the nobles 
at war. Gregory Lord Cromwell, for some unknown reason, 
was granted an exemption from war service. There are no 
details for John Touchett Lord Audley apart from a notice of 
assessment for soldiers to be supplied, or for John Lord Zouche, 
apart from a note suggesting that he was still in England in 
June: the same applies to Henry Earl of Bridgewater, and 
Nicholas Lord Vaux.
Sources:
Seymour Papers, p.5 8; Lodge, Illustrations of History, I,
(xxiii); Pollard, Tudor Tracts, pp.39-47; W.H.Dunham, "Lord
Hasting's Indentured Retainers 1461-1483", Connecticut Academy
of Arts and Sciences XXXIX (1955), p.108; L.P. XIX i (273),
(274), (275), (276), (532), (534), (1032), ii (340 grant 58), 














A Booke of Orders in the Warres by 
See and Land (c.1546) (British Museum 
Harley 309)
"The Rearguard 1544" (Public Records 
Office XIX i 276)
Acts of the Lords of Council in Public 
Affairs 1501-1554 ed. R.K.Hannay 
(H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, 
1932)
The Chronicles of Scotland Compiled 
by Hector Boece Translated into Scots 
by John Bellenden 1531 ed. E.C.
Batho and H.W.Husbands (Blackwood, 
Edinburgh, 1941)
The Tree of Battles of Honore Bonet 
(c.1387) ed. G.W.Coopland (University 
Press, Liverpool, 1949)
Two Missions of Jacques de la Brosse.
An Account of the Affairs of Scotland 
in the Year 1543 ed. G.Dickinson 
(Scottish History Society, Third Series, 
Vol.XXXVI)
The History of Scotland (c .1578) trans. 
J. Aikman (4 vols, Blackie et aT , 
Glasgow, 1827)
"Extracts from the Household Book of 
Edward Stafford, Duke of Buckingham", 
ed. J.Gage Archaeologia XXV ( 1833-4), 
pp.311-41
Le Jouvencel par Jean de Bueil (c.1450) 
ed.L.Lecestre (2 vols, Librairie 
Renouard, Paris, 1887)
Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts 
Existing in the Archives and Collection: 
of Milan ed. A.B.Hinds (His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London, 1912)
/2.
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State Papers , Relating to the
Negotiations Between England and
Spain, Preserved in the Archives at
Simancas and Elsewhere. Volume II.
Henry VIII 1509-1525 ed. G .A.Bergenroth 
et a l  (14 vols, Longmans, London, 
1866-1947)
Calendar of State Papers and Manuscript: 
Relating to English Affairs Existing in 
the Archives and Collections of Venice, 
and in other Libraries of Northern 
Italy ed. R.Brown (4 vols, Longman 
et al, London, 1867-73)
Castiglione, B The Book of the Courtier by Baldassare 
Castiglione trans. T.Hoby (Everyman's, 
London, 1937)
Cavendish, G. The Life of Cardinal Wolsey by 
George Cavendish His Gentleman Usher 
ed. S.W.Singer, second ed. (Harding 
and Lepard, London, 1827)
Caxton, W. Caxton's Book of Curtesye Printed at 
Westminster About 1477-8 A.D. ed.
F.J.Furnival1 (E.E.T.S., ES, no.3)
Caxton The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry. 
Translated and Printed by William 
Caxton From a French Version of Ramon 
Lull's "Le Libre Del Orde de 
Cavayleria" (c.1276) ed. A.T.P.Byles 
(E.E.T.S., no. 168)
Caxton The Prologues and Epilogues of William 




A Collection of State Papers Relating 
To Affairs in the Reigns of King Henry 
VIII, King Edward VI, Queen Mary and 
Queen Elizabeth from Year 1542 to 1570 
ed. S.Hayney (William Bowyer, London, 
1740)
Chalmers, D.(?) A Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland 
From Fergus the First to James the 
Sixth, in the Year M.DC.XI (Maitland 
Club, Edinburgh, 1830)
Chandos Herald The Life and Feats of Arms of Edward 
the Black Prince by Chandos Herald 
(c .1385) trans. F.Michel (Fotheringham, 
London, 1883)
The Chronicle of Calais, in the Reigns 
of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the Year 












de The Memoirs of Philip de Comines:
Containing the History of Lewis XI
and Charles VIII of France!; and of
Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy
(Whittaker, London, 1823)
Militarie Instructions for the 
Cavallrie (1632) (Da Capo, Amsterdam, 
1968)
"A Diary of the Expedition of 1544", 
ed. W.A.J.Archbold English Historical 
Review XVI (19 01), pp.503-7
The Tree of Commonwealth (1509) ed.
D.M. Brodie (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1948)
Maximilian's Triumphal Arch. Woodcuts 
by Albrecht Durer and Others (1515) 
ed. E.Chmelarz (Dover, New York, 1972)
The Chronicle and Political Papers of 
King Edward VI ed. W.K.Jordan (Cornell 
Press, New York, 1960)
English Historical Documents 1189-1327 
ed. H.Rothwell (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London, 1975)
English Historical Documents 1327-1485 
ed. A.R.Myers (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London, 1969)
English Historical Documents 1485-1558 
ed. C.H.Williams (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London, 1967)
The Complaint of Peace trans. T.Paynell 
(1559), (Da Capo, New York, 1973)
The Enchiridion of Erasmus (1503) trans. 
R.Himelick (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1963)
Erasmus' "Institutio Principis
Christiani" trans. P.E.Corbett (Sweet
and Maxwell, London, 1921)
"The History of William the Marshal" 
(c.1226) in English Historical 
Documents ed.H. Rothwell, pp.81-103
An Exact and Circumstantial History 
of the Battle of Flodden in Verse. 
Written About the Time of Elizabeth 











The Blazon of Gentrie: Devided Into 
Two Parts. The First Named the 
Glorie of Generositie. The Second 
Lacyes Nobilitie. Comprehending 
Discourses of Armes and of Gentry. 
Wherein is Treated of the Beginning, 
Partes and Degrees of Gentleness,
With Her Lawes: of the Bearing, and 
Blazon of Cote-armors: of the Lawes 
of Armes, and of Combats (1586) 
(Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Amsterdam,
1973)
Flodden Papers. Diplomatic 
Correspondence Between the Courts 
of France and Scotland 1507-1517 
ed. M.Wood (Scottish History Society, 
Vol.XX)
J. The Governance of England: Otherwise
Called the Difference Between an 
Absolute and a Limited Monarchy 
(1471-6) ed. C.Plummer (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1926)
Letters of Richard Fox 1486-1527 
ed. P.S. and H.M.Allen (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1929)
J. Lord Berners1 Translation of the
Chronicles of Froissart (1531)
ed. G.C.Macaulay (MacMillan, London,
1913)
». de The Unconguered Knight. A Chronicle
of the Deeds of Don Pero Nino Count 
of Buelna (c.1431-1449) trans. J.
Evans (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1928)
de "Narrative of the Visit of the Duke
de Najera to England, in the Year 
1543-4", Archaedlogia XXIII (1831), 
pp.344-57
"Account of Henry the Eighth's 
Expedition Into France, A.D. 1513", 
ArchaeoJpgia XXVI (1836), pp.475-8
, S . Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII .
Selection of Despatches Written by the 
Venetian Ambassador, Sebastian 
Giustinian, and Addressed to the 
Signory of Venice, January 12th 1515, 
to July 26th 1519 trans. R.Brown 










The Chronicle of John Hardynq.
Containing an Account of Public 
Transactions from the Earliest Period 
of English History to the Beginning 
of the Reign of King Edward the Fourth. 
Together with the Continuation by 
Richard Grafton, to the Thirty-fourth 
Year of King Henry the Eighth ed. H. 
Ellis (Rivington et al, London 1812)
The Great Chronicle of London ed.
A.H.Thomas and I.D.Thornley (G.W.Jones, 
London, 19 38)
!. "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier
1523", ed. M.B.Davies Bulletin of 
the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I 
University VI (19 4 4), pp.33-43
"The 'Enterprises' of Paris and 
Boulogne. A Contemporary Narrative", 
Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts XI 
(May 1949), pp.37-95
"Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550", 
Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts XII, i 
(May 1950), pp.1-90
Guy of Warwick (1525) ed. W.B.Todd 
(University of Texas Press, Austin,
1968)
Henry VIII ed. R. Grafton (1550), intr. 
C.Whibley (2 vols, T.C. and E.C.Jack, 
London, 1904)
The Hamilton Papers. Letters and 
Papers Illustrating the Political 
Relations of England and Scotland in 
the XVIth Century Formerly in the 
Possession of the Dukes of Hamilton Now 
in the British Museum ed.' J. Bain 
(2 vols, H.M.General Register House, 
Edinburgh, 1892)
The Pastime of Pleasure (1517) ed. 
W.E.Mead (E.E.T.S., no.173)
et al The Complaynt of Scotlande wyth ane
Exhortatione to the Thre Estaits to be 
Vigilante in the Deffens of their 
Public Veil (1549). With an Appendix 
of Contemporary English Tracts, viz.
The Just Declaration of Henry VIII 
(1542), The Exhortacion of James 
Harrysone, Scottisheman (1547), The 
Epistle of the Lord Protector Somerset 
(1548), The Epitome of Nicholas 
Bodrugan alias James (1548) ed.




Henry VIII The Letters of King Henry VIII ed. 
M.St.Clare Byrne (Cassell, London,
1936)
Henry VIII
Heywood, J . ( ?)
The Love Letters of Henry VIII ed.
H.Savage (Wingate, London, 1949)
Of Gentleness and Nobility (c.1535) 




Calendar of the Manuscripts of the 
Most Hon. the Marguis of Salisbury 
K.G. Preserved at Hatfield House, 
Hertfordshire (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London, 1883)
Hist.Man.Comm. Report on the Manuscripts of the Most 
Honourable the Marguess of Bath 
Preserved at Longleat Volume IV 




A Booke of the Travaile and Lief of 
Me, Thomas Hoby, Wt Diverse Things 
Woorth the Notinge ed. E.Powell 
(Camden, Third Series Vol.IV 
Miscellany Vol.10)
Holinshed's Chronicles of.England, 
Scotland and Ireland (6 vols, Johnson 
et al, London, 1807-8)
How They Lived, Volume II. An 
Anthology of Original Accounts Written 
Between 1485 and 1700 ed. M.Harrison 
and O.M.Royston (Blackwell, Exford, 
1965)
The Huguenot Wars ed.J.Coudy 
(Chilton, Philadelphia, 1969)
Illustrations of British History, 
Biography, and Manners, in the Reigns 
of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, 
Elizabeth & James I, Exhibited in a 
Series of Original Papers, Selected 
from the Mss, of the Noble Families of 
Howard, Talbot and Cecil, (1838) ed.
E. Lodge, second ed. (Gregg Internatio­
nal, Farnborough, 1969)
Illustrations of Scottish History from 
the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century 







Inventories of the Wardrobes, Plate, 
Chapel Stuff, etc. of Henry Fitzroy, 
Duke of Richmond, and of the Wardrobe 
Stuff at Baynard's Castle of Katharine, 
Princess Dowager ed. J.G.Nichols 
(Camden, First Series, Vol. LXI)
The Letters of James the Fourth 1505- 
1513 ed. R.K.Hannay (Scottish History 
Society, Third Series, Vol.XXXXV)
The Statesman's Book of John of 
Salisbury (c.1150) tr. J.Dickinson 
(Russell and Russell, New York, 1963)
Journals of the House of Lords,
Beginning Anno Primo Henrici Octavi 
Vol.I (Great Britain, Parliament,
London, 1836)
Knyghthode and Bataile. A XVth Century 
Verse Paraphrase of Flavius Vegetius 
Renatus Treatise "De Re Militari" ed. 
R.Dyboski and Z.M.Arend (E.E.T.S. no. 
2 0 1 )
The Historie of Scotland Wrytten First 
in Latin by the Most Reverend and Worths 
Jhone Leslie Bishop of Rosse and
Translated in Scottish by Father James
Dalrymple Religious in the Scottis
Cloister of Regensburg The Yeare of
God, 1596 ed. E.G.Cody and W.Murison
(2 vols, Johnson, New York, 1968)
"Extracts from the Household and Privy 
Purse Accounts of the Lestranges of 
Hunstanton, from A.D. 1519 to A.D. 
1578", ed. D.Gurney ArchaedJogia XXV 
( 1833-4) , pp. 411-569" ~
Letters and Papers, Foreign and 
Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII 
ed. j.s.Brewer et. al (37 vols, Longman 
et al, London, 1862-1932)
Letters and Papers Relating to the War 
With France, 1512-13 ed. A.Spont 
(Navy Records Society, London, 1897), 
Vol. X
The Lyfe of Sir Thomas More, Sometymes 
Lord Chancellor of England ed. E.V. 












"The Art of War" (1521) in Machiavelli: 
The Chief Works and Others tr. A. 
Gilbert (2 vols, Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1965)
The Diary of Henry Machyn, Citizen and 
Merchant-Taylor of London From A.D.
1550 to A.D. 1563 ed. J.G.Nichols 
(Camden, First Series, Vol.XLII)
Malory. Works (1485) ed. E.Vinaver, 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1971)
The Famous Historie of Chinon of 
England by Christopher Middleton to 
which is Added The Assertion of King 
Arthure Translated by Richard 
Robinson from Leland's Assertio 
Inclytittimi Arturii Together with 
the Latin Original (1544) ed. W.E.Mead 
(E.E.T.S., O.S., no.165)
Commentaires 1521-1576 ed. P.Courteault 
(Editions Gallimard, Bruges, 1964)
The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More ed. 
L.Bradner and C.A.Lynch (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953)
Utopia in The Complete Works of St. 
Thomas More ed. E.Surtz and J.H.Hexter 
(Yale Press, New Haven, 1965)
An Exhortation to Styre All Englvshemen 
To the Defence of Theyr Countreye (1539) 
(Da Capo Press, New York, 1972)
Original Letters of Eminent Literary 
Men of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Eightheenth Centuries ed. H.Ellis 
(Camden Society, O.S., Vol.XXIII)
Original Letters Illustrative of 
English History; Including Numerous 
Royal Letters: From Autographs in the 
British Museum, ed. Ellis, second ed.
(4 vols, Harding and Lepard, London, 
1828)
"Original Record of the Form of Public 
Entry of King Henry VIII into Tournay, 
After the Surrender in 1513, and the 
Notification, by Queen Catharine of 
Arragon, of the Birth of the Princess 
Mary, to the Municipal Authorities of 













The Compleat Gentleman (1622) (Da Capo 
Press, Amsterdam, 1968)
The Regulations and Establishment of 
the Household of Henry Algernon the 
Fifth Earl of Northumberland, At His 
Castles of Wresill and Lekinfield in 
Yorkshire, Begun Anno Domini MDXII 
ed. T.Percy (William Pickering, London, 
1827)
The Pylgrymage of Sir Richard Guylforde 
to the Holy Land, A.D. 1506 ed. H.Ellis 
(Camden, O.S., Vol.XLI)
The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of 
Chyvalrye (1408-9) trans. W.Caxton, 
ed. A.T.P. Byles (E.E.T.S., O.S., no. 
189)
All the Famous Battels That Have Been
Fought in Our Age (1578) (Da Capo
Press, Amsterdam, 1968)
Acts of the Privy Council of England.
New Series, Volume I A.D. 1542-1547
ed. J.R.Dasent (14 vols, Eyre and
Spottiswoode, London, 1890)
A Relation or Rather a True Account of 
the Island of England with Sundry 
Particulars of the Customs of these 
People and of the Royal Revenues Under 
King Henry the Seventh, About the Year 
1500 trans. C.A. Sneyd (Camden, O.S., 
Vol.XXXVII)
A Pathway to Military Practice (1587) 
(Da Capo Press, Amsterdam, 1969)
Rutland Papers. Original Documents 
Illustrative of the Courts and Times of 
Henry VII and Henry VIII ed. W.Jerdan 
(Camden, O.S., Vol.XXI)
Foedera (Hagae Comitis, 1739-45)




The Complete Poems of John Skelton






Bow versus Gun Being a Reprint of 
'Certain Discourses Written by Sir 
John Smythe, Knight; Concerning 
the Formes and Effects of Divers Sorts 
of Weapons' (1590).and 'A Breefe 
Discourse Concerning the Force and 
Effect of All Manuall Weapons of Fire, 
by Humphrey Barwick1 (1594) ed. E.G. 
Heath (E .P.Publishing, Wakefield, 1973!
A Source Book of Scottish History 
Volume Two 1424 to 1567 ed. W.C. 
Dickinson, G.Donaldson, I.A.Milne 
(Thomas Nelson, London, 1953)
Starkey, T.






England in the Reign of King Henry the 
Eighth ed. S.J.Herrtage (E.E.T.S.,
E.S., No. 12)
State Papers of King Henry the Eighth 
(11 vols, Public Records Office, 
London, 1832-50)
Statutes of the Realm (11 vols, House 
of Commons, London, 1810-22)
Two London Chronicles from the 
Collections of John Stow e d . C .L. 
Kingsford (Camden, Third Series, 
Miscellany, Vol.xil)
The Poems of Henry Howard, Earl of 
Surrey ed. F.M.Padelford (University 
of Washington Press, Seattle, 1920)
Syllabus (in English) of the 
Documents Relating to England and 
other Kingdoms Contained in the 
Collection Known as 'Rymer1 s Foedera' 
Vol.II 1377-1654 (Longman and Co., 
London, 1873)
Catalogue of the Arundel Castle 
Manuscripts Being the Muniments of 
His Grace the Duke of Norfolk Earl 
Marshal, K.G., with an Appendix 
Consisting of a Caldendar of Talbot 
Letters Part of the Bacon Frank 
Collection ed. R.Meredith (Sheffield 
City Libraries, Sheffield, 1965)
The First English Life of King Henry 
the Fifth Written in 1513 by an 
Anonymous Author Known Commonly as the 
Translator of Livius (1513) ed. C.L. 




Tudor Royal Proclamations Volume 1 
The Early Tudors (1485-1553) ed.
P.L.Hughes and J.F.Larkin (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1964)
Tudor Tracts 1532-1588 ed. A.F.Pollard 
(Archibald Constable, Westminster,
1903)
Vergil, P. The Anqlica Historia of Polydore Vergil
A.D. 1485-1537 ed. D.Hay (Camden, Third 
Series, Vol.LXXXIV)
Vitalis, O. The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic 
Vitalis (1075-c.1142) trans. M.Chibnall 
(5 vols, Clarendon, Oxford, 1969)
Vives, J.L. Tudor Schoolboy Life. The Dialogues of 
Juan Luis Vives trans. F.Watson, second 
ed. (Cass, London, 1970)
Williams, R. The Works of Sir Roger Williams (1590) 
ed. J.X.Evans (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1972)
Wills From Doctors' Commons. A 
Selection From the Wills of Eminent 
Persons Proved in the Prerogative Court 
of Canterbury 1495-1695 ed. J.G.Nichols, 
and J.Bruce (Camden, O.S., LXXXIII)
Wilson, T. The State of England (1600) ed.
F.J.Fisher (Camden, Third Series, 
Vol.LII)
Wolf, R. The Late Expedition in Scotland Made by 
the King's Highness' Army, Under the 
Conduct of the Right Honourable the 
Earl of Hertford, the Year of Our Lord 
God 1544 in Tudor Tracts.
Wriostheley, C A Chronicle of England During the 
Reigns of the Tudors from A.D. 1485 
to 1559 by Charles Wriostheley, Windsor 
Herald ed. W.D.Hamilton (Camden,
Second Series, Vols XI and XX)
Worde, W. de The Manner of the Triumph at Calais 




Adams, R.P. The Better Part of Valor, More,
Erasmus, Colet, and Vives, on Humanism, 
War, and Peace, 1496-1535 (University 
of Washington Press, Seattle, 1962)
Perhaps places too much emphasis on the influence of humanists
on sixteenth century attitudes to war.
Allmand, C.T.(ed.) War, Literature, and Politics in the
Late Middle Ages (Liverpool University 
Press, Liverpool, 1976)
Anderson, W. Castles of Europe. From Charlemagne to
the Renaissance (Random House, New York
1970) ....
Anglo, S.(intr.) The Great Tournament Roll of Westminstei
A Collotype Reproduction of the 
Manuscript (2 vols, Clarendon, Oxford,
1968)
Most important aspect of these volumes is Anglo's stimulating
interpretation of the function and role of tournaments.
Anglo Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor
Policy (Clarendon, Oxford, 1969)
An expansion of the previous study.
Anstruther, G. Vaux of Harrowden, A Recusant Family
second ed. (R.H.Johns, Newport, 1953)
Detailed account of Nicholas Lord Vaux and his family.
Bainton, R.H. Christian Attitudes Toward War and
Peace (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 
1961)
Extensive detail on humanist ideas about war.
Baldwin Smith, L. Henry VIII. The Mask of Royalty
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1971)
Barber, R. The Knight and Chivalry (Cardinal,
London, 1974)
Attempts a new interpretation which distinguishes between the
knights as a social class and chivalry as an ideal.
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Barnie, J. War in Medieval Society. Social
Values and the Hundred Years War 
1337-99 (Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
London, 19 74)
Studies the mind and outlook of the English during the 
fourteenth century from literary sources. Refutes the idea 
of a chivalric decline.
Baroja, J.C. "Honour and Shame: A Historical
Account of Several Conflicts", trans. 
R.Johnson, in Honour and Shame ed.
J.G.Peristiany, pp.81-137
Examines honour in several historical contexts.
Bayley, C.C. War and Society in Renaissance
Florence (University of Toronto Press, 
Canada, 1961)
Bean, J.M.W. The Decline of English Feudalism 1215-
1540 (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 19 68)
Sees the feudal system as essentially legal-economic rather than 
military.
Bean The Estates of the Percy Family 1416-
1537 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1958)
Questions accepted ideas about the fluctuation of Percy fortunes.
Beeler, J.H. Warfare in Feudal Europe 730-1200
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
1971)
A revisionist treatment of military history.
Belloc, H. Warfare in England (Thornton
Butterworth, London, 1912)
Does not mention the sixteenth century.
Berger, P.L., The Homeless Mind. Modernization and
B.Berger and Consciousness (Penguin, Harmondsworth,
H.Kellner 1973)
Posits the idea of a divorce between modern man and 
institutions with the consequent decline of the concept of 
honour.




Blair, C. European Armour. Circa 1066 to Circa
1700 (Batsford, London, 1972)
Bottomore, T.B. Elites and Society (C.A.Watts, London,
1964)
Shares similar limitations with other studies of elites listed 
hereunder, as well as studies of sex roles: it is confined 










The Elizabethan Militia 1558-1638 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967'
War Studies from Psychology, Sociology, 
Anthropology (Basic Books, New York,
1964)
A History of the House of Percy from 
the Earliest Times down to the Present 
Century (2 vols, Freemantle, London, 
1902)
"The Courtier in Early Tudor Society, 
Illustrated from Select Examples",
(Ph.D. thesis, London, 1963)
The Two Sieges of Rhodes. 1480-1522 
(John Murray, London, 19 69)
Considerable information on sixteenth century siege tactics.
Bruce, J. "An Outline of the History of the Court






The Civilization of the Renaissance in 
Italy (1860) ed. I.Gordon (New 
American Library, New York, 1960)
A Genealogical History of the Dormant, 
Abeyant, Forfeited and Extinct 
Peerages of the British Empire (1883) 
(Harrison, London, 1962)
Economy and Society in Early Modern 
Europe. Essays from Annales (Harper 
and Row, New York, 197 2)
Venice and Amsterdam. A Study of 
Seventeenth-century Elites (Temple 
Smith, London, 19 74)
Employs two models of elites.
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Byles, A.T.P. "Medieval Courtesy Books and the
Prose Romances of Chivalry", in 
Chivalry ed. E.Prestage, pp.183-206
Cartellieri, 0. The Court of Burgundy. Studies in the
History of Civilization trans. M.Letts 
(Kegan Paul et al, Hertford, 1929)
Dominated by Huizinga's thesis.
Caspari, F. Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor
England (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1954)
Discusses the replacement of chivalry but has no clear
formulation of what chivalry was when it was replaced.
Chambers, R.W. Thomas More (Jonathan Cape, London,
1948)
Chapman, H.W. Two Tudor Portraits, Henry Howard,
Earl of Surrey and Lady Katherine Grey 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1960)
Treats Surrey as an anachronism.
Cipolla, C.M. Before the Industrial Revolution.
European Society and Economy, 1000- 
1700 (Methuen, London, 19 76)
Clayton, M.(ed.) Catalogue of Rubbings of Brasses and
Incised Slabs, second ed.(H.M.S.O., 
London, 1968)
Cliffe, J.T. The Yorkshire Gentry from the
Reformation to the Civil War (Athlone 
Press, London, 1969)
Mainly seventeenth century.
Cockayne, G.E. The Complete Peerage of England,
Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and 
the United Kingdom ed. V.Gibbs, second 
ed. (St.Catherine Press, London, 1910)
Colie, R.L. "Johan Huizinga and the Task of
Cultural History", American Historical 
Review LXIX (1964), pp.607-31
Provides an essential critique of Huizinga's work.
Coltman Clephan, R. "The Military Handgun of the
Sixteenth Century", Archaeological 
Journal LXVII, Second Series, XVII 
(1910), pp.109-51
Questions the efficiency of sixteenth century gunpowder weapons.
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Colvin, H.M. "Castles and Government in Tudor
England", The English Historical Review 
LXXXIII (1968), pp.225-34
Claims that the Tudors had a policy of deliberate neglect of 
castles.
Cooper King, C. The Story of The British Army (Methuen,
London, 1897)
Does not mention wars of Henry VIII.
Cornwall, J. "The Early Tudor Gentry", Economic
History Review XVII, Second Series 
(1964-5), pp.456-475
Surveys gentry in five counties to identify who they were and 
their circumstances.
Crane, R.S. The Vogue of Medieval Chivalric
Romance During the English Renaissance 
(Collegiate Press, Wisconsin, 1919)
Demonstrates the popularity of romances into the seventeenth 
century.
Cripps-Day, F.H. The History of the Tournament in
England and in France (Bernard Quariteh 
London, 1918)
The most extensive history of tournaments yet published.
Cruickshank, C.G. Army Royal. Henry VIII1s Invasion
of France, 1513 (Clarendon, Oxford,
1969)
With the work listed below, the only detailed examination of 
early Tudor war. Contains a narrative account of the war with 
chapters on administration, organization, field operations and 
supply. Details not always accurate.
Cruickshank The English Occupation of Tournai
1513-19 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1971)
A continuation of the previous book.
Cruickshank "King Henry VIII's Army" History
Today XVIII (1968), pp.852-57 and
XIX (1969), pp.40-5
Dahl, R .A. "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model",
American Political Science Review 
LII (1958), i, pp.463-69
Critical of the lack of quantification in most studies of elites.
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Davenport Adams, W.H. Battle Stories from British and
European History (Swann Sonnenschein, 
London, 1882)
Davies, C.S.L. "Provisions for Armies, 1509-60; A
Study in the Effectiveness of Early 
Tudor Government", Economic History 
Review Second Series, XVII, ii (Dec. 
19 64), pp.234-48








"Feudal Society in the Thirteenth 
Century: The Knights", Hi story 
XXVIII (Sep.1943), pp.107-19
"The Tournament in the Thirteenth 
Century" in Studies in Medieval 
History, ed. Hunt, Pantin and Southern
Pendennis and St.Mawes Castles 
(H.M.S.O., London, 1975)
English Government Finance 1485-1641 
sec.ed. (2 vols, Frank Cass, London,
1964)
The Broad Stone of Honour: or the 
True Sense and Practice of History. 
Morus and Tancredus (Longmans et al , 
London, 1826-8)
A confusing work which equates chivalry with medieval Roman 
Catholi ci sm.
Dugdale, W. A Perfect Copy of All Summons of the
Nobility to the Great Councils and 
Parliaments of This Realm from the 
xlix of King Henry H i d  Until These 
Present Times (Robert Clavell, London, 
1685)
Dunham, W.H. "Lord Hastings' Indentured Retainers
1461-1483. The Lawfulness of Livery 
and Retaining Under the Yorkists and 
Tudors", The Connecticut Academy of 
Arts and Sciences New Haven XXXXIX 
(1955), pp.1-75
Sees retaining as an improvement on feudal practice.









The Practice of History (University 
Press, Sydney, 1967)
The Tudor Revolution in Government. 
Administrative Changes in the Reign of 
Henry VIII (University Press, Cambridge 
1953)
"The Replacement of the Longbow by 
Firearms in the English Army", 
Technology and Culture VI, iii (1965), 
pp.38 2-9 4
The Flowering of the Middle Ages (Thame: 
and Hudson, London, 1966)
The Male Machine (McGraw Hill, New York 
19 74)




"Sensibility and History: How to 
Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the 
Past", in A New Kind of History, From 
the Writings of Febvre ed. P.Burke 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973)
The Indian Summer of English Chivalry. 
Studios in the Decline and 
Transformation of Chivalric Idealism 
(Duke University Press, Durham, 1960)
Essays on chivalric ideology rather than practice. 
Ferguson, W.K. The Renaissance in Historical Thought. 
Five Centuries of Interpretation 
(Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1948)
Contains a critique of Huizinga. 
Ffoulkes, C. The Armourer and His Craft From the 
XIth to the XVIth Century (1912) 
(Benjamin Blom, New York, 1967)
Essential for a study of medieval armour.
Fortescue, J.W. A History of the British Army. First 
Part - To the Close of the Seven Years 
War (3 vols, MacMillan, London, 1899)
Comparatively superficial on Henry VIII. 




Fowler, K. (ed.) The Hundred Years War (MacMillan, Londot
1971)
Friedman, R.C., Sex Differences in Behaviour (John
R.M.Richart and Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974)
R.L.Vandewiele (eds.)
Froude, J.A. History of England From the Fall of
Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish 
Armada (12 vols, Longmans, London,
1892)
Gautier, L. La Chevalrie (Victor Palme, Paris,
1884)
The most extensive examination yet of chivalry but limited by 
Gautier's belief that chivalry was the lifestyle of the 
Christian soldier.
Giono, J. The Battle of Pavia 24th February
1525 trans. A.E.Murch (Peter Owen, 
London, 196 5)
Emphasises the importance of concepts such as honour in early 
sixteenth century war.
Gombrich E. In Search of -Cultural History
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1969)
Contains critiques of Burckhardt, Hegel and Huizinga.
Goring, J.J. "The Dress of the English Soldier in
the Early Tudor Period", Journal of 
the Society.for Army Historical Researcl 
XXXIII (1955), pp.136-38
Goring "The Military Obligations of the
English People 1511-1558", (Ph.D., 
London, 1955)
Establishes the conservative nature of recruiting methods.
Goring "Social Change and Military Decline in
Mid-Tudor England", History LX (1975), 
pp.185-97
Grace, F.R. "The Life and Career of Thomas Howard
(1473-15 54)", (M .A., University of 
Nottingham, 1962)
Sees the Howards as representative of the "new men" of the 
Tudor age.
Greenhill, F.A. Incised Effigial Slabs. A Study of
Engraved Stone Memorials c.1100 to 




Gush, G. Renaissance Armies 1480-1650 (Patrick 
Stephens, Cambridge, 1975)
Not a scholarly work but contains the most comprehensive survey 

















The Art of War in Renaissance England 
(Folger Shakespeare Library, 
Washington, 1961)
Renaissance Fortification Art or
Engineering? (Thames and Hudson, 
Norwich, 1977)
"Sixteenth Century Explanations of 
War and Violence", Past and Present 
LII (1971), pp.3-26.
"War and Public Opinion in the 
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", 
Past and Present XXII (1962), pp.18-32
Renaissance Europe 1480-1520 (Collins, 
London, 1971)
Charles de Bourbon. High Constable of 
France. "The Great Condottiere" 
(Bodley Head, London, 1911)
Maximilian the Dreamer. Holy Roman 
Emperor 1459-1519 (Stanley, Paul and 
Co., London, 1913)
"The Knight and the Knight's Fee in 
England", Past and Present XLIX (1970), 
pp.3- 4 4
"Chivalry and Its Place in History", in 
Chivalry ed. Prestage, pp.1-33
The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol.II 
trans. F.P.B. Osmaston (Bell and Sons, 
London, 1920)
Contains a section on chivalry.
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Herbert, Edward Autobiography and History of England
Lord of Cherbury Under Henry VIII (1649) (Ward Lock and
Co., London, 1888)
Hewitt, H.J. "The Organisation of the War", in
The Hundred Years War ed. K.Fowler
Contains details of the social composition of armies.
Hexter, J.H. "The Education of the Aristocracy in
the Renaissance", Journal of Modern 
History XXII, i (1950), pp.1-20
Hexter "Storm Over the Gentry", in
Reappraisals in History (Longmans, 
London, 1961)
Higham, R.(ed.) A Guide to the Sources of British
Military History (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1971)
The only bibliography of military history in English but
should be used in conjunction with general bibliographies.
Hindley, G. Medieval Warfare (Wayland, London, 1971)
Hinton, D.A. Alfred's Kingdom, Wessex and the
South 800-1500 (Book Club Associates, 
London, 197 7)
An archeological study of architectural remains.
Hogrefe, P. The Life and Times of Sir Thomas Elvot,
Englishman (Iowa University Press,
Ames, 1967)
Some information on rural gentry.
Huizinga, J. "The Task of Cultural History", (1926)
in Men and Ideas, History, The Middle 
Ages, The Renaissance trans. J.S.Holmes 
and H. van Marie (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London, 1960), pp.17-76
Indirectly attacks some of his own work.
Huizinga "The Political and Military Significance
of Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle 
Ages", (1921) in Men and Ideas
Huizinga
Study of the Forms of Life, Thought,
and Art in France and the Netherlands
in the Fourteenth and Fi fteenth




Hunt, R.W ., W.A.
Pantin and
R.W.Southern (eds.)
Hunter Blair, C.H. 
and H.L.Honeyman




Studies in Medieval History Presented 
to Frederick Maurice Powieke(Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1948)
Norham Castle, Northumberland (H.M.S.O. 
London, i972)
Warkworth Castle, Northumberland 
(H.M.S.O., London, 19 54)
Letters on Chivalry and Romance (1762) 
ed. H.Trowbridge (William Andrews 
Clark Memorial Library, Los Angeles, 
1963)
"The Revival of Feudalism in Early 
Tudor England", Hi story XXXVII (1952), 
pp.131-4 5
James,
Concerned with the revival of claims to wardship by the Tudors.
Innes, A.D. Ten Tudor Statesmen (Eveleigh Nash,
London, 19 06)
Has a section on Somerset.
James, M.E. Family Lineage and Civil Society. A
Study of Society, Politics and 
Mentality in the Durham Region, 
1500-1640 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1974)
"Obedience and Dissent in Henrician 
England: The Lincolnshire Rebellion 
1536", Past and Present XLVIII (1970), 
pp.3-79
"Military Elites and the Study of 
War", in War Studies from Psychology, 
Sociology, Anthropology ed. L.Bramson 
and G .W .Goethals, pp.337-51
Contains an introduction to theories of military elites.
Jones, T. "A Welsh Chronicler in Tudor England".
The Welsh History Review I (1960-63), 
pp.1-18
Janowitz, M.
History of Ellis Gruffydd. 
Keen, M.H. "Chivalry, Nobility and the Man-at-Arms 
in War, Literature, and Politics ed.
C.T.Allmand, pp.32-45
Suggests that one of the reasons for the medieval failure to 
control war was the idealism to war and the soldier contained 
in the ethic of chivalry.
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Keen The Laws of War in the Late Middle
Ages (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1965)
Demonstrates the need to comprehend noble war from a contemporary 
viewpoint.
Kightly, C. Flodden. The Anglo-Scottish War of
1513 (Allmark, London, 1975)
Most recent account available. Lacks scholarly apparatus.
Kilgour, R.L. The Decline of Chivalrv as Shown in
the French Literature of the Late 
Middle Ages (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass., 1937)
One of only two works in English devoted to a study of the 
decline of chivalry. It is dominated by Huizinga's thesis, 
and is frequently weak in logic.
Koch, H.W. Medieval Warfare (Bison, London, 1978)
Includes the seventeenth century.
Lander, J.R. Conflict and Stability in Fifteenth
Century England (Hutchinson, London,
1969)
Revi sionist.
Lasswell, H.D., The Comparative Study of Elites. An
D.Lerner and Introduction and Bibliography (Stanford
C.E.Rothwell University Press, Stanford, 1954)
Lee, S.(ed.) Dictionary of National Biography
second ed. (22 vols, Smith, Elder and 
Co., London, 1908)
Leonard, H.H. "Knights and Knighthood in Tudor
England", (Ph.D., London,- 1970)
An exhaustive statistical analysis of the composition of Tudor 
knighthood but almost completely ignores their military role.
Liu, J.J.Y. The Chinese Knight Errant (University
of Chicago Press, London, 1967)
Contains comparisons between Chinese soldiers of fortune and 
European knights.
Loomis, R.S. "Edward I, Arthurian Enthusiast",
Speculum XXVIII (1953), pp.114-25
Maccoby, E.E. The Psychology of Sex Differences




McFarlane, K.B. The Nobility of Later Medieval England
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1973)
Mackie, J.D. The Earlier Tudors 1485-1558
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952)
Mackie, R.L. King James IV of Scotland. A Brief
Survey of His Life and Times (Oliver 
and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1958)
McKisack, M. The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1971)
Macklin, H.W. The Brasses of England (1907) (E.P.
Publishing, Wakef.ield, 1975)
Macivor, I. The Fortifications of Berwick-upon-
Tweed (H.M.S.O., London, 1972)
Mallett, .M. Mercenaries and their Masters:
Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Bodley 
Head, London, 1974)
Questions many of the cliches of Renaissance warfare of the
kind propagated by Machiavelli.
Mathew, D. The Courtiers of Henry VIII (Eyre and
Spottiswoode, London, 1970)
Too brief to permit extensive analysis of character or career.
Mattingly, G. Catherine of Aragon (Jonathan Cape,
London, 19 71)
Some detail on the 1513 war.
Merton, R. "Manifest and Latent Function", in
Social Theory and Social Structure 
revised ed. (Free Press, Glencoe,
1957) pp.19-84
A lengthy critique of functionalist interpretation.
Miller, H. ' "The Early Tudor Peerage 1485-1547",
(M . A. , London, 1950)
Emphasises the essential stability of the nobility, as compared
to other eras.
Miller "The Early Tudor Peerage, 1485-1547",
Institute of Historical Research 
Bulletin XXIV (1951), pp.88-90
Summary of thesis.
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Miller "Subsidy Assessments of the Peerage
in the Sixteenth Century", Institute 
of Historical Research Bulletin
XXVIII (1955), pp.15-34
Indicates some difficulties of measuring incomes of nobles.
Mills, C. The History of Chivalry or Knighthood
and Its Times (2 vols, Longman et al, 
London, 1825)
Moyer, K.£. "Sex Differences in Aggression", in
Sex Differences in Behaviour ed. 
Friedman et al, pp.335-72
Mainly concerned with biological determinants of sexual
behaviour rather than social influences.
Nef, J.U. War and Human Progress c.1494-1640.
An Essay on the Rise of Industrial 
Civilization (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London, 1950)
Tries to explain the northward shift of European economic
power as due to the influence of military operations.
Nichols, F.M. "On Feudal and Obligatory Knighthood",
ArchaeologLa XXXIX (1863) , pp. 189-224
Still a standard article.
Oman, C.W.C. The Art of War in the Middle Ages
A.D. 378-1515 (1885) ed. J.H.Beeler 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
1973)
The essay from which the two following works originated.
Oman A History of the Art of War in the
Middle Ages revised ed. (2 vols, Burt 
Franklin, New York, 1924)-
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Accession of the House of Stuart to 
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1797)
"Honour and Social Status", in Honour 
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Discusses theories of honour as they existed in various eras. 
Pollard, A.F. Henry VIII new ed. (Longmans, Green 
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Medieval England new ed. (2 vols, 
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"The English Aristocracy and the War", 
in The Hundred Years War ed. K.Fowler, 
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Illustrate Its Historical Significance 
and Civilizing Influence by Members of 
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1066-1945 second ed. (Seeley Service, 
London, 19 67)
Considerable detail on sixteenth century cavalry 
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Schlight, J. Monarchs and Mercenaries. A
Reappraisal of the Importance of Knight 
Service in Norman and Early Angevin 
England (Conference on British Studies, 
Connecticut, 1968)
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Schumpeter, J.A. "Social Classes in an Ethnically
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Imperialism and Social Classes trans'.
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Scott, W. "An Essay on Chivalry" (1818), in 
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Sh'aw, W . A. The Knights of England. A Complete 
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and Ireland, and of Knights Bachelors 
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Shellabarger, S The Chevalier Bayard: A Study in 
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Shineberg, D. "Guns and Men in Melanesia", Journal of 
Pacific History VI (1971)-, pp.61-82
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envi ronment.
Simpson, W.D. "Bastard Feudalism and the Later 
Castles", The Antiguaries Journal 
XXVI (1946), pp.144-71
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Smail, R.C. "Art of War", in Medieval England ed.
A.L. Poole, Vol.I, pp.128-68
Many similarities to Schlight's work.
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Squibb, G.D. The High Court of Chivalry. A Study
of the Civil Law in England (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1959)
Overturns assumptions such as the idea that the court was 
moribund during the sixteenth century.
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"Warfare in Sixteenth Century England", 
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"The Rise of the Gentry 1558-1640", 
Economic History Review XI (1941), 
pp.1-38
Spanish and Portugese Romances of 
Chivalry. The Revival of the Romance 
of Chivalry in the Spanish Peninsula, 
and its Extension and Influence Abroad 
(University Press, Cambridge, 1920)
Demonstrates the influence of Iberian romances in sixteenth 
century England.
Titow, J.Z. English Rural Society 1200-1350
(George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969)
Trench, C.C. "Horsemanship in History", History
Today XX (1970), pp.771-81
Begins with the sixteenth century.
Trevor-Roper, H.R. "The Gentry 1540-1640" Economic
History Review Supplement I (1953)
Trivick, H. The Picture Book of Brasses in Gilt
(John Baker, London, 1971)
Usherwood, S. "Honi Soit Qui Mal Y Pense, 1585",
History Today XXVIII (1978), pp.53-8
Attitudes to chivalric orders, late sixteenth century.
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Vale, M.G.A. "New Techniques and Old Ideals: The 
Impact of Artillery on War and Chivalry 
at the End of the Hundred Years War", 
in War, Literature and Politics ed.
C.T. Allmand, pp.56-72
had no significant effect on chivalric 
fifteenth century.
"Review of Ferguson's Indian Summer of 
English Chivalry", History XLVI (1961), 
p.136.
Spotless and Fearless. The Story of the 
Chevalier Bayard From the French of the 
Loyal Servant, M.de Berville and others 
(Sampson et .al, London, 1868)
The Honourable Artillery Company 
1537-1947 second ed. (Gale and Polden, 
Hampshire, 1954)
"Some Aspects of Warfare in Melanesia", 
Oceania (1930), pp.5-32
Antient Funeral Monuments of Great
Britain, Ireland, and the Islands
Adjacent (1631) (W.Tooke, London,
1767)
Before the Armada. The Growth of 
English Foreign Policy 1485-1588 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1966)
Sculpture in Britain 1530-1830 
(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964)
Henry VIII and His Court (Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1971)
"The English, Irish and Scotch Knights 
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The Age of Chivalry, Manners and Morals 
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chivalry.
ADDITIONAL NOTE
A monograph that arrived too late to be included in the 
argument of the thesis is M. Keen's "Huizinga, Kilgour 
and the Decline of Chivalry", Medievalia et Humanistica 8 
(1977) , pp.1-20.
